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TRADE LIBERALISATION AND 
MANUFACTURING IN BOLIVIA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Growth of Trade Liberalisation in Latin America 
The past decade in Latin America has seen sweeping changes in economic 
policies. Previously protected economies with highly interventionist govern-
ments have been opened up to foreign competition and have reduced the role of 
the state through cuts in government expenditure and extensive privatisation. 
This worldwide trend, which has been strongly supported by the multilateral 
agencies, has been particularly marked in Latin America. 
The context of these policy reversals is the aftermath of the debt crisis of the 
early 1980s which brought to a head the growing disillusion with the import 
substituting industrialisation strategies which had characterised the region since 
the 1950s. The drying up of private commercial bank loans to the region left it 
vulnerable to the insistence of the IMF and the World Bank on a major shift in 
policy. This coincided with increased domestic recognition of the limitations of 
import substitution and growing awareness of the success of the export oriented 
industrialisation strategies of the East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries 
(NICs). 
Table 1.1: Overview of Trade Liberalisation in Latin America 
Maximum Tariff Quantitative Restriction3 
Start of Initial Year End 1992 Initial Year Post 
Liberalisation (%) (%) (%) Reform 
Argentina 1989 65 30 60 4 
Bolivia 1985 150 10 90 2 
Brazil 1990 105 35 34 1 
Colombia 1990 100 20 93 14 
Costa Rica 1986 100 27 1 1 
Chile 1985 35 11 0 0 
Ecuador 1985 290 35 38 15 
Mexico 1985 100 20 38 2 
Peru 1990 108 25 100 5 
Uruguay 1983 75 45 0 0 
Venezuela 1989 135 20 65 10 
Note: a Coverage of quantitative restrictions either as a percent of total imports or of total 
tariff code items. 
Sources: Agosin and Ffrench-Davis (1993), Table 1; IMF (1992), Tables 11 and 13. 
The main elements of the policy reforms which have taken place in Latin 
American can be enumerated under three main headings. First, there has been 
a shift to more outward-oriented policies, characterised by sweeping reductions 
in both tariff and non-tariff barriers and more competitive real exchange rates. 
Although Argentina, Chile and Uruguay had embarked on trade liberalisation 
under the military regimes of the 1970s, the latest phase in trade liberalisation 
began in the mid-eighties when Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador and Chile (again) 
began to reduce barriers, closely followed by Costa Rica (see Table 1.1). By the 
1990s these were all classified by the IMF as 'open economies' while other 
Latin American countries which began to liberalise slightly later were 
considered 'relatively open'. 
Secondly, there has been considerable liberalisation of domestic markets in 
many Latin American countries. This has been most widespread in the case of 
financial markets where a combination of reduced inflation and deregulation has 
led to positive real interest rates often at very high levels (Griffith-Jones et al, 
1994, Table 3.7). There have been changes in the labour market in a number of 
countries which have made it easier for employers to hire and fire workers. 
Product markets have also been liberalised with removal of price controls and 
elimination of government subsidies both acting to reduce government induced 
price 'distortions'. 
Finally there has been a radical change in the economic role of the state in 
most Latin American economies. Budget deficits have been reduced or 
eliminated in most countries in the 1990s through a combination of cuts in 
expenditure and in some cases tax reforms which increased government 
revenue. Tax revenues have been supplemented by the sale of public enterprises, 
with Chile, Mexico and Argentina taking the lead (see Table 1.2) 
Advocates of liberalisation claim that there is now clear evidence that the 
economic situation in Latin America is turning around after the 'lost decade' of 
the 1980s. Rates of inflation have been brought down; a decade after the debt 
crisis broke, capital is again flowing in to the region; and growth is picking up 
(The Economist, 26 November 1994, pp. 73-7). 
Does this indicate that the changes in policy which the Latin American 
countries introduced have been successful and that the region is about to embark 
on a period of rapid and sustained economic growth? In order to establish this, 
it is necessary to examine the ways in which changes in policy have indeed 
contributed to an improvement in economic performance. In the absence of such 
an analysis, it might be claimed that improved performance is merely a 
reflection of the additional resources which have been made available to 
countries as a reward for adopting liberalisation policies, rather than being a 
result of the policies themselves. 
Table 1.2: Value of Privatisation Transactions in Latin America, 1985-1992 (mn.US$) 
Amount 
Argentina 10,791 
Bolivia 4 
Brazil 3,998 
Colombia 876 
Chile 1,345 
Mexico 22,671 
Peru 267 
Venezuela 2,314 
Source: Devlin (1994), Table 7.3; Bolivian figure includes privatisation in first half of 1993 
(author's investigation). 
The time is therefore ripe for detailed studies of the impact of various policy 
reforms on the Latin American economies. The present Research Paper seeks 
to contribute to such an analysis by focusing on the impact of one of the key 
reforms - trade liberalisation - on the Bolivian economy, and particularly on the 
manufacturing sector, in the belief that it is only by such empirical studies that 
it is possible to move beyond the a priori claims of neo-classical economic 
theory on the one hand, and the generalised condemnation of structural 
adjustment often found amongst the critics on the other. 
The Choice of Case Study 
Why Bolivia? 
The choice of Bolivia as a case study may at first sight appear strange. It would 
perhaps have been more obvious to have selected a larger country such as 
Mexico, or a better known example such as Chile. Much of the discussion of 
trade liberalisation in Latin America has focused on these two cases. 
However, neither Mexico with its long border with the United States and its 
large domestic market, nor Chile with its highly urbanised and relatively well-
educated population, are typical of Latin America, and even less of the Third 
World as a whole. In contrast, Bolivia's income level and human resource 
development is closer to that of sub-Saharan Africa and some Asian countries. 
It is possible, therefore, that its experience has more in common with that of 
other low income countries than do the semi-industrialised Latin American 
countries. 
Many of the problems of market failure which development economists have 
long used to justify state intervention and protection are particularly acute in 
Bolivia. The domestic market is limited, with a total population of only 6 
million, many of whom in the rural areas participate only marginally as 
consumers. The industrial sector is small and technologically backward. Much 
of the population is illiterate and educational indices are low. In addition, 
Bolivia is a landlocked country, with an inadequate internal transport infrastruc-
ture. There are strong grounds for questioning the sufficiency of liberalisation 
policies as a means of promoting economic growth under such conditions. 
Conversely, if it can be shown that 'market friendly' policies have worked in 
Bolivia, then this could well provide lessons for other low income countries. 
A second reason for selecting Bolivia as a case study is the radical nature of 
the trade reform which was introduced there in 1985. The maximum tariff level 
has been reduced from 150% to 10% and quantitative restrictions (QRs) on 
imports totally eliminated. Within the first year of trade liberalisation, tariffs 
were brought down to below 20% and most QRs removed, a process which took 
three or four years in Chile and Mexico (Meller, 1992, Table 6.1). 
In view of the significance of the Bolivian experience, it is surprising that it 
has not been more extensively studied. The short term stabilisation policies 
introduced in 1985 have indeed received considerable attention outside Bolivia, 
and have been hailed as an example of successful orthodox stabilisation. 
However, the changes in trade policy and the longer term success of structural 
adjustment have received relatively little attention. 
Why Trade Liberalisation? 
The decision to focus on trade liberalisation, as opposed to other changes in 
economic policy, was based on two considerations. First, there is a wealth of 
theoretical and empirical literature which discusses the relative merits of 
outward as opposed to inward-oriented trade policies, and the expected gains to 
be achieved through trade liberalisation. This makes it possible to formulate 
quite precise hypotheses which can be tested in the Bolivian case (see Sections 
IV-VI). 
Secondly, the measures taken to liberalise trade were very central to the 
policy reforms carried out in Bolivia. Some other measures, such as the 
elimination of the fiscal deficit and the launching of privatisation, played a less 
significant role and came much later. Others, such as the changes in labour 
legislation and liberalisation of the domestic capital market, were introduced at 
the same time as trade was liberalised and these are touched upon at various 
points in the study; however, the central focus remains the impact of trade 
liberalisation. 
Why Manufacturing? 
A final decision was to focus the study on the impact of trade liberalisation on 
the manufacturing sector. Historically this has always been a relatively small 
sector of the Bolivian economy compared to minerals and hydrocarbons which 
have dominated (legal) exports and agriculture which has been the major source 
of employment. However, sustained economic growth in Bolivia and increased 
levels of employment can only be achieved with a dynamic manufacturing 
sector. While in the short term, income levels may be increased by an expansion 
of mineral exports, these will not be able to provide employment possibilities for 
the bulk of the population because of its relatively capital-intensive nature, while 
the ability of agriculture to absorb labour is also severely constrained as is 
reflected in the growing trend to migrate to the urban areas. The impact of trade 
liberalisation on manufacturing, therefore, is seen as being central to Bolivia's 
economic prospects. 
Background to the Bolivian Trade Liberalisation 
The adoption of the New Economic Policy (NEP) by the Movimiento Nacional 
Revolucionario (MNR) government headed by President Paz Estenssoro in 
August 1985 marked the end of a phase in Bolivian economic policy which 
began with the 1952 Revolution that brought Paz Estenssoro and the MNR to 
power for the first time. 
The 1952 Revolution broke the power of the traditional oligarchy through the 
nationalisation of the tin mines, which formed the backbone of the Bolivian 
economy and the land reform which abolished feudal relations and expropriated 
the large landowners of the Altiplano. Through the tin nationalisation, it gave 
the state a central role in the economy, controlling the bulk of the country's 
exports and a significant part of the investible surplus. 
However, despite these revolutionary measures, key features of the Bolivian 
economy remained unchanged. The income levels of the bulk of the Bolivian 
peasantry remained low so that they constituted only a very limited market for 
manufactured goods. The economic structure therefore changed very little and 
this was reflected in exports which continued to rely overwhelmingly on primary 
commodities, mainly tin and, increasingly, oil and gas.1 
Despite the state's control over these key export sectors, surpluses were not 
channelled into productive investment and government finances were never 
adequate to fund a high level of public investment. In the 1950s and 1960s 
Bolivia depended partly on aid flows from the USA. In the 1970s, as in other 
Latin American countries, Bolivia's foreign borrowing grew rapidly, although 
compared to other Latin American countries a much higher proportion was in 
the form of bilateral and multilateral government loans. 
The first half of the 1980s was a period of severe economic crisis in Bolivia. 
Capital inflows, which had sustained the boom of the 1970s, declined sharply, 
while repayments continued to increase. The United States stopped providing aid 
to Bolivia during the dictatorship of General Garcia Meza, and other foreign 
loans dried up as a result of the international debt crisis. Consequently, between 
1982 and 1985, there was a substantial net transfer of resources, equivalent to 
about 3.5% of GDP from Bolivia to its foreign creditors (Morales, 1988, p.27). 
The economic crisis was characterised by falling GDP, rising unemployment, 
a growing budget deficit, a deteriorating balance of payments situation and 
accelerating inflation (see Table 1.3). It was accompanied by considerable 
political instability and increased social mobilisation reflected in strikes and 
demonstrations (Dunkerley, 1990). 
Table 1.3; Key Economic Indicators, 1980-1985 
GDP Budget Balance of 
Growth Unemployment Deficit Payments Inflation 
(% p.a.) (%) (% GDP) a (US$ mn)b (% p.a.)c 
1980 -1.4 5.8 7.8 321.3 47.2 
1981 0.9 9.7 6.9 -129.2 32.1 
1982 -4.4 10.5 15.2 -43.5 123.5 
1983 -4.5 14.2 18.7 -101.2 275.6 
1984 -0.6 15.1 25.1 -37.7 1,281.4 
1985 -1.0 18.0 10.1 -373.6 11,749.6 
Notes: a Consolidated Non-financial Public Sector Deficit 
b Balance on Current and Long-Term Capital Account 
c Change in Consumer Price Index 
Sources: Muller & Asociados (1992); World Bank (1991) 
Between 1980 and 1985 GDP fell by more than 10% and GDP per capita by 
almost a fifth. Open unemployment more than tripled and inflation accelerated 
to hyperinflationary levels unprecedented in any country in peace time. The 
public sector deficit spiralled until it accounted for a quarter of Bolivia's GDP 
in 1984, and the balance of payments was consistently in the red. 
The crisis can be seen as the culmination of the Bolivian strategy of state 
capitalism with indebted industrialisation. The model was unable to generate 
either the fiscal revenues or the export earnings which would have made it 
sustainable. When the new inflows of capital began to dry up at the end of the 
1970s, the need to transfer resources abroad became pressing. Successive 
governments attempted to introduce stabilisation packages during the early 
1980s, but none of these lasted. 
Economic conditions deteriorated further and the fiscal deficit increased with 
rising inflation. As different groups attempted to maintain their income, while 
the overall size of the cake shrank, political and social conflicts intensified. 
External difficulties were further intensified by the deteriorating terms of trade. 
In 1984 payments to foreign creditors were suspended due to a lack of funds, 
and in 1985 the government was forced to bring forward the elections as 
inflation accelerated. 
The New Economic Policy2 
The Paz Estenssoro Government which came to power in August 1985 
immediately introduced a combined stabilisation and structural adjustment 
package known as the New Economic Policy. This involved an orthodox 
stabilisation policy (in sharp contrast to the heterodox policies adopted by other 
Latin American countries at around the same time) and extensive economic 
reforms. 
The Main Policy Measures 
In order to bring inflation under control, the government adopted a sharply 
contractionary fiscal and monetary policy, cutting government employment by 
ten per cent, freezing wages in the public sector, and halting public investment 
for a year. Government revenues were increased by raising petrol prices to 
international levels and increasing the tariffs of public utilities. 
In addition, the foreign exchange market was unified with the introduction of 
a single floating exchange rate, resulting in an immediate devaluation of 93% 
and the virtual elimination of the black market premium. Restrictions on inflows 
and outflows of foreign capital were also removed. 
The longer term structural adjustment components of the NEP, in line with 
those introduced elsewhere in Latin America, had three major pillars - a shift 
to a more outward-oriented economy; liberalisation of domestic markets; and 
a reduction in the role of the state (Aguirre et al, 1992, pp. 28-35). 
In order to bring about a more outward-oriented economy, virtually all 
quantitative restrictions and non-tariff barriers were eliminated and tariffs 
reduced significantly (see Section III below for further details). Subsequently, 
in 1987, a new tax incentive for exports was created. The new exchange rate 
system, which has been characterised as a 'dirty float', was also designed to 
encourage greater openness by maintaining a relatively stable real exchange rate 
and avoiding extreme levels of overvaluation which had characterised the pre-
1985 period. 
The domestic capital, labour and goods markets were also liberalised. Key 
elements of the reform package included deregulation of the domestic financial 
system and freeing of interest rates. Similarly in the labour market, employment 
protection for workers was reduced and wage indexation eliminated. A further 
step was taken towards a market economy through the deregulation of most 
prices, particularly agricultural prices, and the removal of subsidies. 
The role of the state in the economy was reduced through cuts in government 
expenditure and the sacking of workers in state enterprises, particularly the state 
mining company, COMIBOL, where three quarters of the labour force was 
dismissed. Privatisation efforts, however, were slow to get off the ground. 
As a first step, the Bolivian Development Corporation was broken up and its 
productive enterprises handed over to the Regional Development Corporations. 
However, when the new Sanchez de Losada government took office in 1993, 
very few state firms had been privatised. 
These measures were seen as representing a decisive break with the state 
capitalist model that had characterised Bolivian economic development since 
1952. The intention was that in the future, market forces should play the key 
role in determining the allocation of resources. 
Impact of the NEP 
The success of the New Economic Policy in stabilising the economy was quite 
remarkable. By 1987 the annual rate of inflation had been brought down to less 
than 20% and the public sector deficit was reduced to under five per cent of 
GDP by the late 1980s. 
The economy has become significantly more outward-oriented than it was in 
the first half of the 1980s or indeed in the late 1970s before the economic 
crisis.3 The index of openness increased sharply in 1986 and rose again in the 
early 1990s (see Table 1.4). 
The clearest indicator of the impact of domestic liberalisation can be seen in 
the capital markets. Real interest rates, which were negative during the mid-
eighties, rose to high positive levels from 1987 onwards (see Table 1.4). 
There is also evidence that liberalisation has led to greater flexibility in the 
labour market. The value of the minimum wage in the late 1980s was about a 
third of its level in the early 1980s in real terms (Afcha et al, 1992, Table A-6). 
As a result, average industrial incomes in the late 1980s were five times the 
minimum wage (Montano and Villegas, 1993, Table IV-18) suggesting that 
minimum wage legislation had little impact on wages. There was also a 
significant increase in the proportion of the labour force employed on temporary 
contracts (Montano and Villegas, 1993, Table IV-21). 
Distortions in the goods market were reduced by trade liberalisation and the 
removal of price controls and subsidies. The low and uniform level of protection 
in Bolivia by the late 1980s ensured that most prices were close to, or below, 
international levels. 
Finally, the size of the state sector has been substantially reduced compared 
to the early 1980s. The share of public expenditure in GDP fell from over 40% 
in the first half of the decade to just over a quarter in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (see Table 1.4). This was paralleled by a significant reduction in public 
sector employment (Arauco, 1988). 
Table 1.4: Indicators of Liberalisation, 1980-91 
Openness 
(% GDP)a 
Real Interest Rate 
(% p.a.) 
Public Sector 
Expenditure (% GDP) 
1980 45.8 3.2 48.3 
1981 49.6 5.5 38.9 
1982 44.1 -63.4 49.4 
1983 44.4 -60.6 43.3 
1984 46.9 -88.7 46.0 
1985 48.5 -96.0 23.9 
1986 57.4 -0.1 22.9 
1987 56.7 29.4 24.1 
1988 52.0 14.9 27.8 
1989 54.9 19.6 27.6 
1990 60.0 17.8 27.8 
1991 62.3 20.4 29.1 
Notes: 
Source: 
a (Exports + Imports)/GDP at constant 1980 prices. 
Author's elaboration from INE (1992a), UDAPE (1992b), World Bank (1991). 
By the late 1980s, therefore, the key elements of the New Economic Policy 
had already had a major effect on the Bolivian economy. Inflation had been 
brought under control, the economy was opened up to foreign competition and 
becoming more outward-oriented, domestic markets had been liberalised, and 
the role of the state in the economy cut back. Despite the elections in 1989, 
which saw the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) candidate, 
Jaime Paz Zamora, elected President, the main elements of the NEP were 
maintained by the new government. 
In spite of the success of stabilisation and the implementation of the major 
structural reforms, some aspects of the policy have given grounds for concern. 
Critics have pointed to some of the social costs of adjustment reflected in 
declining real wages, high levels of unemployment and cuts in social expendi-
ture (NACLA, 1991). 
Another key area of concern has been how to move from stabilisation to a 
reactivation of the economy (Morales, 1989). It is here that the structural 
adjustment measures should have a major impact. However, the level of 
investment, particularly private investment, in Bolivia has remained stubbornly 
low and this has been reflected in relatively low rates of economic growth. The 
balance of payments situation has also remained a problem, and improvements 
have reflected changes in the capital account rather than a major turn around in 
trade performance. 
It seems opportune, therefore, to consider the role which trade liberalisation 
has played in Bolivia's economic reform programme. Before doing so, however, 
the next section considers the ways in which theoretical analysis has suggested 
that trade reform can lead to improved economic performance, and the existing 
empirical evidence which bears on this question. 
II: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
TRADE LIBERALISATION 
Introduction 
The advocacy of trade liberalisation in developing countries emerged largely 
from a disillusion with previous strategies of import-substituting industrialis-
ation and a belief in the superiority of outward-oriented trade strategies. A 
number of empirical studies have supported the claim that countries adopting 
outward-oriented policies have performed better than those which pursued 
inward-oriented policies (see Edwards, 1993, for a review of these studies). The 
World Bank has been to the fore in arguing the case for outward-orientation (see 
for example World Bank, 1987, Ch.5; World Bank, 1991, Ch. 5). However 
such generalised claims for the superiority of outward-orientation have been 
challenged on a number of grounds, including the need to differentiate between 
countries at different levels of development and according to whether external 
conditions are favourable or not (cf. Singer, 1988; Gray and Singer, 1988; 
Evans, 1991). 
Before embarking on a discussion of trade policy, it is important to have a 
clear definition of outward-orientation and of trade liberalisation. For some 
writers, outward-orientation is seen simply as having policies which are not 
inward-oriented i.e. do not provide incentives for production for the domestic 
market. However, as Bhagwati (1988) has pointed out, it is possible to 
distinguish between export promotion, where production for the domestic and 
export markets receive equal protection, and ultra-export promotion where there 
is a positive bias in favour of exports. Even this threefold classification is 
oversimplistic since it assumes that all goods are tradable. When non-tradables 
are introduced it is possible that production of tradables both for the domestic 
and external market can be promoted simultaneously (or simultaneously 
discriminated against), giving rise to a five-fold classification (Liang, 1992). 
Finally, particular combinations of incentives can be achieved in different ways. 
Neutrality between exports and domestic sales may be the result of free trade or 
of protection with export incentives. Thus, it is possible to generate a continuum 
of different strategies (Bradford, 1990). 
While trade liberalisation might be defined as a move towards a more 
outward-oriented regime, the concept of outward orientation itself is somewhat 
ambiguous. The recent major comparative study by the World Bank defines 
trade liberalisation as 
'any act that would make the trade regime more neutral - nearer to a trade 
system free of government intervention' (Michaely et al, 1991, p. 17). 
As Greenaway (1993) points out, this combines two conceptions of liberal-
isation: a move towards neutrality between the domestic and export market, and 
a move to free trade. 
This is particularly problematic in multi-country studies, where ambiguity in 
defining what constitutes liberalisation makes it extremely difficult to compare 
experiences. It is less of a problem in an individual country case study, where 
it is the direction of policy change that is at issue rather than the extent of 
liberalisation. 
For the purpose of the present study, therefore, trade liberalisation is 
identified with a reduction in the extent of quantitative restrictions on imports, 
and a reduction in the level and dispersion of the Effective Rate of Protection 
(both between different activities and between different markets). This restricts 
trade liberalisation to measures affecting trade policy instruments, so that 
exchange rate policies are not regarded as part of trade liberalisation. 
Perspectives on Trade Liberalisation 
The Neo-Liberal Case for Trade Liberalisation 
The traditional case for trade liberalisation is based on comparative advantage. 
Third World countries have, it is argued, adopted protectionist policies (both 
tariff and non-tariff barriers) which have led to an inefficient allocation of 
resources, distorting their production structures from the optimum which would 
have existed under free trade. Trade liberalisation is therefore essential so that 
these countries can realise their true comparative advantage. 
However, the advocates of trade liberalisation are not content to rest their 
case merely on static considerations of allocative efficiency in a perfectly 
competitive economy. It is argued that the gains from liberalisation will be 
greater when there are increasing returns to scale or where production is 
dominated by a small number of producers. Furthermore, there may also be 
dynamic long-term gains from trade liberalisation, as a result of the links 
between trade policies and growth of GDP, exports or productivity (World 
Bank, 1991, p.98). Liberalisation, it is further argued, will reduce the degree 
of unproductive rent-seeking associated with state intervention, and improve 
income distribution by increasing employment through the expansion of labour-
intensive industries. 
Neo-structuralist Critiques 
While the theoretical arguments underlying the static case for free trade are well 
established (although not uncontroversial), the other arguments for liberalisation 
are less firmly based theoretically. The introduction of increasing returns to 
scale and/or imperfect competition can give rise to situations in which trade 
liberalisation leads to losses rather than gains, depending on which sectors 
expand and which contract when trade is liberalised (Devarajan and Rodrik, 
1989). 
In any case, the main arguments for intervention in the development literature 
have always been couched in dynamic terms, as in the case of the Prebisch-
Singer thesis on the deteriorating terms of trade or the infant industry argument, 
rather than in terms of static resource allocation. The growing literature on the 
development of technological capabilities in the Third World has strengthened 
the arguments for infant industry protection by highlighting the importance of 
productivity gains through learning (Pack, 1991). 
The dynamic links that neo-liberals seek to establish between trade policies 
and growth in GDP, exports or productivity are not well grounded theoretically. 
Reviewing these arguments, Taylor (1991, p. 119) concludes that, 
'the case for a positive association between trade liberalisation and 
economic performance as measured by growth is prima facie difficult to 
make, and is not supported by cross-sectional or time-series evidence'. 
The central concern of the critics is that trade liberalisation will tend to reinforce 
an international division of labour which is inimical to long-run growth, 
particularly in low income developing countries. As Amsden points out, 'The 
more backward the country, the harsher the justice meted out by market forces' 
(Amsden, 1989, p. 13). One aspect of this is that, because of a low level of 
productivity, less developed countries are at an absolute disadvantage vis-a-vis 
the developed countries, in all but a small number of commodities, so that. 
'in free trade the absolute disadvantage of the underdeveloped capitalist 
country will result in chronic trade deficits and mounting international 
borrowing. It will be chronically in deficit and chronically in debt' 
(Shaikh, 1979, p.226). 
As Taylor (1991) and Rodrik (1991) have shown, it is possible to develop 
theoretical models in which trade liberalisation has a negative effect on growth, 
with reasonably plausible technical and institutional assumptions. A common 
feature of these models is the importance of demand as an incentive for firms to 
invest, and some notion of a process of cumulative causation. This provides a 
basis for selective, targeted intervention via trade policy. 
Empirical Evidence 
The a priori arguments for trade liberalisation are by no means conclusive. 
Many of the leading advocates of liberalisation therefore rest their case heavily 
on empirical evidence. The evidence linking trade orientation and economic 
performance has already been mentioned above. Here we shall consider studies 
which focus specifically on the impact of trade liberalisation. 
The effects of trade liberalisation have been analysed using a number of 
different methodologies. The most commonly nsed have been: 
- 'before/after' studies which compare the performance of countries 
before and after the introduction of trade reform; 
- 'with/without' studies which compare the performance of countries 
which use trade reform with a control group which did not; 
- simulation modelling which compares performance with a hypothetical 
outcome without trade reform. 
Each of these approaches is subject to limitations. 'Before/after' studies cannot 
distinguish between the effects of trade reform and other changes which occur 
simultaneously, and implicitly assume that pre-reform policies would otherwise 
have been maintained. 'With/without' studies assume that conditions other than 
trade policy are similar in the two groups of countries, but since trade reform 
is usually accompanied by additional financial resources or other policy 
changes, this is problematic. Moreover, countries undertaking trade reform 
cannot be assumed to constitute a random sample of developing countries. 
Finally, the outcome of simulation exercises depends crucially on the assump-
tions built into the model being used and therefore tell us more about the 
specification of the model than the outcome of trade reform. It also assumes that 
the key parameters of the model are not changed as a result of the reforms. 
(i) 'Before/After' Studies 
The most comprehensive study of this kind is the World Bank sponsored 
study by Michaely et al (1991). It concluded that liberalisation tended to 
accelerate growth and improve the balance of payments. An earlier multi-
country study by Krueger (1978) failed to find any significant direct 
relationship between changes in a country's trade regime and growth 
performance. 
(ii) 'With/Without' Studies 
A number of studies compare the performance of countries which have 
implemented trade reforms with a control group of countries which have 
not. Frequently this is combined with a type of 'before/after' approach by 
looking at changes in relative performance compared to the period before 
trade reform was introduced. These studies have tended to show an 
improvement in the balance of payments position, no clear-cut picture in 
terms of growth and a worsening in terms of investment (Greenaway and 
Milner, 1993, Ch.13). Some studies do show a significant improvement in 
terms of growth in countries undertaking trade reform relative to those 
which do not, but this may be attributable to the worse initial performance 
of the reformers (Thomas, 1991). 
A rather different type of econometric study by Clarke and Kirkpatrick 
(1991), using pooled data for 80 countries during the 1980s, concluded that 
trade reform had no significant impact on economic performance. 
(iii) Simulation Exercises 
A number of such exercises have attempted to illustrate the impact of trade 
liberalisation (e.g. Condon and de Melo, 1991; Rodrik, 1988; Devarajan 
and Rodrik, 1989). These have generally shown that there are gains from 
liberalisation, but this depends on the assumptions made concerning firm 
behaviour, entry and exit and the cost conditions. 
The evidence from all these studies, therefore, is by no means clear in 
establishing a link between trade liberalisation and economic performance. The 
World Bank has recently adopted a somewhat cautious tone, stating that 
'the difficulties in isolating the impact of trade policies per se and 
establishing causality suggest that the debate is not fully resolved' (World 
Bank, 1991, Box 5.3, emphasis in the original). 
In addition to the lack of unambiguous results, the multi-country studies 
reviewed suffer from a number of weaknesses. If, as has been suggested, the 
effects of trade liberalisation hinge significantly on technological and institu-
tional factors, then a case-by-case approach may be necessary in order to take 
these factors into account. Cross-section analysis of multi-country data sets may 
contain so much 'noise' that it is hardly surprising that statistically significant 
relationships often fail to emerge. 
Where country case studies have been drawn upon in such studies these have 
mainly involved middle-income countries (cf. Krueger, 1978; Michaely et al, 
1991). Structuralist arguments which emphasise the narrow range of commodi-
ties in which an underdeveloped country has an absolute advantage, and 
problems of supply bottlenecks and resource immobility, may be more acute in 
the least developed countries than in middle-income countries. 
A second weakness of many of these studies is a failure to analyse empirically 
the mechanisms through which trade liberalisation is meant to affect economic 
performance. Both 'before/after' and 'with/without' studies focus on differences 
in performance outcomes, compared either to the pre-reform situation or the 
control group. As was pointed out above, a weakness of these approaches is 
their assumption that the key difference between the two situations is the 
difference in trade policy. In practice however, whether one adopts a 
'before/after' or 'with/without' approach, there are likely to be other factors 
which also affect performance, so that it may be illegitimate to attribute the 
change in performance entirely, or even mainly, to trade liberalisation. 
In this context it is important to identify the mechanisms through which trade 
reform affects economic performance. It is surprising that these linkages are not 
given more attention in the literature. Empirical studies seem to adopt a 'black 
box' approach to the ways in which trade liberalisation affects economic 
performance. However, in view of the conflicting theoretical approaches to 
liberalisation and the ambiguous empirical evidence, there is a strong case for 
giving more attention to these linkages. In the remainder of this section, 
therefore, three of the most important effects of trade liberalisation, on resource 
allocation, productivity and exports, will be examined in more detail. 
Trade Liberalisation and Resource Allocation 
Theoretical Arguments 
The effects of trade liberalisation on resource allocation will be discussed first 
of all in the context of a simple two-good model, before later introducing a third 
non-traded good. In the two-good case, liberalisation leads, under certain 
assumptions, to a shift along the production possibility curve to a new 
equilibrium in which more of the exportable and less of the import-competing 
good is produced. Among the key assumptions on which this conclusion is based 
are that factors of production are mobile between different activities, and that 
resources are fully employed. 
If factors of production are not fully mobile, there may still be gains from 
trade, although these will be less than when resources are totally mobile. If, 
however, the assumption of full employment is relaxed, production may shift to 
a point inside the production possibility frontier and trade may lead to losses. 
Thus, if trade liberalisation is to lead to gains for the country concerned, it is 
vital that resources which are released from import-competing activities should 
be reabsorbed in export activities. 
A further complication arises where, as is generally the case, one is not 
moving towards a situation of complete free trade. In this case the theory of the 
second best implies that partial liberalisation will not necessarily lead to welfare 
improvement. 
As indicated above, a further question arises over the effects of trade 
liberalisation where economies of scale exist. Under certain circumstances these 
may increase the gains to be achieved through trade liberalisation. However, 
where sectors subject to increasing returns to scale contract as a result of 
liberalisation then there may be losses from trade. Similarly, where markets are 
imperfect, the outcome of liberalisation is difficult to predict. 
An important advantage of trade liberalisation in developing countries is often 
held to be its effect on factor incomes. On the Hecksher-Ohlin assumption that 
exportables are relatively labour-intensive and importables relatively capital-
intensive, trade liberalisation will tend to increase the return to the abundant 
factor, labour. This prediction is often extended to argue that trade reform will 
lead to a reduction in income inequality in developing countries. 
In practice it is not possible to classify all goods as either exportables or 
importables, and recent analyses of trade liberalisation have introduced a third, 
non-tradable, good into the picture (Edwards and van Wijnbergen, 1989). 
Although it might be expected that with trade liberalisation, production of non-
traded goods would fall, this is not in fact the case. Assuming that the ranking 
of goods in terms of capital-intensity goes from importables (most capital-
intensive) to non-traded to exportables (most labour-intensive), and that factors 
of production are mobile between sectors, it can be shown that trade liberal-
isation will in the long-run lead to an expansion of the production of exportables 
and non-traded goods and a contraction of importables. 
If capital is sector specific i.e. cannot move between sectors, the production 
of non-traded goods may increase or decrease in the short-run, and the price of 
the non-traded good will rise relative to the importable good and fall relative to 
exportables. A further complication arises if wages are not fully flexible. Where 
capital is sector specific and wages are sticky downwards, trade liberalisation 
can lead to a disequilibrium situation with unemployment. 
Empirical Evidence 
One of the key issues in the analysis of trade liberalisation is whether or not it 
will lead to a process of deindustrialisation. In so far as the industrial sector has 
tended to be the most highly protected sector in developing countries, it might 
be expected that it would contract as a result of trade liberalisation. Indeed in 
Latin America, the experience of the Southern Cone countries in the 1970s and 
early 1980s seemed to support this view (cf.Tokman, 1984). However, it has 
also been argued that this was not a direct consequence of trade liberalisation but 
rather of other policies which led to overvalued exchange rates. 
However, when account is taken of scale economies and imperfect competi-
tion, it is quite possible that trade liberalisation may lead to the expansion of a 
previously protected manufacturing sector. Devarajan and Rodrik (1989) 
illustrate this possibility with a simulation of the effects of trade liberalisation 
in Cameroon. 
Michaely et al (1991) conclude, on the basis of their case studies, that the rate 
of growth of manufacturing output only falls in the first year after liberalisation 
and then accelerates. Tybout (1991) similarly concludes that manufacturing has 
performed relatively better in countries which have undergone policy reform 
than the average for the region in which they are found. Clarke and Kirkpatrick 
(1991), however, find no relationship between manufacturing growth and trade 
liberalisation. 
It is perhaps not surprising that no overall pattern has been found in 
manufacturing. Since the sector is made up of import-competing, exportable and 
non-traded goods, the extent to which output expands will depend on the relative 
importance of each of these and the impact of liberalisation on non-tradable 
production. It will also depend on the nature of firm reactions, cost conditions 
and entry and exit, where markets are imperfect and scale economies important. 
Another issue which gives rise to considerable debate is the effect of 
liberalisation on employment. On the basis of their studies Michaely et al (1991, 
p.76) claim that 
'The overwhelming impression gained from these findings and country 
studies is that import ratios and unemployment are correlated either very 
weakly or not at all.' 
As Greenaway (1993) points out, however, a number of the case studies show 
substantial increases in unemployment following liberalisation. The authors of 
the World Bank study dismiss these examples as being the result of factors other 
than trade reform, but this is a rather subjective conclusion. Thus the possibility 
that trade liberalisation may lead to underemployed resources cannot be ruled 
out. 
There is a similar lack of consensus concerning the claims that trade 
liberalisation will lead to increased income equality. As Helleiner (1990, p.893) 
points out, the effects of such policies will differ between countries depending 
on their economic structure. This is borne out by a study by the OECD which 
concluded that 
'foreign-oriented growth is necessarily associated with equitable growth 
in some cases but [that] in others this form of growth may go hand in hand 
with persistent or deteriorating inequalities and poverty' (Bourguignon and 
Morrisson, 1989, p. 299). 
A recent survey of liberalisation and income distribution in the 1980s arrived at 
a similar conclusion: 
'liberalisation could affect income distribution substantially differently 
according to countries' initial conditions (factor endowments, institutions) 
and policy set-ups' (Berry and Stewart, 1994, p.22). 
Looking more specifically at the impact of trade liberalisation on income 
distribution, the previously cited World Bank sponsored study found that in 
some cases liberalisation was accompanied by a deterioration in income 
distribution while in others it improved. The study concluded that 
'there is no evidence that lower income groups derive particular advantage 
from liberalisation, nor is there any confirmation for the oft-repeated 
contention that liberalisation is bound to lead to a deterioration of income 
distribution, deepening the poverty for the poor' (Michaely et al, 1991, 
p. 112). 
However, another study of four Latin American countries for the World Bank 
found an association between real devaluation and decreases in real wages of 
low-income labourers (quoted in Thomas et al, 1991, p.76). These results 
reinforce Helleiner's point that it is difficult to generalise about the employment 
and income distribution effects of trade liberalisation. 
Trade Liberalisation and Productivity 
Theoretical Arguments 
A number of theoretical arguments have been put forward to support the view 
that open trade regimes lead to faster rates of productivity growth than inward-
oriented ones, and that trade liberalisation will lead to improved productivity 
growth. Three such arguments have received particular attention in the literature 
(see for example Nishimizu and Robinson, 1984). These are illustrated 
schematically in Figure II. 1. 
The first of these is the 'import discipline' hypothesis that trade liberalisation 
will result in increased competitive pressures on domestic producers which will 
in turn lead to greater entrepreneurial effort to increase X-efficiency. This 
argument implicitly assumes satisfying rather than optimising behaviour on the 
part of firms, and insufficient competitive pressure within the domestic market 
to cause firms to seek to maximise return. Moreover, as Rodrik (1991) shows, 
it is possible to show that a protected market will, by ensuring a larger market 
share for a domestic producer, make it more worthwhile to invest in 
productivity-enhancing technology. Thus, as long as protection increases the 
firm's market share, it will improve the level of technical efficiency. 
A second argument is based on economies of scale. If trade liberalisation 
leads to wider markets for domestic producers through exports, they can expand 
and take advantage of economies of scale to reduce costs. Moreover, where 
protection has led to a proliferation of small, high-cost producers in an industry, 
liberalisation may lead to rationalisation of the domestic industry with further 
scale effects. These arguments are analytically fragile, however, since they 
depend on a number of assumptions (Rodrik, 1992; Tybout, 1992). In practice, 
trade liberalisation will not necessarily lead to the growth of industries which are 
subject to increasing returns to scale. The assumptions of freedom of entry and 
exit on which the rationalisation argument is based are also open to question. 
Figure II. 1: The Mechanics of Trade Liberalisation 
A third argument introduces imports for which there are no domestic 
substitutes as a variable in the production function. Trade liberalisation increases 
the availability of these inputs and thus contributes to a higher level of capacity 
utilisation and of productivity (Dornbusch, 1992). However it is also possible 
for trade liberalisation to lead to 'import strangulation' if, when import controls 
are removed, imports of consumer goods expand rapidly leaving less foreign 
exchange available for imports of inputs and capital goods which previously 
received priority treatment (Fontaine, 1992a). 
This third point is also sometimes linked to a more general argument that a 
more open economy is associated with greater transfer of know-how from 
abroad. This, however, confuses openness to foreign technology and foreign 
capital with openness to trade. 
Thus, the theoretical mechanisms through which trade policy affect 
productivity growth continue to be controversial, and there is no clear cut a 
priori case for supposing that trade liberalisation will lead to increased 
productivity growth. As Rodrik (1991, p. 171) concludes 
4we are far from having any systematic theories which link trade policy to 
technical efficiency perse. In particular, we do not have any good reason 
to expect that trade liberalisation will generally be helpful to overall 
technological performance'. 
Empirical Evidence 
(i) The Direct Relation Between Trade Liberalisation and Productivity: 
Most of the empirical evidence on trade liberalisation and productivity growth 
is based on establishing a direct relationship between some indicator of openness 
or trade liberalisation and a productivity index.4 Studies include cross-country 
comparisons, time-series studies of particular countries and cross-industry 
studies within countries. 
Many of these studies have been reviewed in recent surveys, so that it is 
unnecessary to review them all here (see Pack, 1988; Havrylyshyn, 1990; 
Tybout, 1992; Kirkpatrick and Maharaj, 1992; Helleiner, 1994). No clear-cut 
picture emerges from these studies. Even the strongest supporters of liberal-
isation can only find tentative evidence of a positive relationship between 
openness and productivity. Tybout (1992, p.207) concludes 
4In view of the diverse, ambiguous theoretical literature on the link 
between trade and productivity, it is not surprising that stable, predictable 
correlations have not emerged. Nonetheless in some countries and during 
some sub-periods there is some association between trade flow patterns and 
indexes of productivity growth at the industry level, even after correcting 
for several measurement problems.' 
Havrylyshyn (1990, p. 19) points out that 
Tew studies measure directly the effect of trade policy on productivity, 
but most of those that do conclude that outward orientation leads to 
productivity gains, although the results are not always consistent or 
statistically robust.' 
An even more sceptical view of the link between trade orientation and 
productivity growth is provided by Pack (1988, p.372) who states that 
'Export orientation, whatever its other merits, does not appear to yield 
higher total factor productivity growth than does import substitution. 
Comparisons of total factor productivity growth among countries pursuing 
different international trade orientations do not reveal systematic differ-
ences in productivity growth in manufacturing, nor do the time-series 
studies of individual countries that have experienced alternating trade 
regimes allow strong conclusions in this dimension.' 
This conclusion is echoed by Kirkpatrick and Maharaj (1992) and Helleiner 
(1994). 
(ii) Mechanisms Linking Trade Liberalisation to Productivity Growth: 
In the light of this rather ambiguous evidence, it is relevant to ask whether the 
theoretical arguments linking productivity growth to trade liberalisation 
discussed above, stand up empirically. Although there are numerous studies 
which test the relationship between trade policy and productivity, there are 
relatively few which consider the links between trade liberalisation and the 
specific mechanisms that theoretically could lead to increased productivity. 
Import Discipline 
Most of the studies of industrial structure in developing countries are based on 
domestic measures of concentration, and only a few take trade variables into 
account (see Lee, 1991, Table 2). In cross-section studies, where these are taken 
into account, Lee finds some support for the import discipline hypothesis in that 
profit margins are typically negatively correlated with import penetration and 
positively correlated with measures of protection, although several writers have 
warned of the need for caution in interpreting the relationship between 
profitability and trade variables (Lee, 1991, p. 109). Havrylyshyn (1990), 
moreover, concludes that although studies from industrial countries support the 
import discipline hypothesis, the results of three studies which looked at changes 
over time in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) were ambiguous (studies of 
Spain, Ivory Coast and Chile). A more recent study of Mexico by Weiss (1992) 
found evidence of a weak relationship between trade liberalisation and price 
markups, while a study of Turkey found a significant negative relationship 
between import penetration and price-cost margins in the post-1980 period 
(Celasun, 1994). 
The second step in the chain is whether or not the level of competition affects 
the growth of productivity. There is considerable debate within the advanced 
industrial countries over the relationship between market structure and technical 
progress. Broadly speaking, the neo-classical view emphasises the importance 
of competition as a force for technical change while the Schumpeterian view 
sees the need for large-scale operations and stable markets as crucial for 
investment in research and development. 
In LDCs this issue has hardly been studied, which is not entirely surprising 
in view of the primitive state of industrial studies. The evidence of the few 
studies of productivity performance which have included market structure 
variables, for what they are worth, are supportive of the Schumpeterian, rather 
than the neo-classical view of technical change, since productivity growth has 
usually been found to be positively correlated with concentration (see for 
example the studies of Brazil, Colombia, India and South Korea in Helleiner, 
1994). However, as was indicated above, studies of concentration in LDCs do 
not usually take account of trade, which is a major limitation. 
Scale Economies 
A second question is whether or not trade liberalisation does in fact generally 
lead to firms being able to take advantage of economies of scale. Again there are 
very few studies which have analysed this issue. Tybout (1992, p.204) refers to 
three such studies on Chile, Colombia and Morocco and concludes that, 
although it is unclear how far their findings can be generalised, 'they do cast 
doubt on the popular conjecture that opening an economy leads to efficiency 
gains through the exploitation of plant-level scale economies.' 
The link between economies of scale and productivity gains in developing 
countries has also been relatively neglected. Havrylyshyn (1990) reviewing 
some of the studies which address this issue, concludes that what evidence there 
is tends to confirm the existence of some positive effect of scale on productivity. 
A number of subsequent studies in South Korea, Brazil and India have 
confirmed that growth of establishment size was an important determinant of 
total factor productivity growth (Dollar and Sokoloff, 1990; Fritsch and Franco, 
1994; Ahluwalia, 1994). 
However Berry (1992, p.58) is more agnostic: 
4To summarize, neither the evidence on the relation of size to unit costs or 
profits nor the implications of survivor analysis suggest a prevalence of 
economies of scale, scope or size in LDC manufacturing. But neither do 
these data clearly contradict such a possibility, given the alternative 
interpretations to which they are open.' 
What both Havrylyshyn and Berry are agreed on is that the importance of 
economies of scale tends to vary considerably from industry to industry. 
Input Availability 
Finally what evidence is there concerning the link between increased availability 
of imported inputs and trade liberalisation? One of the most consistent findings 
of studies of trade liberalisation is that it is accompanied by increased imports 
(Thomas, 1991, Table 4.5; Michaely et al, 1991, Ch.ll).5 However this does 
not necessarily show that imports of inputs or capital goods increased, or that 
these contributed to increased productivity. One case study which addresses this 
issue (Fontaine, 1992b on Kenya) finds that although consumer goods benefited 
more than inputs from liberalisation, there was also an increase in the level of 
imported inputs. However, contrary to expectations, there was a negative 
relationship between availability of imported inputs and productivity. 
An important way in which greater availability of imported inputs can lead 
to increased levels of productivity in practice is through higher levels of capacity 
utilisation. In reviewing the empirical evidence, Havrylyshyn (1990) concludes 
that the first step in this argument, linking trade liberalisation to higher levels 
of utilisation, has not as yet been adequately tested, although it is intuitively 
plausible. A number of studies however have found that capacity utilisation is 
an important determinant of productivity, as might be expected. 
In summary then, neither the theoretical arguments nor the empirical 
evidence provide a conclusive case that trade liberalisation leads to better 
performance in terms of productivity. It is possible to construct equally plausible 
theoretical models in which liberalisation can lead to slower productivity 
growth. In the case of the empirical evidence, it is difficult by its very nature to 
establish a direct link between trade liberalisation and productivity growth 
because of the role of many other factors. The mechanisms linking trade and 
productivity, which are identified theoretically, have been subject to very little 
empirical verification, and the various studies which do bear on these issues 
have not produced unambiguous results. 
Trade Liberalisation and Exports 
Theoretical Arguments 
A third major plank in the case for trade liberalisation is the claim that it will 
stimulate exports. Under protectionist regimes, it is argued, there is an anti-
export bias because of the lower effective exchange rate for exports compared 
to imports (Bhagwati, 1988). As long as there are large profits to be made in 
protected import-substituting industries, firms will be unwilling to invest in 
production for export (Michalopolous, 1987, quoted in Agosfn, 1991). 
In these circumstances, it is argued, trade reform is essential if exports are 
to grow. Liberalisation will lead to a shift in resources from the production of 
import substitutes to the production of exportables. However, there are a 
number of assumptions implicit in this argument. First it assumes that resources 
can be transferred costlessly from producing import substitutes to producing 
exportables. In practice the growth of exports is likely to require investment in 
new capacity as well as substantial costs in developing overseas markets. 
Secondly, it assumes that resources are fully utilised so that the economy is on 
its production possibility frontier. However, it is quite possible that import 
liberalisation will lead to a loss of output and increased idle resources. Equally, 
if resources are not fully utilised initially, it may be possible to increase exports 
without at the same time withdrawing resources from the production of import 
substitutes. 
The above argument emphasises the incentive effects of protection on 
production for export vis-a-vis production for the domestic market and is 
sometimes referred to as the relative anti-export bias (Balassa, 1982). However, 
protection can also affect the competitiveness of exports vis-a-vis the production 
of other countries. Because inputs cost more than world market prices, 
protection puts exporters at a competitive disadvantage in international markets. 
Unless they are exempted from duties on imported inputs and are free to 
substitute imports for domestically produced inputs, local exporters will suffer 
a cost penalty. This has been described as the 'input tax' source of bias against 
exports (Milner, 1990) and is sometimes referred to as an absolute bias against 
exports (Balassa, 1982). 
The difference between the relative and absolute bias against exports can be 
presented formally in terms of the Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) for 
production for the domestic market and for exports. Neutrality implies that the 
ERP is equal for import substitutes (IS) and exports (X). A relative bias against 
exports exists when ERPIS > ERPX. A measure of the extent of the relative anti-
export bias is given by (1 • ERPIS)/( 1 + ERPx) (Balassa, 1982). The larger this 
ratio, the greater the degree of anti-export bias. 
An absolute bias against exports occurs when ERP for exports is negative 
(ERPx < 0). This implies that the additional costs, in terms of import duties and 
highly priced local inputs, which exporters face as a result of protection, exceed 
any additional incentive which they receive for exporting. 
The importance of a relative bias against exports depends on assumptions 
concerning full utilisation of capacity, so that an increase in exports will be at 
the expense of domestic sales. Where there is substantial excess capacity, a 
relative bias against exports will not necessarily discourage exports. An absolute 
bias against exports has a more direct effect on exports because it puts the 
country's exporters at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other countries. 
A further argument which is sometimes made is that trade liberalisation not 
only reduces the cost of imported inputs, but can also increase their availability. 
Under restrictive trade regimes, potential exporters may not be able to acquire 
certain key imported inputs or capital goods which they require in order to 
produce for export. 
4If appropriate intermediate goods can be imported, a country may easily 
become an exporter of labour intensive tasks such as assembly services; 
without such imports, that value-added opportunity is lost, along with the 
opportunity to graduate over time from assembly to tasks with higher value 
added'. (Dornbusch, 1992, p.74). 
Protectionist policies, it is argued, not only discourage exports directly through 
their effects on the costs and availability of imported inputs, but also indirectly 
through their impact on the exchange rate. Protection reduces the demand for 
foreign exchange below that which would exist under free trade leading to a 
higher exchange rate than would exist in the absence of protectionist measures. 
The consequent overvaluation of the currency is a disincentive to exporters 
(Morrison, 1975). 
In this scenario, trade liberalisation will result in a more realistic real 
effective exchange rate (REER), giving a boost to exports. It is also likely to 
lead to a more stable REER, because whereas in protectionist regimes the 
negative effects of fluctuations in the exchange rate are dampened by the 
existence of quantitative controls, in more export-oriented regimes these effects 
are felt much more quickly so that the government has to take corrective action. 
A more stable REER encourages investment in production for export because 
it reduces the uncertainty associated with exchange rate fluctuations. 
Empirical Evidence 
In view of these theoretical arguments, what evidence is there that trade 
liberalisation does in practice lead to improved export performance? A number 
of cross-section studies have concluded that countries with more liberal trade 
regimes have tended to perform better in terms of exports. The best known of 
these, by the World Bank, showed that on average manufactured exports grew 
more rapidly in outward-oriented than in inward-oriented countries during both 
the 1965-73 and the 1973-85 periods (World Bank, 1987). 
The methodology of this study has been subject to numerous criticisms (see 
for example Singer, 1988; Evans, 1990). More detailed analysis of the link 
between protection and export performance shows a somewhat equivocal 
relationship. Morrison (1975), for instance, finds a negative relationship with 
tariff levels, but this is only significant at the 10% level. Agosin (1991) finds no 
statistically significant difference between the prevalence of non-tariff barriers 
in countries where manufactured exports have grown fast and those where they 
have grown slowly. 
While the relationship between protection and export performance has a 
bearing on the question of the link between trade liberalisation and exports, the 
latter has also been directly addressed in a number of recent studies. The results 
of these studies are by no means clear-cut. Those associated with the World 
Bank have found that exports, particularly manufactured exports, tend to 
increase following liberalisation (Michaely et al, 1991, Ch.12; Thomas et al, 
1991, Ch.3), and that reforming countries have performed better than non-
reformers (Thomas et al, 1991, Ch.3), although the differences are not always 
statistically significant. On the other hand, three studies for UNCTAD found 
little evidence to support a link between liberalisation and export performance 
(UNCTAD, 1989, Part I, Ch.V.B; Agosin, 1991; Shafaeddin, 1994), a 
conclusion that is supported by Clarke and Kirkpatrick (1991). 
Even those studies which find a relationship between trade reform and export 
performance differ over the mechanisms which link them. Thus, while Michaely 
et al (1991, p. 275) conclude that it is the relaxation of import restrictions 
(together with depreciation of the real exchange rate) that account for export 
expansion, while export promotion measures have no independent impact, 
Thomas et al (1991, p.76) claim that 
'Generally, the positive effects on exports and growth resulting from a real 
devaluation with export reform would be expected to be more immediate 
than those from a real devaluation with import liberalisation.' 
A further point which should be noted is that in the most successful exporters, 
the East Asian NICs, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, the export drive 
preceded import liberalisation, rather than being a consequence of it. Thus both 
theoretically and empirically the causal link between trade liberalisation and an 
improvement in export performance is not nearly as clear-cut as is sometimes 
claimed. While there is no doubt that protection can discourage exports in 
various ways, it is not inevitably incompatible with a strong export performance, 
nor does trade liberalisation on its own guarantee a good export performance. 
Conclusion 
This review of the theoretical and empirical literature on trade liberalisation 
suggests that, despite the widespread adoption of trade policy reform by 
developing countries over the past decade, the consequences of such measures 
are not fully understood. The enthusiasm for liberalisation has often been based 
more on faith than sound theoretical arguments, while evaluation has often been 
carried out using 'rose tinted glasses' (Greenaway, 1993). 
The debate on liberalisation is therefore by no means closed. The present 
study is intended as a small contribution to this debate in two respects. First, it 
is a study of a low income country which undertook sweeping trade liberalisation 
under extremely difficult circumstances, and is often held up as an example of 
what can be achieved. However, as yet there has been little detailed analysis of 
the effects of this trade reform. 
Second, in analysing the impact of trade liberalisation on the Bolivian 
manufacturing sector, the study adopts a microeconomic approach, and seeks 
to identify the mechanisms through which trade liberalisation is supposed to 
affect economic performance. This type of research which links the analysis of 
trade relations with industrial studies has so far been very little used in 
discussing trade policy reform, but provides a valuable approach to the trade 
liberalisation debate. 
Ill: THE BOLIVIAN MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
AND TRADE LIBERALISATION 
The Development of the Manufacturing Sector 
Unlike other Latin American economies which have undertaken radical trade 
policy reform, such as Chile or Mexico, Bolivia's industrial development is 
relatively recent. There was little manufacturing activity before the 1952 
Revolution, but since then successive governments have paid lip service to the 
need to industrialise the country. In 1955 the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) emphasised the need for Bolivia to promote industry through 
import substitution, and the period from 1952 to 1985 has been described as one 
of state capitalism with indebted industrialisation (Morales, 1988b). 
Policies to Promote Industrialisation 
The policies adopted by Bolivian governments to promote industrial develop-
ment in the period up to 1985 were the typical ones of Latin American import 
substitution strategies. This involved giving protection to local producers, 
particularly of consumer goods, while at the same time providing them with 
preferential access to imported inputs. A number of investment laws were 
passed in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1971 Law (DL 10045), for example, enabled 
firms to receive exemptions from import duties on machinery and equipment and 
on raw materials and components, as well as reductions on domestic taxes 
(Violand, 1990). 
During the 1970s the Ley de Inversiones did not succeed in attracting much 
foreign investment. Nor was it used selectively to promote particular industries 
or to encourage regional development (Violand, 1990). The impact of tariff 
protection generally was also weakened by the large-scale contraband trade. 
In addition to tariff and tax exemptions, there were some rediscounted loans 
from programmes managed by the Central Bank, for the manufacturing sector. 
However, these credit programmes had limited effect, either because they did 
not involve preferential interest rates or because the credit was diverted to non-
industrial activities (UDAPE, 1990a, p.25). 
The Growth of the Manufacturing Sector 
Despite these attempts to promote import substitution, the manufacturing sector 
remained relatively small. In the quarter century after 1955, its share of GDP 
increased by only one per cent and it remained well below the Latin American 
average (Espejo et al, 1988, p. 13). In fact, throughout the period 1960-1990, 
Bolivia's industrial sector has lagged behind that of other Latin American 
countries both in terms of its share of GDP and of value added per capita 
(Montano and Villegas, 1993, Tables II.4 and II.5). 
During the 1950s, when Bolivia suffered from high inflation in the aftermath 
of the Revolution, the manufacturing sector stagnated. In the 1960s, however, 
manufacturing grew at an average of 7.9% per annum and between 1970 and 
1978 at 6.7% a year. Despite this, however, manufacturing accounted for only 
15.6% of GDP in 1978. From 1978 onwards, industry was affected by the 
growing economic crisis and between 1978 and 1985 production fell at an 
average rate of 4.7% per annum (Table III.l). 
Table III. l: Growth of Manufacturing Sector, 1950-1991 
Growth Rate (% p.a.) Share of GDP (% end year) 
1950-60 -0.4 14.la 
1960-70 7.9 14.4 
1970-78 6.7 15.2 
1978-85 -4.7 12.1 
1985-91 4.3 13.7 
Note: a End year is 1962 
Sources: Espejo et al (1988), pp. 12-13; own elaboration from INE (1992a). 
After the introduction of the New Economic Policy, manufacturing output 
began to recover slowly, growing at an average annual rate of 4.3% between 
1985 and 1991. However, despite this recovery, manufacturing value added had 
not regained the level of the late 1970s by the early 1990s (INE, 1992a). 
Characteristics of Bolivian Manufacturing 
The relative backwardness of the manufacturing sector is also reflected in its 
composition. The industrialisation which took place in Bolivia in the sixties and 
seventies hardly went beyond the so-called 'easy phase' of import substitution 
in non-durable consumer goods. In 1978, when industrial production reached a 
peak, the food, drink and tobacco industry (ISIC 31) accounted for about 40% 
of manufacturing value added, while textiles, clothing and footwear (ISIC 32) 
contributed almost 20% (Montano and Villegas, 1993, Table 1.4). 
A further illustration of the limited degree of industrialisation in Bolivia is the 
extent to which manufacturing depended on imported inputs. Except for certain 
industries such as wood products and nonferrous metals, which depended on 
local raw materials, more than half of the inputs to the manufacturing sector 
came from abroad (Ministerio de Planeamiento y Coordination, 1988, Table 
IX.5). This reflected the low degree of intra-sectoral linkages within the 
manufacturing sector. 
The Bolivian manufacturing sector is also characterised by a very large 
number of micro-enterprises which make up the overwhelming majority of firms 
(about 90%) and account for between a quarter and a third of industrial 
employment. The average size of manufacturing firm in the early 1980s was 
only 6.3 employees in Bolivia, which was considerably less than the norm in 
other developing countries (Sanchez, 1988). 
Finally, the Bolivian manufacturing sector was far from being internationally 
competitive. A significant part of industrial capacity is technologically obsolete 
and cannot hope to compete in foreign markets (Cobas and Aurrecoechea, 1988; 
Aguirre et al, 1992). This is reflected in the very low level of manufactured 
exports from Bolivia. Although on some indicators Bolivia appeared to have 
significant exports of manufactures by the late 1970s, these were either 
processed minerals or basically agricultural products such as sugar. Even when 
these were considered as manufactured goods, the industrial sector as a whole 
showed a substantial trade deficit. 
Obstacles to Industrial Development 
Studies of industrial development in Bolivia have identified a number of 
obstacles which account for the backwardness of Bolivian industry.6 The first of 
these is the relatively small size of the domestic market. This is a function not 
only of the relatively small and dispersed population, but also of the unequal 
income distribution. This means that a significant section of the population do 
not enter into the market as consumers of manufactured goods. 
The small market has also given rise to oligopolistic industries where 
collusion is the norm and firms see little need to compete. Economic concentra-
tion is even greater than plant concentration levels might indicate because of the 
existence of a number of economic groups which control several plants within 
a particular industry and have interests in other areas. As a result of these 
oligopolistic structures, there was little innovation or effort to improve the 
quality of products. 
It has proved difficult to attract capital into the industrial sector. Unlike some 
other Latin American countries, there has been little direct foreign investment 
in manufacturing in Bolivia. In addition to the small domestic market, this 
probably reflects the lack of domestic infrastructure and the chronic political 
instability which has characterised Bolivia throughout most of its history. 
Other external sources of funds have not generally been available for the 
industrial sector. Domestic private investment has been limited and has tended 
to concentrate on financial and commercial activities which give a much quicker 
return, rather than on manufacturing. Although the state has been a major 
economic actor in Bolivia since the 1950s, its direct involvement in manufactur-
ing has been concentrated largely in oil refining and in metals, so that it has not 
been able to develop the industrial sector as a whole. 
Finally, a frequently heard complaint is the lack of skilled manpower, which 
is cited as a factor causing low productivity in manufacturing. This reflects both 
the low overall levels of literacy and education, and the lack of adequate 
vocational training opportunities. 
In addition to these obstacles, the policies themselves never constituted a 
coherent industrial strategy. As one report put it, 
4 A clear industrial policy has always been lacking in Bolivia, because the 
country has based its economy solely on exports of raw materials, particularly 
minerals and hydrocarbons' (Espejo et al, 1988, p. 6, my translation). 
Trade Policy Reform and the Structure of Protection 
Protection Before 1985 
Immediately before the adoption of the NEP, the main features of Bolivia's 
import regime were the following: 
- an average (unweighted) nominal import duty which was not particularly 
high - just over 20% - following a revision of the tariff code in 1982 
(Econometria, 1987, Table 5). 
- considerable dispersion in tariff levels, with imports of consumer goods 
being relatively highly protected while fuels, intermediate inputs and 
capital goods paid low levels of duty. 
- a number of exemptions from import duties, for particular industries and 
for firms covered by the Ley de Inversiones, so that the average import 
duty paid was below the nominal tariff. 
- use of non-tariff barriers to protect local production from imports of 
similar products, which affected about 10% of all imports. 
The effects of these protectionist measures, together with a low share of value 
added in gross production in the manufacturing sector, was to give a relatively 
high level of effective protection to industry. As can be seen in Table III.2, the 
ERP in Bolivia in the early 1980s was considerably higher than in a number of 
other Latin American countries at that time. 
The Post-1985 Trade Liberalisation 
The main measures affecting imports since 1985 are set out in Table III.3. The 
government implemented two of the main recommendations of trade reformers, 
the elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports, and the adoption of a 
relatively low, uniform tariff structure. DS 21060 established the freedom to 
import all goods, except those which constitute a threat to public health or the 
security of the state. It also substantially reduced differential tariff levels which 
were totally eliminated a year later when a uniform tariff rate of 20% was set, 
and attempted to eliminate duty exemptions. 
Table III.2: 
Effective Rates of Protection in Manufacturing in Selected Latin American Countries 
Country Year ERP(%) 
Bolivia 1982 94 
Argentina 1977 38 
Brazil 1980-81 46 
Chile 1979 14 
Colombia 1979 44 
Mexico 1979 11 
Uruguay 1981 75 
Sources: Table II.5; Schmitz (1984), Table 1; Agarwala (1983), Table 1; Corbo and Sanchez 
(1985), Table 3-5; Mezzera and de Melo (1985), Table 5-3. 
However, these general principles were breached in a number of ways. Three 
industries, flour milling, sugar refining and edible oils, were protected through 
a system of prior licensing for imports. Agro-industries were also given 
preferential treatment through exemptions from duties on their imported inputs. 
In fact exemptions as a whole, which accounted for 28% of total import duties 
due in the early 1990s, were just as prevalent as they had been in 1981 (own 
calculation from INE data). The principle of tariff uniformity was also breached 
by the introduction of a preferential duty of 10% for capital goods in 1988. 
Table III.3: Measures Affecting Imports Introduced since 1985 
Decree Measures 
DS21060 (29/08/85) Tariff reduced to 10% plus 10% of existing tariff; non-tariff 
barriers removed 
DS21094 (15/10/85) Tariff exemptions for inputs for agriculture and agro-industry 
DS21098 
DS22193 
DS22374 
(19/10/85) 
(17/05/89) 
(22/11/89) 
Prior licences required for imports of sugar, edible oils and flour 
DS21367 (13/08/86) Import tariff consolidated at uniform rate of 20% 
DS21910 (01/03/88) Preferential duty of 10% for capital goods; gradual reductions of 
duty on other goods planned 
DS22407 (11/01/90) Tariff on capital goods reduced to 5 % 
DS22585 (20/08/90) General tariff reduced to 10% 
Although an initial attempt to reduce import duties gradually had to be 
abandoned at the end of 1988 for fiscal reasons, import duties were further 
reduced to 10% in general and 5% for capital goods in 1990, and have been 
maintained at that rate since then. 
Changes in Nominal Protection After 1985 
The initial uniform tariff of 20% introduced in 1986 did not represent a 
significant reduction over the average tariff level on all goods which existed 
prior to 1985. Thus, the main feature of the trade reform as far as the overall 
structure of import duties were concerned was a reduction in their dispersal 
rather than in their level. As a result, while for some products duties were 
considerably reduced, for others the new tariff structure meant a higher level of 
protection. 
Table III.4: Nominal Tariffs on Manufacturing, 1982, 1988, 1990 (%) 
1982 1988 1990 
Meat Products 8.3 10.4 10.9 
Dairy Products 2.8 12.1 10.3 
Mills & Bakeries 17.5 11.5 2.8 
Sugar & Confectionery 41.7 17.9 13.7 
Other Food Products 19.9 15.2 10.8 
Drink 60.2 17.1 12.7 
Tobacco 100.0a 11.5 13.0 
Textiles, Clothing & Leather 72.2 17.8 14.4 
Wood & Wood Products 62.1 10.9 5.1 
Paper & Paper Products 35.0 13.4 9.9 
Chemicals 37.2 14.9 12.0 
Petroleum Products n.a. 19.7 13.5 
Non-metallic Minerals 45.6 17.5 14.0 
Base Metals n.a. 17.0 12.4 
Metal Products, Machinery & Equipment 45.7 13.2 8.4 
Other Manufacturing 43.3 10.3 8.1 
Total Manufacturing 47.7 14.0 9.7 
Standard Deviation 19.6 3.0 3.2 
Coefficient of Variation (%) 41.1 21.4 33.0 
Note: a Industry protected by non-tariff barriers where the tariff equivalent was assumed 
to be 100%. 
Source: Econometria (1987), Table 7, for 1982; author's elaboration from INE data for 
1988 and 1990. 
Table III.4 shows the nominal rates of protection for 16 Bolivian manufacturing 
industries before and after the introduction of trade reform. These were 
calculated from data on imports and import duties actually paid, weighted by the 
structure of imports (in other words these are ex post rather than ex ante 
measures). The estimates took account of tariff exemptions, but because direct 
price comparisons were not made between domestic and world prices, the 
protective effects of non-tariff barriers or the possibility of 'water-in-the-tariff 
(i.e. domestic prices below the world price plus tariff) were not included. 
Nominal tariffs were calculated from the import duties actually paid on 
officially declared imports, although the latter underestimate the total value of 
imports because of smuggling and under-declaration for customs valuation. The 
rationale for doing so is the belief that, although illegal imports do not pay duty, 
there are a number of additional costs involved in smuggling (e.g. bribes, risk 
premium) so that it cannot be assumed that they sell in the Bolivian market at 
international prices. Thus, despite smuggling, the average tariff provides a 
reasonable estimate of the excess price of goods in Bolivia. 
The overall level of nominal protection was not significantly reduced by the 
reforms. Under the pre-1985 tariff structure, however, manufactured goods had 
been more highly protected than primary products, so the average level of 
nominal protection for manufacturing industry was significantly reduced from 
47.7% to 14.0% in 1988 (see Table III.4). The dispersion in tariffs was also 
reduced, as is indicated by the fall in the standard deviation and the coefficient 
of variation between 1982 and 1990. Most industries had lower levels of 
protection in 1988 and 1990 than in 1982, the only exceptions being the meat and 
dairy products industries. 
Changes in the Effective Rate of Protection 
A more accurate measure of the protection received by the manufacturing sector 
is the Effective Rate of Protection calculated on the value added in a particular 
industry rather than the Nominal Rate of Protection calculated on the gross value 
of production. 
The only detailed study of ERP in Bolivia before the introduction of the NEP 
is the one carried out by Econometria (1987) for the Camara Nacional de 
Industrias, the results of which are included in Table III.5. The estimates of 
ERP were made using the Corden method.7 In calculating the ERP, input-output 
coefficients from the 1978 input-output table were used. 
As indicated above, despite the low average level of import duties before 
1985, the ERP for the manufacturing sector was relatively high. As Table III.5 
shows, there were also considerable differences in the levels of protection given 
to different industries, ranging from a low of 2.1 % for dairy products to a high 
of 195.7% for tobacco. 
In theory, the introduction of a uniform tariff, as was done in Bolivia in 1986, 
should lead to a uniform ERP, equal to the level of the tariff, because the prices 
of both inputs and outputs are raised by the same proportion. In practice, as can 
be seen from Table III.5, this was not the case because some imports were 
exempt from duties. 
The estimates of ERP for 1988 and 1990 were carried out using the same 
methodology as in the Econometria study in order to make them as comparable 
as possible. The input-output coefficients used to estimate the 1988 and 1990 
ERPs were derived from the 1988 input-output table (INE, 1992b). Although 
this differed slightly from the 1978 input-output table, with an increase in the 
number of branches from 31 to 35, the manufacturing sector was unaffected by 
these changes. 
Table III.5 shows that the ERP for the manufacturing sector was reduced 
from 94.1% in 1982 to 17.1% in 1988 and further to 8.9% in 1990 when the 
lower rates of duty of 10% was introduced. As was the case with nominal 
tariffs, most industries received less protection in 1988 than in 1982, the only 
exceptions being dairy products and other food products. In practice most 
industries were affected by reduced duties on their output and increased duties 
on inputs, both of which tended to reduce the ERP. 
Table III.5: Estimates of ERP in Manufacturing, 1982,1988,1990 (%) 
1982 1988 1990 
Meat Products 80.4 -4.4 6.1 
Dairy Products 2.1 7.8 8.5 
Mills & Bakeries 65.0 21.2 3.0 
Sugar & Confectionery 114.5 54.6 8.0 
Other Food Products 40.0 49.6 0.7 
Drink 88.4 19.5 14.1 
Tobacco 195.7 13.0 13.0 
Textiles, Clothing & Leather 169.1 19.9 14.9 
Wood & Wood Products 145.8 1.6 -4.2 
Paper & Paper Products 76.0 12.8 9.2 
Chemicals 64.8 13.6 11.6 
Petroleum Products n.a 22.2 13.0 
Non-metallic Minerals 56.1 18.7 14.7 
Base Metals n.a 19.1 10.2 
Metal Products, Machinery & Equipment 57.4 11.6 6.3 
Other Manufacturing 49.9 6.3 3.6 
Total Manufacturing 94.1 17.1 8.9 
Standard Deviation 44.5 14.8 5.3 
Coefficient of Variation (%) 41.1 86.6 59.5 
Source: Econometria (1987), Table 7, for 1982; author's elaboration for 1988 and 1990. 
Although the dispersal of ERP was reduced when measured by the standard 
deviation between 1982 and 1988, there continued to be large differences in ERP 
for different sectors, ranging from -4.4% for meat products to +54.6% for 
sugar and confectionery; when measured by the coefficient of variation, the 
dispersal of ERP rates in fact increased. 
The further reductions in tariff rates which took place in 1990 are reflected 
in a significantly lower ERP in that year compared with two years previously. 
These reductions in ERP were particularly marked in the case of the two sectors 
with the highest protection in 1988, sugar and confectionery and other food 
products. As a result, there was considerably less dispersal in rates of protection 
in 1990 than there had been two years earlier. 
Exchange Rate Overvaluation and the Effective Rate of Protection 
The calculations of protection which have been made so far have not taken into 
account the possibility that the exchange rate was overvalued. In comparing the 
ERP at two different dates, differences in the degree of overvaluation of the 
exchange rate may affect the real protection which industry receives. 
There was obviously a significant difference between the situation in Bolivia 
in 1982 and that in 1988 or 1990. This is indicated by the difference between the 
parallel and the official exchange rate in 1982, which averaged around 160%. 
While this overestimates the degree to which the exchange rate was overvalued, 
it is clear evidence of substantial overvaluation. In contrast the differential 
between the official and parallel rates in 1988 and 1990 was less than one per 
cent. 
The effect of overvaluation on ERP depends on the availability of foreign 
exchange at the official exchange rate. If this is readily available for both inputs 
and output, the ERP calculated at the official rate overestimates the net ERP 
which needs to be deflated according to the formula 
Net ERP = [(1 • ERP) * R/Req] - 1 
where R is the official exchange rate 
Req is the equilibrium exchange rate. 
If however, official foreign exchange is so scarce that it has to be obtained 
mainly on the parallel market, and domestic prices are set in relation to dollar 
prices converted at the black market rate, then the ERP is a good indicator of the 
degree of protection afforded to the manufacturing sector. 
If certain manufacturers enjoy privileged access to imported inputs at the 
official exchange rate, whereas consumer goods have to be acquired with black 
market foreign exchange, then the ERP for these producers will be even higher 
than that calculated at the official exchange rate. Thus, under certain circum-
stances, the existence of an overvalued exchange rate may lead to the effective 
rate of protection being underestimated. 
From what is known about the availability of foreign exchange in Bolivia in 
1982, it is unlikely that the calculations of the ERP made in the previous section 
substantially underestimates the true extent of protection. Manufacturers, with 
very few exceptions, priced their products in dollars converted at the black 
market exchange rate. At the same time, they frequently complained that they 
did not have enough foreign exchange allocated at the official rate to pay for the 
imported inputs which they required, although the parallel market could always 
meet their requirements (Morales, 1988, p.43). Under these circumstances, the 
unadjusted ERP provides a better overall indication of the extent of the 
protection received by manufacturing industry than the Net ERP adjusted for 
overvaluation. 
Export Incentives 
The first systematic attempt to promote non-traditional exports in Bolivia was 
the Regimen de Incentivos Fiscales a las Exportaciones no Tradicionales created 
in 1977. This provided exporters with exemptions from duties on imported 
inputs incorporated into exports. It also created a Certificado de Reintegro 
Tributario a las Exportaciones (CERTEX) which varied from 6% to 25% 
depending on the 'embodied value added' of the product. 
The main measures introduced since 1985 to promote exports are set out in 
Table III.6. Initially under DS21.060 the existing CERTEX system of export 
incentives was maintained until 1986, when it was withdrawn. In 1987 a new 
incentive, the Certificado de Reintegro Arancelario (CRA), was introduced with 
two rates, 5% for traditional exports and 10% for non-traditional exports, 
although subsequently the incentive was restricted to non-traditional exports. At 
the end of 1990 the rate was reduced to 6% and in April 1991 was replaced by 
a Drawback with rates of 2% and 4% for non-traditional exports. 
Other measures designed to promote exports include the Certificados de Notas 
de Credito Negociables (CENOCREN) to compensate exporters for value added 
tax payments, the temporary import regime (RITEX), free commercial and 
industrial zones (although as yet there are no industrial zones in operation), and 
preferential freight rates for exporters on the national railways. The Bolivian 
government also sought to provide institutional support for exporters through the 
creation of the Instituto Nacional de Promotion de Exportaciones (INPEX). 
Finally, in 1993 the government issued a decree which sought to ensure that 
exporters would be compensated for any taxes which they paid, including the 
transactions tax and the full amount of the value added tax. 
Table III.6; Main Measures taken to Promote Exports, 1985-93 
Decree Measures 
Law 843 (20/05/86) Created CENOCREN 
DS21660 (10/07/87) Introduced the CRA; authorised setting up of 
industrial free trade zones; created INPEX 
DS22407 & DS 22410 (11/01/90) Established legal framework for industrial and 
commercial free zones and RITEX (temporary 
import regime) 
DS22526 (13/06/90) Established the norms for applying DS22410 
DS22585 (20/08/90) Reduced the CRA to 6 % 
DS22753 (15/03/91) Introduction of Drawback of 2% and 4% to replace 
CRA 
Ley de Exportaciones (1993) Created the Consejo Nacional de Exportaciones and 
the principle of not exporting taxes 
Conclusion 
The trade policy changes which formed a key part of the New Economic Policy 
have significantly altered the conditions facing Bolivian manufacturing. This 
small and technologically backward sector has been opened to international 
competition. Imports, which accounted for 42% of domestic demand for 
manufactured goods in both 1978 and 1985, supplied almost half the market in 
1991 (my calculation from INE data). The share of total production exported 
increased from a fifth in 1978 and 1985 to almost a quarter in the early 1990s. 
The remainder of this study will examine the impact that this has had on Bolivian 
industry. 
IV: THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION 
ON RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Introduction 
As was indicated in Section II, the traditional case for trade liberalisation is 
based on comparative advantage. A move towards free trade, it is argued, will 
lead to a more efficient allocation of resources, which shift out of protected 
import-competing sectors and into those sectors which produce exportables. An 
additional advantage is that if exportables are labour-intensive relative to import-
competing sectors (and non-tradable goods), the reallocation of resources leads 
to increased demand for labour reflected in higher levels of employment or 
increased wages. 
There are, however, a number of dangers in wholesale trade liberalisation .It 
may lead to a process of deindustrialisation, which, while reflecting static 
comparative advantage, may undermine a sector which is crucial in terms of the 
country's dynamic comparative advantage. Structural rigidities may prevent the 
transfer of resources from those sectors which contract as a result of increased 
competition from imports, to new activities .Where economies of scale are 
important in protected sectors, increased import competition may, by reducing 
the market for local firms, lead to increased costs and less competitive 
production. 
In view of these theoretical arguments and counter-arguments, the impact of 
trade liberalisation on resource allocation cannot be determined a priori. The 
purpose of this section is to analyse empirically the impact of trade liberalisation 
since 1985 on resource allocation in Bolivia, with particular reference to the 
manufacturing sector. 
The Size of the Manufacturing Sector 
The first question which needs to be considered is whether or not trade 
liberalisation in Bolivia has led to deindustrialisation. In a neo-classical world, 
a highly protected sector such as manufacturing before 1985 would be expected 
to contract as a result of trade liberalisation, while sectors which received 
negative effective protection, such as mining and some areas of agriculture, 
would expand. 
Analysis of broad sectoral changes in shares of GDP in Bolivia provide some 
indication of resource reallocation, although in some cases they are masked by 
counteracting changes in different industries within the same sector. Table IV. 1 
indicates that since 1985 the shares of mining, manufacturing and public utilities 
have increased, while those of agriculture, construction and other services have 
contracted. 
This is consistent with Table IV. 1 above which showed that, far from the 
manufacturing sector contracting after the introduction of trade liberalisation, 
it grew steadily after 1985. This would seem to contradict the arguments of 
those pessimists who believe that trade liberalisation will inevitably lead to 
deindustrialisation. 
Table IV.l: Share of GDP by Broad Sector, 1978-1991 (%) 
1978 1985 1991 
Agriculture 17.3 22.7 21.3 
Mining 11.4 6.5 9.0 
Petroleum 5.6 6.3 6.3 
Manufacturing 15.2 12.1 13.7 
Construction 5.4 3.0 2.7 
Utilities 5.9 8.8 9.5 
Other Services 36.4 39.4 36.6 
Source: INE. 
However, the pattern of sectoral change is rather different if 1991 is 
compared to 1978 when GDP was at roughly the same level (i.e. before the 
severe economic crisis of the early 1980s). In this case the most striking 
increases in shares of GDP are recorded in agriculture8 and utilities (mainly 
transport and communications). In 1991, the shares of both mining and 
manufacturing were well below those recorded at the beginning of the period. 
As far as manufacturing is concerned, this again is consistent with Table III. 1 
which showed that the recovery after 1985 had not matched the decline in 
production between 1978 and 1985. 
In terms of resource allocation this seem to bear out the expectation that a 
highly protected manufacturing sector would indeed contract as a result of trade 
liberalisation, and that the growth in manufacturing after 1985 merely reflects 
a partial recovery from the very depressed levels brought about by the crisis. 
In order to disentangle the impact of trade liberalisation and economic 
recovery on growth in the manufacturing sector, it is necessary to separate out 
the different sources of growth of output. Between 1985 and 1991, the share of 
domestic demand for industrial goods met by imports increased from 42% to 
49%. Thus desubstitution of imports had a negative effect on industrial 
production. Nevertheless, as was seen above, industrial production actually 
increased over the period 1985-91. What accounts for this? As can be seen in 
Table IV.2, the loss of output as a result of increased import penetration was 
almost matched by increased production for export. However the major 
contribution to the growth of industrial production came from the recovery in 
domestic demand. 
If, however, one takes the previous peak year of industrial production (1978), 
as a base, there is a slight increase in domestic demand in 1991 but industrial 
production is still lower. Over this longer period, although both exports and 
domestic demand have contributed to increased industrial production, they have 
been more than offset by desubstitution of imports (see Table IV.2). This 
explains why, although GDP in 1991 exceeded that of 1978, the share of the 
manufacturing sector was 1.5% lower in 1991 than in 1978. 
Table IV.2: 
Contribution of Sources of Growth to Increased Production of Manufactures, 
1985-91 and 1978-91 (%) 
1985-91 1978-91 
Import Substitution -13.7 (-15.6) -10.8 (-12.9) 
Domestic Demand Expansion 41.1 (51.7) 2.0 (4.7) 
Export Growth 13.3 (13.9) 2.7 (5.5) 
Production Growth 41.4 (50.8) -6.1 (-2.7) 
Note: Figures are expressed as a percentage of gross production in the base year. 
Figures in brackets are for manufacturing excluding National Accounts Sector 19, 
Base Metals. 
Source: Author's elaboration from INE, Boletin de Cuentas Nacionales. 
The shift of resources away from manufacturing is even clearer if one looks at 
changes in employment. Although the number employed in manufacturing fell 
by 30,000 from its peak in 1980 to 1985 as a result of the recession and the share 
of manufacturing in total employment fell from 10.3% to 8.7%, 1986 saw a 
further reduction of 30,000 in employment which reduced the share of 
manufacturing to only seven per cent. It is unclear how far this was a result of 
trade liberalisation or of other measures introduced at the same time, particu-
larly the changes in labour legislation which reduced employment protection for 
workers ('libre contratacion'). Whatever the cause, employment levels only 
began to show signs of increasing again after 1989. 
Changing Resource Allocation within the Manufacturing Sector 
Patterns of Change 
Trade liberalisation not only affects the size of the manufacturing sector as a 
whole, but also its sectoral composition. Some sectors expand while others 
contract or stagnate. A first overview of the uneven pattern of development 
between sectors, classified according to the branches of manufacturing identified 
in the Bolivian national accounts, can be obtained from Table IV.3. 
A number of sectors grew rapidly (at over 8% per annum) between 1985 and 
1991, increasing their share of total manufacturing. The fastest growing sectors 
were tobacco, dairy products, drinks, sugar and non-metallic minerals. Despite 
the overall recovery in manufacturing after 1985, three industries, wood, 
textiles, clothing and leather, and processed meat, contracted between 1985 and 
1991 and a number of others grew slowly and remained well below their 1978 
peak. Compared to 1978, the only manufacturing industries which had a higher 
level of output in 1991 were food and drinks, and non-metallic minerals. 
Table IV.3: 
Growth of Manufacturing Sectors by National Accounts Industries (1980 prices) 
Growth Rates (%) 
Indusrtry 1978-85 1985-91 1978-91 
Processed Meats 6.9 -1.5 2.9 
Dairy Products 7.2 10.4 8.7 
Mills & Bakeries 0.4 1.6 0.9 
Sugar -5.2 8.1 0.7 
Other Foodstuffs 7.2 4.7 6.1 
Drinks -1.5 10.2 3.7 
Tobacco -9.9 12.7 -0.1 
Textiles etc -15.0 -2.5 -9.4 
Wood -9.2 -4.6 -7.1 
Paper -6.6 5.6 -1.1 
Chemicals -5.0 1.5 -2.0 
Petroleum Refining -4.5 4.1 -0.6 
Non-metallic Minerals -4.3 8.0 1.2 
Basic Metals -3.6 2.2 -1.0 
Metal Products, Machinery and 
Transport Equipment -16.3 6.1 -6.6 
Other Manufacturing -4.2 4.1 -0.4 
Total Manufacturing -4.7 4.3 -0.7 
Source: Author's elaboration from INE; input-output tables. 
Table IV.4 gives a more disaggregated view of the differential growth pattern 
during the period from 1978 to 1991. The index of manufacturing production is 
available for 34 four-digit industries, which account for almost 90% of Bolivian 
industrial output from 1978 to 1991. Table IV.4 presents annual average growth 
rates of production for three periods 1978-85, 1985-91 and 1978-91. 
Table IV.4: 
Growth of Volume of Manufacturing Production by 4-digit Industry, 1978 to 1991 (% p.a.) 
ISIC Branch 1978-85 1985-91 1978-91 
3692 Cement -1.1 14.1 5.6 
3112 Dairy Products -1.3 12.0 4.6 
3115 Vegetable & Animal Oils -0.7 10.4 4.3 
3133 Beer -8.9 16.0 1.9 
3111 Processed Meat Products -1.1 4.9 1.6 
3523 Soap -2.4 6.0 1.4 
3118 Sugar Refining -4.5 7.9 1.0 
3530 Petroleum & Coal Derivatives -0.5 2.1 0.7 
3134 Non-alcoholic Beverages -15.0 22.3 0.6 
3132 Wines & Fermented Beverages 6.1 -5.8 0.4 
3131 Spirits 0.4 -1.0 -0.3 
3122 Animal Feed Products 2.4 -3.9 -0.5 
3117 Bakery Products -1.2 0.0 -0.7 
3720 Non-ferrous Metals -3.9 2.3 -1.1 
3213 Knitted Textiles -18.2 22.8 -1.3 
3116 Mill Products 1.9 -1.0 -1.5 
3113 Canned Fruit & Vegetables -12.9 13.4 -1.6 
3691 Construction Materials -3.1 -0.1 -1.8 
3140 Tobacco -11.9 11.6 -1.8 
3620 Glass -3.1 -2.1 -2.6 
3699 Non-metallic Minerals -20.2 21.0 -3.3 
3420 Printing & Publishing -8.8 2.9 -3.6 
3560 Plastic Products -7.4 0.4 -3.9 
3121 Other Food Products -4.4 -5.7 -5.0 
3511 Chemical Products -17.8 11.6 -5.3 
3211 Spinning and Weaving -7.5 -3.6 -5.7 
3311 Saw Mills -16.4 6.0 -6.7 
3119 Cocoa & Chocolate -10.4 -3.0 -7.1 
3559 Rubber Products -9.9 -5.2 -7.7 
3819 Metal Products -21.6 9.2 -8.6 
3220 Clothing -15.5 -0.4 -8.8 
3240 Footwear -15.4 -3.6 -10.2 
3811 Cutlery, Tools, etc -33.3 7.0 -17.1 
3512 Fertilisers & Pesticides -13.2 -30.0 -21.4 
Source: Author's elaboration from INE, INVOFIM. 
As Table IV.4 indicates, ten four-digit industries increased their production 
between 1978 and 1991. Of these the majority were in food processing (4) and 
beverages (3). The remaining three sectors were cement, which had the highest 
growth rate of any industry during the period, soaps and detergents, and 
petroleum and coal derivatives. At the other end of the scale, ten industries 
contracted at an average annual rate of over 5%. Of these three were in textiles, 
clothing and leather, three in chemicals and the two metal product sectors; the 
other two were sawmills and cocoa and chocolate. This reinforces the pattern 
observed at the more aggregate level, where growth was seen to be concentrated 
in the food and drinks industries, while more technology-intensive industries 
such as chemicals and metal products, machinery and equipment, declined. 
The Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Resource Allocation 
How far are the broad changes in resource allocation within manufacturing 
described in the previous section those that would be expected as a result of 
trade liberalisation? Trade liberalisation affects resource allocation primarily 
through changes in the relative prices of import-competing, exportable and non-
traded goods. Thus, in order to analyse the impact of trade liberalisation, the 34 
industries included in Table III.4 were classified into these three categories.9 
In general terms, trade liberalisation will bring about changes in the relative 
prices of importable, exportable and non-traded goods. Specifically liberal-
isation will reduce the price of importables and non-traded goods in relation to 
exportables, while increasing the price of non-tradeables with respect to 
importables. This will lead to an increase in the output of exportables and a 
reduction in the output of importables. Given certain assumptions about 
substitutability, the output of non-tradeables will also increase in the medium-to-
long term (Edwards and Van Wijnbergen, 1989). 
The analysis of the Bolivian situation is complicated by the substantial change 
which took place in the Real Effective Exchange Rate between 1985 and 1986 
as a result of the massive nominal devaluation in August 1985. A real devalua-
tion, as opposed to trade liberalisation, increases the price of both exportables 
and importables relative to the price of non-traded goods. As a result resources 
are switched out of production of non-tradables into production of tradables. 
The combined effect of trade liberalisation and devaluation then is unambigu-
ously to reduce the price of both importables and non-traded goods in relation 
to exportables. The effect on the relative price of non-tradables and importables 
is ambiguous since devaluation and trade liberalisation act in opposite directions. 
Consequently resources are expected to be attracted into the production of 
exportables. Whether or not importables will expand or contract will depend on 
the relative strength of the devaluation and the import liberalising effect. Finally 
the effect on non-tradables will depend on the direction of the liberalisation 
effect and (when positive) its relative strength compared to the effect of 
devaluation. 
This analysis assumes that other factors are held constant. However, a further 
complicating factor in the Bolivian case was a large adverse terms of trade shock 
which led to a decline of 33 % in the price index for manufactured exports in 
1986. This was followed by a further drop of 20% in export prices between 1989 
and 1991 (UDAPE, 1992b, Table 2.3.9). 
(i) Relative Prices 
Figure IV. 1 illustrates the changes in the relative prices of exportables, 
importables and non-tradables between 1985 and 1991. Between 1985 and 1986 
the relative prices of both importables and non-tradables increase relative to 
exportables, reflecting the adverse terms of trade shock. Thereafter, the price 
of non-tradables falls relative to exportables up to 1989, as would be expected,. 
reflecting the impact of both devaluation and liberalisation. In terms of 
importables, the price of non-tradables falls between 1985 and 1988 and then 
rises somewhat between 1988 and 1991. This suggests that the dominant effect 
in the earlier period was the change in the exchange rate, while in the later 
period the effects of devaluation had worked themselves through and that 
continuing trade liberalisation had a more significant impact. 
Figure I V . l 
Relative Prices, 1985-91 
(1985=1) 
Year 
NT/X M/X NT/M 
Note: NT: Non-Tradables; X: Exportables; M: Importables. 
After the initial increase in the price of importables relative to exportables, there 
is no clear trend in relative prices. This is surprising since liberalisation should 
lead to a decline in the price of importables in terms of exportables. Between 
1989 and 1991, the prices of both importables and non-tradables rise once more 
relative to exportables, which probably reflects the further deterioration in the 
terms of trade in these two years. 
(ii) Output 
The adverse terms of trade shock led as might be expected to a decline in the 
output of the sectors producing exportables between 1985 and 1987 (see Figure 
IV.2). From 1987 onwards, however, the production of exportables recovered 
rapidly and the output expansion expected as a result of devaluation and 
liberalisation occurred. 
Production of non-tradables increased steadily throughout the period (with a 
slight dip in 1989). This is consistent with the relative fall in the price of non-
tradables up to 1988 or 1989, but even when the relative price of non-tradables 
increased, output continued to expand. 
Production of importables remained almost constant throughout the period, 
causing a relative decline in their share of manufacturing output. The increased 
relative price of importables following the 1985 devaluation did not lead to an 
expansion of production, as might have been predicted. 
Figure IV.2 
Index of Manufacturing Production 
1985-1991 (1985=100) 
Why did devaluation not lead to a significant increase in production of import-
competing sectors in the 1985-7 period? The most plausible explanation is along 
the following lines. Before the introduction of the New Economic Policy, as was 
indicated in Section III, there was a severe shortage of foreign exchange 
available at the official exchange rate and manufacturers priced consumer goods 
in relation to dollar prices converted at the black market rate. The devaluation 
of the official exchange rate therefore did not have such a marked effect on 
prices as might be expected. At the same time, the costs of imported inputs, 
some of which were obtained at the official exchange rate, did increase 
substantially. Add to this the initial effects of trade liberalisation, which affected 
consumer goods much more than inputs, and it can be seen that the devaluation 
may not have increased the profitability of import-competing industries. 
The assumptions made in this model are consistent with the Bolivian situation 
in the mid-eighties. In particular, responses to the annual manufacturing survey 
of INE indicated a significant increase in import competition in the mid-eighties. 
It is also clear that Bolivian industry, particularly the sector producing 
importable goods, is highly dependent on imported inputs so that devaluation has 
a major impact on costs.10 Thus, despite increased prices after 1985 those 
sectors producing importables were unable to expand production. 
In the longer term, the increased openness of the economy has as expected 
constrained the expansion of production of importables. This has been reflected 
in the fall in the relative price of importables in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
leading to a shift in resources to exportables and non-traded goods. 
Although the changes in relative prices and resource allocation between 1985 
and 1991 are broadly consistent with those predicted by the theory of liberal-
isation, they are affected to a large extent by the low base from which they 
started in 1985. The effects of devaluation and liberalisation are confused with 
the effects of economic recovery from the severe crisis of the mid-eighties. 
Thus, as in the previous section, it is necessary to look at a longer time period 
in order to arrive at a final evaluation of shifts in resource allocation. 
A starting point for this analysis is 1978, the peak year for Bolivian industrial 
production and the base year for the Index of Industrial Production (INVOFIM). 
Unfortunately the corresponding producer price index (IPPI) only goes back to 
1985 so that changes in prices between 1978 and 1985 have to be deduced. The 
appreciation of the Real Effective Exchange Rate in the first half of the 1980s 
implies that the relative price of non-tradables increased relative to that of 
tradables. This seems to be borne out by the fall in output of both exportable and 
importable good industries between 1978 and 1985, while production of non-
tradables held up much better, only declining in 1984 when the crisis was at its 
most intense (see Figure IV.3). 
Figure IV.3 
Index of Manufacturing Production 
1978-1991 (1978=100) 
When the collapse of tradable production in the early 1980s is taken into 
account, the increased production of exportables since the mid-eighties is only 
a recovery of previously lost production. In fact production of exportables was 
still slightly below its 1978 level in 1991.11 Since production of importables over 
the same period has declined, the only growing sector in manufacturing over the 
longer term has been non-traded goods. 
Although in the short-to-medium term it would seem that devaluation and 
liberalisation had the desired effect of attracting resources into the exportable 
sector, in the long term resources seem to have been reallocated towards non-
traded goods. 
Implications of Changes in Resource Allocation 
The changes in resource allocation associated with trade liberalisation are not 
an end in themselves, but are desired by advocates of trade liberalisation for two 
main reasons. First, it is believed that they will lead to a more efficient 
allocation of resources by shifting resources out of high-cost industries into low-
cost industries in accordance with the country's comparative advantage. Second, 
in low-income countries, it is assumed that comparative advantage lies primarily 
in those sectors of manufacturing which make intensive use of labour. Resources 
will therefore tend to shift out of capital-intensive industries into labour-
intensive industries with positive effects in terms of employment creation. 
To what extent have these expectations been borne out in the case of Bolivia? 
The most appropriate way of examining the proposition that resources have 
shifted out of high-cost and into low-cost industries would be in terms of the 
Domestic Resource Costs (DRCs) of different industries in the period before 
1985. Unfortunately, there are no data available on DRCs in Bolivia in this 
period. In the absence of DRC indicators, it is necessary to use the Effective 
Rate of Protection as a proxy for the DRC.12 
Data on ERPs in Bolivia before 1985 are only available for the main sectors 
identified in the national accounts. There are 16 industries identified within 
manufacturing, of which ERP estimates for 1982 are available for 14 
(Econometria, 1987, Table 7). Growth rates of production in constant prices 
were calculated from the Bolivian national accounts for the post-reform period 
1985-91. In view of the possibility that the very depressed level of production 
in 1985 might have a distorting effect, rates of growth were also calculated for 
the period 1978-91, in the belief that this might capture longer term effects 
which were obscured in the shorter term. 
Since ERP is only a crude proxy for the Domestic Resource Cost of different 
industries, but provides some indication of the ranking of industries by cost, 
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient was calculated. As expected there was 
a negative correlation between a sector's growth rate and the level of protection 
in 1982, suggesting that resources have in fact shifted out of high-cost and into 
low-cost industries. The relationship was significant at the 10% level for the 
longer period, but not statistically significant between 1985 and 1991.13 
Is it also the case that resources have shifted out of capital-intensive industries 
towards more labour-intensive industries? In order to analyse this, combined 
physical and human capital intensity is proxied by value added per person 
employed in 1988 (source INE, 1992b). Surprisingly, a positive correlation was 
observed between growth rates and capital intensity, implying a shift of 
resources towards more capital intensive sectors.14 
When the relations between capital intensity (KINT), ERP and growth are 
analysed by multiple regression, both ERP and capital intensity have a 
significant impact on growth both after 1985 and in the longer term. The 
equation obtained for the 1985-91 period was:15 
GROWTH = 3.82 - 0.05ERP* • 02ZKINT** Adj R2 = 0.48 
(1.858) ( -2.205) (3.623) DW = 3.16 
* significant at 5% level ** significant at 1 % level 
An even stronger relationship was found for the longer period, 1978-91: 
GROWTH = 2.90 - 0MERP** • 0.21 KINT** Adj R2 = 0.59 
(1.654) (-4.275) (3.172) DW = 1.39 
These equations confirm that resources have shifted out of high-cost industries, 
as proxied by ERP, towards low-cost industries. They also indicate that growth 
has tended to be higher in the more capital-intensive industries, and that this is 
not a spurious correlation which might be caused by high protection of labour-
intensive industries in the pre-liberalisation era. 
There is an obvious problem here that the above analysis has been undertaken 
at a relatively high level of aggregation, which combines heterogeneous 
activities into broad sectors. Can the effects of trade liberalisation on resource 
allocation described above be confirmed at a more disaggregated level? In order 
to attempt to do so, it is necessary to look at growth rates at the 4-digit level of 
the ISIC. 
Unfortunately, estimates of ERP before liberalisation are not available at the 
4-digit level; therefore, average nominal rates of protection had to be used, 
taken from Econometrfa (1987), Appendix D.3. This is an even more imperfect 
measure of cost than the ERP used as a proxy for DRC above, but it is the only 
indicator available. 
The data available to measure capital in Bolivia are not very reliable and so 
two ratios, calculated from INE data on firms employing more than 15 
employees, have been constructed. Value added per person employed is used as 
an indicator of combined physical and human capital, while electricity 
consumption per person employed is used as a proxy for fixed capital intensity. 
In order to explore the characteristics of growing and declining industries, 
thirty-three 4-digit industries16 were classified into three groups according to the 
average annual rate of growth of output between 1978 and 1991, and 1985 to 
1991, as measured by the INVOFIM. Table IV.5 sets out the unweighted 
average rate of protection for each group of industries, and the average 
employment-weighted capital-intensity for the three groups of industries in the 
two periods. 
The data seem at first sight to confirm the previous finding that the industries 
which have grown most rapidly in both periods have tended to have below 
average protection in 1982, while those industries which have contracted most 
had above average protection levels. 
Table IV.5: Protection and Capital Intensity Indicators, 1978-91 and 1985-91 
GROWTH (% p.a) PROT(%) VA/L (OOOBs) K/L (OOOBs) 
1978-91 
G r > 0 % 22.6 46.9 2.04 
0 > Gr > -5 % 27.6 24.2 1.23 
-5% > G r 31.8 17.9 0.91 
1985-91 
G r > 10% 22.0 49.2 2.24 
10% > G r > 0 25.5 24.8 0.98 
0 > G r 33.6 20.3 1.32 
Average 27.6 30.9 1.44 
Notes: Gr - growth 
VA/L - value added per person employed, 1989 
K/L - electricity consumption per person employed, 1989 
PROT - average nominal tariff, 1982 
Bs - Pesos Bolivianos 
Source: Author's elaboration from INE data and Econometria (1987), Appendix D.3. 
Table IV.5 also confirms the other finding at the more aggregated level, that it 
is relatively capital-intensive industries which have grown most rapidly. This is 
the case over both periods, and for both indicators of capital intensity. 
Conversely, industries which have shown a tendency to contract have been 
relatively labour-intensive. 
The results of running multiple regressions, with growth as a dependent 
variable, suggests caution in assuming a link between the initial level of 
protection and growth, since there was no statistically significant relation with 
the level of nominal protection. However, the paradoxical results for capital 
intensity received further confirmation and were significant at the 5% level in 
both periods.17 
It may be that the nominal rate of protection is a rather poor indicator of 
differences in Domestic Resource Cost in different industries, and one cannot 
reject the view, supported by ERP data, that resources have shifted towards 
lower cost industries over the period under study. 
What is more in need of explanation is why resources appear to have shifted 
out of labour-intensive industries and into relatively capital-intensive industries. 
This is less difficult than it might seem. In the conventional analysis of trade 
liberalisation in developing countries, it is usually assumed that in terms of 
factor intensity exportables are relatively labour-intensive, import competing 
industries relatively capital-intensive and non-tradables in between (cf. Edwards 
and van Wijnbergen, 1989). In Bolivian manufacturing, however, import-
competing industries have been the most labour-intensive, and non-tradables the 
most capital-intensive industries.18 
Since trade liberalisation has led to the contraction of the importables sector, 
and since non-traded good industries have done relatively well, particularly over 
the longer term, as was seen above, it is not surprising that output growth has 
been concentrated in relatively capital-intensive industries while labour-
intensive industries have contracted. 
Conclusion 
Having looked in some detail at the changes in resource allocation in Bolivia, 
what provisional conclusions can be drawn? First, although manufacturing 
output has grown since 1985, both in absolute terms and as a share of GDP, it 
can still be argued that trade liberalisation has contributed to a shift in resources 
away from the manufacturing sector in the long term, since output has not 
regained its 1978 peak and import penetration has increased significantly. 
Second, it is evident that trade liberalisation has also had an important impact 
on resource allocation within the Bolivian manufacturing sector. Resources have 
been shifted out of import-competing industries and into non-tradable good 
industries and export industries. The long term effect on the export industries 
has been dampened, however, by the adverse terms of trade movements which 
have acted as a negative shock on prices of exportables. 
The unexpected conclusion as far as resource allocation is concerned is that 
resources have shifted away from labour-intensive industries towards more 
capital-intensive industries. This partly reflects the fact that - contrary to 
expectations - import-competing industries in Bolivia were relatively labour-
intensive, while non-tradable good industries were the most capital-intensive. 
Putting it another way, while there is some evidence that trade liberalisation 
has had the expected effects in terms of shifting resources towards those 
industries in which Bolivia enjoys a comparative advantage, the further 
assumption that this can be explained in terms of a two factor Hecksher-Ohlin-
Samuelson (H-O-S) type model does not stand up to examination. 
V: TRADE LIBERALISATION 
AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
As was seen in Section II, it has been suggested that more open economies tend 
to have higher rates of productivity growth than inward looking ones and that 
trade liberalisation contributes to improvements in productivity. Thus, one of 
the key indicators of the success of trade policy reform is the effect which it has 
on the level and growth of productivity within the economy. 
In order to assess these claims, this section will look at productivity growth 
in the Bolivian manufacturing sector as a whole and at a more disaggregated 
level. The first part considers the prima facie evidence that there has been a 
significant improvement in productivity in Bolivian manufacturing following the 
introduction of the New Economic Policy. The second part considers the 
evidence regarding the various mechanisms through which trade liberalisation 
may affect productivity, while the third involves an econometric examination of 
the determinants of productivity growth in order to identify the contribution of 
key trade variables. Finally, the experience of six industries in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s is discussed to put more flesh on the bare bones of the earlier 
analysis. 
Has Productivity Increased in the Manufacturing Sector? 
Productivity in the Manufacturing Sector as a Whole 
The first question which must be considered is whether or not productivity has 
increased in Bolivian industry in the aftermath of the trade liberalisation under 
the NEP. Although ideally one might wish to look at Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP), this is impossible to calculate for the Bolivian manufacturing sector 
because of the absence of time-series data on the capital stock, or indeed even 
reliable estimates of fixed investment in manufacturing. Even if the data had 
existed, there would have been major problems of valuation because of the high 
inflation of the early 1980s, which would have made any attempt to calculate the 
capital input extremely difficult. 
Even calculating a time series for labour productivity is not without its 
problems. A first difficulty in measuring productivity in Bolivian manufacturing 
is the existence of a number of different estimates of total employment in the 
manufacturing sector. There are three main sources of employment data over 
time. The first is for employment in manufacturing and artisan activities and is 
derived by UDAPE from data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (INE) 
and the Ministry of Labour. A second source is official estimates based on data 
from the Planning Ministry and the Ministry of Labour. These estimates are 
lower since presumably artisans are not included. Finally INE provides figures 
on manufacturing employment from its own manufacturing surveys, but these 
considerably understate total employment since the coverage of the surveys is 
partial. 
The existence of such different estimates presents a problem in terms of 
attempting to measures labour productivity. It was decided to use the estimates 
of manufacturing employment, excluding artisans for this purpose, because it 
was felt that the data from the INE surveys were partial and affected by changes 
in coverage, while the data on employment in manufacturing and artisan 
activities probably included a significant number of people who were essentially 
underemployed and that this would obscure any changes in productivity. 
In calculating labour productivity for the manufacturing sector as a whole, 
output was measured by manufacturing value added in constant 1980 prices, 
taken from the Bolivian national accounts tables. Table V. 1 indicates the major 
trends in productivity over the period from 1976 to 1990. This shows that labour 
productivity declined considerably as manufacturing output contracted between 
1978 and 1985, as indeed would be expected in a recession. There was a sharp 
increase in productivity in 1986, as a result of the substantial reduction in 
employment in that year, following which productivity fluctuated around its new 
higher level. 
A number of factors can determine the level/growth of productivity in 
industry. There is a well-established relationship between output growth and 
productivity growth (Verdoorn's law) in many branches of economic activity. 
In manufacturing this has been attributed by Kaldor to the existence of dynamic 
increasing returns associated with skill and learning effects in the labour force 
and technological progress.19 
Table V . l : Labour Productivity in Manufacturing (Mfg), 1976-1990 
Mfg. GDP (1980 Pesos) 
(mn) 
Mfg. Employment 
('000) 
Productivity (1980 Pesos) 
('000) 
1976 16886 156.3 108.0 
1977 18059 160.5 112.5 
1978 18881 166.1 113.7 
1979 18578 172.7 107.6 
1980 17974 177.1 101.5 
1981 16581 168.4 98.5 
1982 14531 155.5 93.4 
1983 14558 150.2 96.9 
1984 14707 149.3 98.5 
1985 13483 147.1 91.7 
1986 13742 117.1 117.4 
1987 14087 118.1 119.3 
1988 14852 125.1 118.7 
1989 15374 117.5 130.8 
1990 16250 130.3 124.7 
Note: 1 million pesos = 1 boliviano 
Source: INE; UDAPE. 
Capacity utilisation also has an impact on productivity since costs rise when 
plants operate below capacity. In order to test for the effects of liberalisation on 
productivity, a model was constructed in which productivity was a function of 
growth in value added, capacity utilisation and a dummy variable to represent 
trade liberalisation set at 0 up to 1985 and 1 from 1986 onwards.20 
Using the data from Table V.l as the dependent variable, the regression 
equation obtained was: 
VAIL « 53.5* • 0 .004MFG* - 0.35 CAPUT • 27.5 LIB * 
(4.27) (3.43) (-0.77) (9.44) 
Adj R2 = 0.92; DW = 2.11 
* - significant at the 5 % level (t-statistics in brackets) 
VA/L - value added per person employed 
MFG - manufacturing GDP 
CAPUT - capacity utilisation 
LIB - liberalisation dummy 
Not surprisingly, in view of the substantial increase in labour productivity in 
1986 noted earlier, this shows that trade liberalisation was associated with an 
increase in the level of productivity, with the dummy variable being highly 
significant. As expected there was also a positive correlation with the level of 
manufacturing output, although surprisingly the level of capacity utilisation was 
not significant. 
When the rate of growth of labour productivity rather than its level was used 
as a dependent variable, the liberalisation dummy was only significant at the 
10% level and neither growth nor capacity utilisation were significant. This 
suggests that liberalisation may have led to a once and for all increase in 
productivity, but leaves open to question whether or not it led to a faster rate of 
productivity growth. 
Productivity Growth at the Industry Level 
The evidence that labour productivity in the manufacturing sector increased after 
1985 does not of course indicate that this was necessarily associated with trade 
liberalisation since many other changes took place at the same time. Therefore, 
in order to investigate further the relationship between trade liberalisation and 
productivity growth, it is necessary to construct estimates of productivity at a 
more disaggregated level. 
An index of productivity was derived from two data sets from the INE 
surveys of manufacturing. Production was taken from the index of manufactur-
ing production (INVOFIM) which gives an index of volume of production for 
34 four-digit manufacturing industries from 1978 to 1991. Employment was 
derived from the index of workers employed, which is also available at the four-
digit level for the period 1987 to 1991, with a base year of 1980. In total this 
gave 27 four-digit industries for which it was possible to calculate an index of 
output per worker for 1987 to 1991 with 1980 as a base year. 
This index is subject to a number of limitations since the numerator is a 
physical index of production and does not take into account changes in the value 
added content of the product which might distort the output measure. Equally, 
the denominator only includes workers and not employees or managers. While 
this is a useful indicator of productivity at the plant level, it will not necessarily 
reflect overall firm-level productivity changes. However, it is the best indicator 
available and does at least give some indication of the orders of magnitude of 
productivity growth in different four-digit manufacturing industries. 
In order to test for the possible impact of trade liberalisation on productivity 
growth, a regression was run using changes in the Nominal Rate of Protection 
(NRP) between 1982 and 1988 as an independent variable, and the rate of 
growth of productivity between 1987 and 1991 as the dependent variable. 
Although it would have been preferable to use the Effective Rate of Protection 
(ERP) rather than the NRP, this is not available at the 4-digit level and therefore 
NRP has been used as a proxy. The NRP was calculated on the basis of import 
duties actually paid and therefore took into account any duty exemptions. 
As in the case of the time series analysis, output growth and capacity 
utilisation were also used as explanatory variables. (In the latter case, the level 
of capacity utilisation at the beginning of the period (1987/8) was used, with the 
expectation that a low initial level of utilisation would provide more scope for 
increased productivity over the period.) 
The resulting equation was obtained: 
LP{1987-91) - 8.29 • 0 .65GR* - 0 . 2 7 C A P U T - 024DPROT* 
(0.98) (5 .17) (-1.62) (-3.10) 
Adj R2 = 0.57 DW = 2.11 
where LP - Labour productivity growth 
GR - Output growth 
DPROT- Change in nominal protection (1982-88) 
Both output growth and capacity utilisation have the expected sign, although the 
latter is not statistically significant. The change in NRP between 1982 and 1988 
is found to be negatively related to the rate of productivity growth. Since 
protection fell for most industries, this meant that the larger the reduction in the 
NRP, the faster the rate of productivity growth. This is obviously consistent 
with the view that trade liberalisation in Bolivia has led to productivity growth. 
Mechanisms Linking Trade Liberalisation and Productivity Growth 
Although the previous section suggests that liberalisation in Bolivia has been 
accompanied by an increase in the level of productivity, it does not necessarily 
establish a causal link. If productivity is indeed a result of trade liberalisation, 
this should be via the mechanisms identified in Section II: competitive effects; 
scale effects; and import availability effects. In this section, each of these effects 
will be examined in turn. If there is evidence of increased competition, 
rationalisation or increased availability of imported inputs, then it will be 
necessary to analyse whether there is any link between them and productivity 
performance. If, however, there is no such evidence, it is likely that the 
supposed effect of liberalisation has not operated in the Bolivian case. 
Import Discipline 
Trade liberalisation is likely to result in greater competition for domestic 
producers from imports. One indicator of this for the manufacturing sector is the 
share of imports in domestic demand, defined as domestic production plus 
imports minus exports. 
Table V.2 shows a clear pattern with the share of imports dropping from just 
over 40% in the late 1970s as the economic crisis limited the availability of 
imports. By the end of 1985, however, the level of import competition had 
recovered to that of the late 1970s and by the early 1990s imports accounted for 
almost half the demand for manufactures in Bolivia. This does support the view 
that Bolivian industry has faced increased competition from imports in the 
aftermath of liberalisation. 
Although liberalisation has taken place (almost) across the board, its impact 
in terms of import competition differs considerably from industry to industry. 
It has been most marked in the textile, clothing and leather industry. Increasing 
import shares have also occurred in wood and wood products, chemicals, non-
metallic minerals and metal products and equipment. On the other hand, in some 
industries the share of imports has in fact declined compared to the late 1970s, 
against the general trend. Industries where foreign competition has decreased 
include dairy products, sugar, miscellaneous food products, tobacco, and 
petroleum products. In some of these industries, the changes in trade policy in 
fact increased the Effective Rate of Protection initially as in the case of dairy 
products and other food products, and some, particularly sugar and vegetable 
oils (included in miscellaneous food products), continued to receive non-tariff 
protection. 
Table V.2: Share of Imports in the Domestic Demand for Manufactured Goods, 1978-1991 
Year Import Competition (%) 
1978 41.5 
1979 41.2 
1980 34.5 
1981 39.9 
1982 33.7 
1983 30.5 
1984 36.6 
1985 41.9 
1986 47.8 
1987 47.9 
1988 47.0 
1989 45.0 
1990 48.7 
1991 49.3 
Note: Import competition is the share of imports in domestic demand (calculated as gross 
production + imports - exports) at constant 1980 prices. 
Source: Author's elaboration from INE data. 
There is therefore strong evidence that the import discipline effect of trade 
liberalisation may indeed operate in Bolivia. However the importance of this 
effect is likely to differ considerably between different industries, an issue 
which will be taken up later. 
Scale Effects 
The second mechanism through which trade liberalisation can increase 
productivity is through the rationalisation of previously protected industries 
which enables them to take advantage of economies of scale. Unfortunately, 
Bolivia has never carried out the kind of industrial census which would be 
needed in order to examine in detail the impact of trade liberalisation on 
industrial structure. The most comprehensive surveys carried out to date, in 
terms of coverage, are the Censos de Establecimientos Economicos of 1983 and 
1992, which covered 150,000 and almost 250,000 establishments in all sectors 
respectively. However the data collected were very limited (mainly employ-
ment) and have only been published in very aggregated form. 
Table V.3 compares the distribution of employment by size of firm in 1983 
and 1992. This shows a very clear pattern - employment has increased, both 
absolutely and relatively, in all sizes of firms except the largest (firms 
employing 50 or more) where it has fallen markedly. This supports the view that 
trade liberalisation in Bolivia has been accompanied by a process of 'informal-
isation' of the manufacturing sector, rather than rationalisation and larger scale 
production. 
Table V.3: Employment by Size of Manufacturing Firms, 1983,1992 
Size 1983 Employment 1992 Employment 1983 (96) 1992 (%) 
1-4 20,140 22,970 27.0 29.9 
5-9 8,612 10,454 11.5 13.6 
10-14 3,313 4,564 4.4 5.9 
15-19 2,425 3,112 3.2 4.1 
20-24 1,652 2,887 2.2 3.8 
25-29 2,030 2,072 2.7 2.7 
30-39 2,608 3,147 3.5 4.1 
40-49 1,800 2,301 2.4 3.0 
50- 32,046 25,211 42.9 32.8 
All 74,626 76,718 100.0 100.0 
Source: INE, Censos de Establecimientos Economicos, 1983 and 1992. 
This hypothesis needs to be examined further, however. The data presented 
above suffer from two major limitations. First, the fact that firms are becoming 
smaller in terms of employment does not necessarily mean that they are 
contracting output, since productivity may have increased over the period. 
Second, since the timing of the Census does not coincide exactly with the period 
of liberalisation, it is possible that part of the observed change occurred prior 
to liberalisation. 
This can partly be overcome by using data from the INE annual surveys of 
manufacturing (Formulario Economico Unico) which in recent years have 
covered between 700 and 1000 establishments. Although the data from the 
Formulario Economico Unico are inadequate in terms of coverage of the 
manufacturing sector as a whole, they are fairly comprehensive as far as 
establishments employing 15 or more workers are concerned. They can 
therefore be used to identify trends amongst the largest Bolivian manufacturing 
firms. 
The NEP reforms were introduced in August 1985 and the introduction of a 
uniform tariff of 20% occurred a year later. Table V.4 uses 1986 as a base year 
to compare with 1990, the latest year for which processed data is available. 
Table V.4 shows a number of trends. First, there has been a slight increase in 
the total number of establishments with 15 or more employees from 338 in 1986 
to 364 in 1990. Second, employment in this group of firms has contracted by 
almost a quarter over this period. Third, total value added has remained 
virtually unchanged in real terms. Since both total employment in manufacturing 
and total manufacturing value added increased during this period, this implies 
that large firms have lost ground vis-a-vis smaller firms. Finally, the average 
size of establishment in terms both of value added and the average number of 
persons employed has fallen. 
Table V.4: 
Selected Indicators for Manufacturing Establishments with 15 or more Employees, 
1986,1990. 
1986 1990 
No. of Establishments 338 364 
Employment 43,491 32,958 
Employment per Establishment 129 91 
Value Added (1986 prices) Bs 948.3mn Bs 923.9mn 
Value Added per Establishment Bs 2.8mn Bs 2.5mn 
Source: Author's elaboration from INE data. 
Surveys by the Camara Nacional de Industria confirm that there has been a 
reduction in the average size of firms employing more than 15 employees in 
terms of value added between 1987/8 and 1990/91 (my calculation from CNI 
data).21 Thus both the INE and CNI data contradict the view that trade 
liberalisation will lead to a process of industrial rationalisation enabling firms 
to take advantage of economies of scale. In fact trade liberalisation appears to 
have been accompanied by further informalisation of the manufacturing sector 
and increased production by small-scale producers. This view is given further 
support by evidence of the rapid growth of employment in family firms in the 
major Bolivian cities between 1985 and 1991 (Montano and Villegas, 1993, 
Ch.IV). 
Import Availability 
A final way in which trade liberalisation may lead to better productivity 
performance is through greater access to imported inputs and capital goods. 
Restrictive trade regimes may make it difficult for manufacturers to obtain the 
inputs or equipment which they require. Liberalisation increases the availability 
of such imported inputs. 
Table V.5 shows the evolution of imports of consumer goods and of inputs 
and capital goods for the industrial sector since the late 1970s. There was a 
significant decline in Bolivia's capacity to import during the early 1980s, and 
this is reflected in the sharp reduction in imports of both consumer goods and 
capital goods in the 1982-5 period compared to 1977-81. Imports of inputs for 
the industrial sector were given priority during the crisis and held up rather 
better. 
After 1985 there was an improvement in the situation and imports of both 
inputs and capital goods for the industrial sector increased slightly. Imports of 
capital goods however remained well below the level of the late 1970s and early 
1980s. The most significant increase in imports took place in consumer goods. 
Table V.5: Imports of Inputs and Capital Goods for the Industrial Sector (US $ million.) 
1977-81 1982-85 1986-92 
Inputs 217.4 201.9 219.1 
Capital Goods 210.5 133.9 153.0 
Consumer Goods 173.4 97.6 152.4 
All Imports 818.0 577.6 698.4 
Source: INE. 
There is little doubt that in the period immediately before the trade reforms 
of the mid-1980s, access to imports did represent a problem for Bolivian 
manufacturers. Between 1983 and 1986, lack of foreign exchange consistently 
ranked as one of the most important factors accounting for under-utilisation of 
capacity in Bolivian industry (see Table V.6). After 1986, the proportion of 
firms identifying this as a cause of capacity under-utilisation declined signifi-
cantly. 
Further evidence to support the view that access to imported inputs improved 
after 1986 is obtained from data on the share of imported inputs in total inputs 
for the major Bolivian manufacturing firms which increased by more than half, 
from 24.7% in 1986 to 37.3% in 1988 (my elaboration from the data of the INE 
manufacturing surveys). 
However, what is unclear is whether or not the increased availability of 
imported inputs and capital goods is primarily a result of trade liberalisation or 
of other factors. In fact, looked at from a balance of payments point of view, the 
major factor which has led to an improvement in Bolivia's capacity to import 
since 1985 has been a reduction in debt service payments, which is only 
indirectly connected to the trade liberalisation programme. 
While the increased level of imports is primarily a result of other factors, 
changes in the composition of imports do partly reflect the effects of trade 
liberalisation. The fact that it is imports of consumer goods which have 
increased most significantly since liberalisation and have increased their share 
of imports, while imports of inputs and capital goods for industry have seen their 
shares decline, is consistent with Rodrik's 'import compression' hypothesis. The 
fact that imports of inputs and capital goods have not been compressed (in 
absolute terms), reflects the improved financial terms that Bolivia has been able 
to obtain from multilateral and bilateral donors, as a result of adopting trade and 
other economic policy reforms. 
Table V.6: 
Causes of Capacity Under-utilisation in Manufacturing, 1983-88 (% of responding firms) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Lack of Operating Capital 16 16 17 15 7 3 
Lack of Primary Inputs 58 56 43 31 8 4 
Strikes 40 56 35 11 3 0.1 
Labour Instability 15 21 22 5 0.5 0.2 
Lack of Skilled Labour 4 5 5 4 1 0.5 
Obsolete Equipment 12 14 12 11 3 1 
Lack of Spare Parts 22 24 15 9 1 0.7 
Lack of Demand 46 40 54 58 16 20 
Lack of Foreign Exchange 45 48 54 58 16 20 
Lack of Storage/Capacity 0.5 0.6 0.9 1 0.5 0.01 
Competition from Imports 21 22 37 38 25 31 
Source: INE manufacturing surveys. 
Conclusion 
From the above discussion, it appears that both the 'import discipline' effect and 
the 'input availability' effect of trade liberalisation could have had some impact 
on productivity in Bolivian industry. However there is no evidence of rationalis-
ation having taken place so that there is no reason to suppose that scale effects 
could have influenced productivity. In the next section, therefore, the focus will 
be on the first two effects. 
Determinants of Productivity Growth 
Time Series Analysis 
It was seen above that the level of productivity in the manufacturing sector was 
significantly higher in the period after the introduction of the NEP, but that the 
results in terms of productivity growth were much less clear cut. In order to test 
the effects of trade liberalisation on productivity, a model of the domestic 
determinants of productivity growth is developed and then trade variables are 
introduced to see their explanatory significance. 
The main domestic determinant of the rate of productivity growth is expected 
to be the rate of growth of output. However, it is clear from the data in Table 
V. 1 that there was a substantial upward shift in labour productivity in Bolivia 
between 1985 and 1986, which could not be explained by the very limited 
growth in output in that year. Moreover, it is known that major changes were 
made in Bolivian labour legislation as part of the NEP which made it much 
easier for firms to lay off workers. In order to take account of this once-and-for-
all increase in labour productivity, a dummy variable was introduced with a 
value of 1 in 1986 and 0 in all other years. Equation la in the table below shows 
that when such a dummy variable (DUM) is included, the growth of manufactur-
ing value added (MFGgr) is an important determinant of productivity growth. 
In Equation lb, the change in the level of capacity utilisation (DCAPUT) is 
introduced as a further factor influencing productivity growth. Unfortunately, 
there is a high degree of collinearity between changes in capacity utilisation and 
growth in output, and as a result neither variable is significant. Since two 
observations are also lost when changes in capacity utilisation is introduced, it 
is not included as an independent variable in the remaining equations. 
Determinants of Productivity Growth, 1976-91 
Equation la lb lc Id 
Constant -0.58 
(-0.47) 
-0.69 
(-0.46) 
8.44 
(0.74) 
-0.57 
(-0.46) 
MFGgr 0.49* 
(2.42) 
0.55 
(1.79) 
0.58** 
(2.12) 
0.49* 
(2.31) 
DUM 27.6* 
(6.24) 
28.9* 
(5.11) 
29.0* 
(5.85) 
27.8* 
(5.78) 
DCAPUT -0.33 
(-0.50) 
MCOMP -0.22 
(-0.81) 
DMIMP 0.003 
(0.18) 
Adj. R2 0.77 0.75 0.77 0.76 
DW 2.42 2.39 2.47 2.37 
Observations 14 12 13 14 
Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
* - significant at 5% level; ** - significant at 1 % level 
The 'import discipline' hypothesis predicts that a high level of import competi-
tion will lead to rapid productivity growth. Contrary to expectations, however, 
Equation lc indicates a negative coefficient on the import discipline variable 
(MCOMP) although it is not significantly different from zero. 
Finally, it is expected that increases in the availability of imported inputs will 
have a positive effect on productivity growth. In this case, the growth of 
imported inputs (DMIMP) is positively related to productivity growth but - as 
with import competition - is not significant (see Equation Id). 
What emerges from these figures is a clear and sharp increase in productivity 
in 1986, which is consistent with the earlier finding that the level of productiv-
ity was substantially higher in the period following the introduction of the New 
Economic Policy, However, it is difficult to explain this in terms of the trade 
policy aspects of the NEP. First, the effects of trade liberalisation are not likely 
to be felt immediately, particularly as the main reductions in tariffs only came 
about in 1986. Second, there is no evidence to indicate that the mechanisms 
through which trade liberalisation is meant to lead to improved performance 
were an important factor determining the rate of productivity growth during the 
period. These findings are, however, consistent with the view that changes in 
Bolivian labour legislation which made it easier for firms to lay off workers 
contributed to the increased level of labour productivity. 
Cross-Section Analysis 
In order to explore further the determinants of productivity growth, the 
performance of 27 4-digit manufacturing industries will be examined in this 
section. There are substantial intra-mdustry differences in productivity 
performance, which raises the question of the determinants of productivity 
growth at the industry level. 
The Verdoorn effect linking output and productivity growth applies at the 
industry level as well as to the manufacturing sector as a whole, so that the 
growth of output is expected to have a major influence on productivity. 
Similarly, changes in capacity utilisation also affect industry productivity 
growth. In addition, there may be industry specific variables which influence the 
underlying rate of technical progress and hence productivity growth in an 
industry. One such variable is the level of concentration in the industry, 
although there are conflicting theories as to whether the relationship between 
concentration and technical progress is positive or negative. It is also possible 
that more capital-intensive industries have greater possibilities of increasing 
productivity than labour-intensive industries. 
Once a model of the determinants of productivity growth has been estab-
lished, it is possible to consider the effects of various trade variables on 
productivity. The import discipline hypothesis suggests that those industries 
most subject to competition from imports will have the fastest rate of productiv-
ity growth. The import availability argument implies that it is industries which 
rely heavily on imported inputs which will perform best when trade is 
liberalised. Finally, the orientation of an industry towards the international or 
the domestic market may also be an important factor determining productivity 
growth, with industries which have to compete on the international market 
expected to have a higher rate of productivity growth. 
Data on employment at the 4-digit level were only available for the period 
from 1987 to 1991. However, this period can be taken to represent the effects 
of trade liberalisation on productivity growth after the short-term, once-and-for-
all, effects had taken place. It is, therefore, particularly relevant in terms of 
addressing the question of whether trade liberalisation affects the growth, as 
opposed to the level, of productivity. 
Determinants of Productivity Growth 1987-91 at 4-digit Level 
Equation 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 
CONST 15.2 
(1.61) 
13.5 
(1.37) 
15.4 
(1.47) 
18.7 
(1.67) 
16.1 
(2.06) 
PROD 0.59* 
(4.06) 
0.61* 
(4.08) 
0.58* 
(3.69) 
0.54* 
(3.33) 
0.98* 
(5.99) 
CAPUT -0.31 
(1.59) 
-0.31 
(1.59) 
-0.31 
(1.55) 
-0.33 
(1.67) 
-0.32 
(2.03) 
MCOMP 0.07 
(0.72) 
MCONT -0.67 
(0.06) 
MSHARE -4.32 
(0.61) 
XRATIO -0.38* 
(3.51) 
AdjR 2 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.60 
DW 2.06 2.02 2.06 2.08 2.00 
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 
Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics 
* - significant at 5% level. 
The two industry-specific variables considered that might have an effect on 
productivity growth were the four-firm concentration ratio and electricity 
consumption per person employed (a proxy for capital-intensity); however, 
neither was significant, and were not included in the regressions. The basic 
model, therefore, included growth of production (PROD) and capacity 
utilisation (CAPUT) as independent variables. Capacity utilisation was not 
significant at the 10% level, but was kept in the equation because it had the 
correct sign and improved the fit of the equation (see Equation 2a above). 
As was indicated above, there is an apparent cross-section relation between 
the reduction in protection in an industry and the rate of productivity growth. If 
trade liberalisation had indeed led to faster productivity growth in the 1987-91 
period, then it is to be expected that it did so through one of the major 
mechanisms identified previously. 
Equation 2b tests the import discipline hypothesis that productivity growth 
will be fastest in those industries which are subject to most competition from 
imports. In order to analyse the impact of import competition, the share of 
imports in the total value of production plus imports (MCOMP) for each four 
digit industry was calculated from unpublished INE data. The data are only 
available for 1988, but this is not too serious a problem since, as was seen 
above, the increase in import competition compared to the late 1970s had 
already taken place by the late 1980s. Although the coefficient for import 
competition is positive as expected, it is not significantly different from zero, 
so that the import discipline hypothesis is not confirmed. 
The second hypothesis to be tested is that the increased availability of 
imported inputs has increased productivity. If this were indeed the case, then it 
would be expected that industries which rely heavily on imported inputs would 
have experienced the largest increases in productivity following liberalisation. 
To test this hypothesis, two variables were used, the ratio of imported inputs 
to the value of production in an industry (MCONT), and the ratio of imported 
to total inputs (MSHARE). These ratios were calculated from the INE 
manufacturing surveys for 1989, the last year for which data on inputs separated 
into domestic and imported was available. It was appropriate to use this data 
because what is relevant is the extent to which an industry would use imported 
inputs when import restrictions were minimal, and such conditions had been 
achieved by 1989. 
Contrary to expectations, equations 2c and 2d both indicate a negative 
relationship between productivity growth and dependence on imported inputs, 
however measured, in the 1987-91 period, although in neither case is this 
statistically significant. 
Finally, Equation 2e examines the impact of trade orientation on productivity 
growth, using the share of exports in total output (XRATIO) in 1988, as the 
independent variable. In this case it is expected that those industries which sell 
a higher share of their output on international markets will have the strongest 
productivity growth. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient on the export 
variable is negative and highly significant. 
Thus, despite the apparent relationship between productivity growth and 
changes in protection levels in different industries, there is no evidence to 
support the view that any of the mechanisms through which trade liberalisation 
has been claimed to affect productivity are operative. Indeed, of the trade 
variables considered here, only import competition had the expected sign, while 
only the export ratio was statistically significant, but with the wrong sign. 
Case Studies 
In order to try and throw further light on this paradox, a number of four digit 
industries were analysed in depth over time. The industries chosen include some 
which faced substantial import competition after 1985 and some which were 
relatively immune to import competition. They also include some which depend 
mainly on imported inputs and others which depended more on local inputs. The 
industries also represent contrasting situations in terms of output and productiv-
ity growth. 
Spinning and Weaving (3211) 
Spinning and weaving was one of the industries which was worst hit by trade 
liberalisation. Producers experienced a double negative effect, first through a 
significant increase in competition from imported yarns and fabrics, and 
secondly through the stagnation in domestic clothing production, which was also 
hit by increased imports after 1985. As a result, production in 1991 was 20% 
lower than in the mid-1980s (Table V.7). 
Although a number of firms in the industry rely heavily on imported inputs 
(particularly of dyes, chemicals and synthetic fibres), trade liberalisation has 
had little positive impact in terms of access to imported inputs since these were 
usually either subject to low tariffs or imported with exemptions before 1985. 
Indeed the ending of the overvaluation of the peso boliviano meant an increase 
in the cost of imported inputs, particularly for manufacturers of synthetic fabrics 
(PREALC, 1989, p. 15). Thus, the overall impact of liberalisation on the 
industry was highly negative. 
Table V.7: Indicators for the Spinning and Weaving Industry 
INVOFIM (1978 = 100) Permanent Workers (1980= 100) 
1980 82.9 100.0 
1985 57.9 n.a 
1986 58.2 56.4 
1987 58.8 57.2 
1988 54.2 49.1 
1989 39.0 32.0 
1990 34.0 29.3 
1991 46.5 35.5 
1992 n.a 33.5 
Notes: INVOFIM - index of physical volume of manufacturing production. 
n.a. - not available 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. 
As a result of declining domestic demand and increased import competition, a 
number of textile firms went out of business or severely cut back their activities 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Firms which closed down included 
MASA which had been the largest textile factory in Bolivia, FENIX and 
Lanficio Boliviano 'Domingo Soligno'. Other firms laid off workers and 
scrapped part of their capacity. Employment in the industry fell by 40% between 
1986 and 1992 (see Table V.7). 
These changes within the textile industry led to a contraction in the average 
size of firm and a growth of small-scale informal activities. The fragmentation 
of production which prevents firms from producing long runs and taking 
advantage of economies of scale has been noted as a major problem in this 
industry (Arana, 1991, p.22). Moreover, levels of capacity utilisation have 
remained low. 
There is little evidence of new investment or changes in technology or 
organisation which would lead to increased productivity in the industry. Not 
surprisingly in view of the decline in production, there has been very little 
investment in the industry (World Bank, 1991, Table 5.4). Nor has there been 
any introduction of Just-in-Time and Total Quality Control methods in the 
industry (Triana and Espana, 1990, p.7). 
In so far as there has been an increase in productivity in the industry, this is 
a result of the closure of some of the most inefficient firms and the scrapping of 
obsolete equipment, as part of the downsizing of the industry. However, the 
industry remains technologically backward by international standards, or even 
those of other Andean countries, particularly in natural fibres (cotton and wool). 
Moreover, increases in productivity of this kind, which reflect the elimination 
of marginal capacity, do not represent any technological progress, and cannot 
sustain long-run productivity growth. 
Knitting (3213) 
Production of knitted textiles was hit very badly by the crisis of the first half of 
the 1980s and in 1985 was less than a quarter of its 1978 level. Since most 
producers were integrated with clothing production, they were affected by the 
decline in household demand for clothing and increased levels of smuggling 
which hit clothing more than yarn and fabrics (see below). Production recovered 
from the trough of 1985 making the industry one of the fastest growing in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s output still 
remained below the level of the late seventies (Table V.8). 
The industry has not been as badly affected by competition from imports as 
the flat goods industry (source: personal interviews). Because of the high level 
of contraband before 1985, the effect of liberalisation may have been less severe 
than in the case of woven fabrics. Also the fact that equipment in the industry 
was generally of a more recent vintage than in spinning and weaving meant that 
it was better placed to withstand foreign competition. 
Table V.8: Indicators for the Knitting Industry 
INVOFIM (1978= 100) Permanent Workers (1980= 100) 
1980 95.7 100.0 
1985 24.5 n.a 
1986 36.2 90.8 
1987 33.4 81.0 
1988 49.1 62.2 
1989 59.5 63.2 
1990 78.4 66.5 
1991 83.9 68.7 
1992 n.a 74.2 
Source: As Table V.7. 
There was a recovery in domestic consumer demand as the economy 
stabilised and began to grow again. The steady growth of exports, which had 
been negligible in the mid-1980s, also contributed to recovery, increasing by 
over US$5 million between 1986 and 1991. 
The knitting industry benefited somewhat from the liberalisation of tariffs on 
imported inputs. Because major inputs such as yarn competed with local 
production, duty exemptions were less common and import duties were higher 
than for the inputs used in spinning and weaving. As a result of liberalisation 
duties are now much lower and some manufacturers even obtain inputs duty free 
from neighbouring countries. 
There is some evidence that rationalisation has taken place in the industry. 
The number of very small firms (1-4 employees) fell substantially between 
1987-8 and 1990-91 (CNI, SUP). This has been accompanied by a reduction in 
the level of employment in the industry. 
Growing production since the mid-1980s has been accompanied by increased 
labour productivity. A number of factors appear to have contributed to 
productivity growth. First increased output, as a result of economies of scale 
and increased capacity utilisation, reinforced by rationalisation has contributed 
directly to improvements in productivity. Easier access to imported inputs has 
also contributed to productivity, because the low quality of local yarn led to 
frequent breakages and poor quality of output. This is now being avoided by 
using imported yarn, which of course has intensified the problems of the 
spinning industry (Triana and Espana, 1990, pp. 13-14). 
Some firms in this sector have also introduced new technology and new forms 
of organisation of production. The technology used in the industry is of a much 
more recent vintage than is found in the flat textile sector and there has been 
some new investment in recent years. However, performance is patchy and only 
a few key firms have responded positively in terms of technological and 
organisational change. 
Clothing (3220) 
The clothing industry was badly affected by the economic crisis of the early 
1980s. Household demand for garments fell by more than 50% between 1980 
and 1985 (INE, 1989). The industry also suffered severely from competition 
from contraband, which accounted for the bulk of imports of clothing in the first 
half of the 1980s. However, unlike the knitwear industry, production has 
remained stagnant since the mid-eighties (see Table V.9). 
Table V.9: Indicators for the Clothing Industry 
INVOFIM (1978=100) Permanent Workers (1980= 100) 
1980 94.2 100.0 
1985 30.8 n.a 
1986 34.9 43.8 
1987 29.5 43.9 
1988 30.2 42.2 
1989 35.3 36.9 
1990 38.0 35.1 
1991 30.0 37.7 
1992 n.a 44.4 
Source: As Table V.7. 
Why has there been no significant increase in clothing production since the 
mid-eighties? The industry continues to face massive competition from imports, 
which account for more than half the domestic market. This includes competi-
tion from used clothing imported in bulk, with which local manufacturers are 
unable to compete. There has been some increase in exports (US $2.7 million 
in 1986-91) but not on the scale of knitted goods. Thus with increased import 
penetration and limited export growth, domestic production has not expanded 
significantly. 
It is unclear how far producers have benefited from increased access to 
imported inputs. Small-scale producers rely mainly on national inputs, but this 
probably reflects purchases from local wholesalers or retailers and the origin of 
these inputs may well be foreign. However, since these small producers 
probably took advantage of smuggled imports of fabric before liberalisation, 
changes in trade policy may not have benefited them significantly. Larger 
producers which import directly may now have better access to imported inputs. 
Contrary to what has taken place in the knitting industry, the evidence for the 
clothing industry is that there has been an increasing 'informalisation' of 
production. The estimated share of production accounted for by firms employing 
1-4 employees increased from 63% in 1987-8 to 77% in 1990-1991 (CNI, SUP). 
There is little new investment in this sector with the exception of a very small 
number of firms that have become major exporters of clothing. Similarly with 
the exception of these latter firms, there has been little technological or 
organisational change in the industry. 
This, together with stagnant production and increased proliferation of micro-
enterprises, has meant that there has been little increase in productivity in the 
industry. Indeed, labour productivity is lower in the early 1990s than it was in 
1980. 
Footwear (3240) 
As in the case of clothing, there was a major drop in consumer demand for 
footwear during the first half of the 1980s, falling by almost a half between 1980 
and 1985 (INE, 1989). The industry also faced competition from contraband, 
although not to the same extent as clothing. These factors led to a substantial 
reduction in production which fell in 1985 to about a third of its 1978 level (see 
Table V. 10). 
The decline of production continued after 1985. The liberalisation of trade 
and the unification of the exchange rate had a negative effect on shoe manufac-
turers. Before 1985, the fact that legal exports of leather were made at the 
official exchange rate, kept the price of the industry's key raw material 
artificially low in local currency, which helped it compete with imported shoes. 
The introduction of the single exchange rate led to a substantial increase in the 
price of leather causing costs to rise (PREALC, 1989). Thus the industry was 
particularly badly hit and had the largest fall in production of any industry in the 
post-1985 period. 
The Bolivian shoe industry is dominated by one major producer, which 
accounts for three-quarters of industrial production. There are a handful of 
medium-size producers and over 200 micro-enterprises (1-4 employees) which 
account for the remaining quarter of output. As a result, developments in the 
shoe industry depend very largely on the behaviour of the major manufacturer. 
This firm has increasingly resorted to sub-contracting and also imported shoes 
to distribute through its own chain of shops (PREALC, 1989). This has enabled 
it to reduce substantially its work force and employment in the industry as a 
whole fell by over a third between 1986 and 1991. 
Table V.10: Indicators for the Footwear Industry 
INVOFIM (1978 = 100) Permanent Workers (1980= 100) 
1980 62.6 100.0 
1985 31.0 n.a 
1986 34.2 73.7 
1987 21.2 59.3 
1988 22.9 51.5 
1989 23.2 46.1 
1990 20.9 43.0 
1991 24.8 47.4 
1992 n.a 51.0 
Source: As Table V.7. 
Levels of capacity utilisation in the shoe industry have remained low and 
there has been little new investment (World Bank, 1991, Table 5.4). The main 
organisational change has been the increased use of sub-contracting. The 
significant increase in labour productivity in the late 1980s and early 1990s is 
probably due to this factor, rather than to any major technological or organisa-
tional changes in the production process. It has also been suggested that the 
major producer has shifted its product mix towards low-cost shoes where it is 
better able to compete with imports, and this too would have led to an increase 
in physical productivity. 
Beer (3133) 
Household consumption of alcoholic beverages, of which beer was a major 
component, kept up much better than that of clothing and footwear during the 
crisis of the early 1980s (INE, 1989). As a result, beer production did not fall 
dramatically until the height of the hyperinflation in 1984 and 1985 (see Table 
V. l l ) . 
After 1985, consumer demand picked up rapidly and this was reflected in a 
recovery in production. Import liberalisation had very little impact on the 
industry because transport costs are high (almost 10% of the gross value of 
production) so that competition from imports is minimal. The major Bolivian 
breweries felt that the changes in trade policy in the mid-eighties had little 
impact on their activities. Not only did they experience little competition from 
imports, but they were also unaffected on the input side because the major 
imported inputs which they use, such as malt, hops etc., had been largely 
exempt from duties under the previous trade regimes (source: personal 
interviews). 
Table V . l l : Indicators for the Beer Industry 
INVOFIM (1978 = 100) Permanent Workers (1980= 100) 
1980 109.0 100.0 
1985 52.2 n.a 
1986 87.1 n.a 
1987 102.1 66.7 
1988 99.7 70.7 
1989 95.4 72.3 
1990 99.7 73.1 
1991 127.0 69.7 
1992 n.a 79.3 
Source: As Table V.7. 
By the early 1990s the breweries had become exporters to the tune of over $2 
million, mainly to neighbouring countries but also taking advantage of the 
growing consumer market for exotic beers in the USA (see next section). 
However exports are also limited by high transport costs and only account for 
a relatively small share of total beer production (less than 5% for the two 
breweries which do export). Thus, the main factor in growth of production since 
the mid-eighties has been the expansion of domestic demand. 
The beer industry is dominated by one firm, the Cervecerfa Boliviana 
Nacional (CBN) which accounts for over half the market, with two other large 
producers in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba respectively, and some smaller 
regional breweries. Since the mid-eighties, competition within the industry has 
intensified as regional markets have tended to break down and recently CBN 
opened a new brewery in Santa Cruz. A brewery owned by Taquina was also 
opened in Santa Cruz in 1987 to produce Heineken under licence, but this was 
not successful. 
There has been substantial investment in the industry since the mid-eighties, 
both to expand capacity and to modernise existing plant. The major investment 
has been the new CBN plant in Santa Cruz, which was built primarily to save on 
transport costs. However, the other breweries have also increased their capacity 
and modernised plant. These have led to some technological improvements, 
although apart from the new Santa Cruz plant these have been incremental rather 
than radical. There is little evidence of major organisational change in the 
industry, although the nature of beer production limits possibilities in this 
respect. There is considerable excess capacity in the industry following the 
opening of the new CBN plant. Taquina also has its second plant in Santa Cruz 
which is shut down at present. 
The recovery of production since the mid-eighties has been accompanied by 
an increase in labour productivity. Employment is down almost a third 
compared to its level in 1980, while output is higher than before the crisis. All 
three of the major breweries reported increased productivity as a result of new 
equipment and reduced manning levels. 
Increased productivity in this industry has not been a result of trade 
liberalisation since changes in trade policy have had little impact on the industry. 
Productivity growth may have been indirectly promoted by increased domestic 
competition in the industry as the regional division of the Bolivian market 
between the major producers breaks down. It is directly related to the significant 
investments which have taken place in the industry in recent years, distinguish-
ing it from other Bolivian manufacturing industries.22 
Soft Drinks (3134) 
Household consumption of non-alcoholic beverages fell by 60% in the first half 
of the 1980s (INE, 1989), and this was reflected in a drastic fall in domestic 
production (see Table V.12). However, as in the case of beer, production 
recovered rapidly after 1985 and by the late 1980s and early 1990s was well 
above the level of a decade earlier. 
Table V.12: Indicators for the Soft Drinks Industry 
INVOFIM (1978 = 100) Permanent Workers (1980= 100) 
1980 95.3 100.0 
1985 32.2 n.a 
1986 50.4 n.a 
1987 86.6 66.2 
1988 114.9 72.8 
1989 122.7 74.4 
1990 110.7 73.9 
1991 107.7 74.0 
1992 n.a 75.1 
Source: As Table V.7. 
Transport costs are an even more significant component of total costs for soft 
drinks than they are for beer, so that competition from imports is minimal. This 
is reinforced for those international brands which are produced under licence by 
the fact that the licensors grant rights for restricted geographical regions, which 
prevents firms in neighbouring countries from exporting. 
Some firms have taken advantage of the creation of commercial free trade 
zones to import concentrates. This enables them to delay payment of import 
duties until the concentrate is required, but otherwise the impact of the trade 
reforms on imported inputs has been limited. Thus, as in the case of the 
breweries, trade liberalisation has not had a major impact on the industry. 
The same reasons limiting competition from imports have also meant that the 
soft drinks industry has not exported from Bolivia. Growth since the mid-
eighties has therefore been entirely dependent on the recovery and growth of 
domestic demand. 
The industry is much more fragmented than the beer industry, with over 30 
bottlers in the whole country. Because of high transport costs, the market is 
highly regionalised, but there is still considerable competition in the major 
centre of La Paz (15 producers) and Santa Cruz (9). Competition within the 
industry has intensified in recent years on two fronts. Some of the large 
producers, particularly the two Coca Cola franchises in La Paz and Santa Cruz, 
have pursued aggressive expansion policies. At the same time, there has been 
an increase in the number of firms in the industry with the entry of several small 
firms producing their own brands, often using used bottles from the beer 
industry. As a result some of the medium-size producers have found their profits 
squeezed. 
This has been reflected in differences in the investment behaviour of different 
firms. The more dynamic companies have expanded, building new regional 
plants and increasing the capacity of their existing plants. On the other hand a 
number of producers, whose market share has declined, have invested very little 
in recent years. Amongst investing firms there has been some technological 
change, mainly associated with the introduction of large size, or plastic, bottles. 
Organisational changes have been limited although there have been improve-
ments in quality control in some firms. In several firms there has been a shift 
away from family control towards more professional management as a result of 
intensified competition in the industry. 
As in the case of the beer industry, the recovery of output since the mid-
eighties has been accompanied by increased labour productivity. Employment 
is down by a quarter compared to the level of 1980, while output has increased. 
The main cause of increased productivity mentioned by several firms has been 
the changes in labour legislation, introduced as part of the New Economic 
Policy, which made it easier to fire workers. Again, as in the case of beer, 
productivity increases have had little to do with trade liberalisation. 
The brief surveys of the six industries discussed in this section serve to throw 
some light on the earlier finding that there was little evidence of any link 
between trade liberalisation and productivity growth in Bolivian industry. 
The only industry where there is some evidence that the supposed mecha-
nisms through which liberalisation affects productivity were indeed operative 
was the knitting industry. Here there is evidence both to support the view that 
trade liberalisation has led to rationalisation and that increased availability of 
imported inputs has contributed to productivity improvements. Moreover a 
limited number of firms have responded to the new trade regime by increasing 
investment, modernising plant and reorganising production and even entering 
export markets. 
The other industries analysed provide little support for the operation of the 
neo-classical mechanisms. The other industry which was characterised by high 
growth of labour productivity in recent years was footwear. However, it would 
seem that a significant part of this productivity gain was illusory and that the 
overall impact of liberalisation has been negative since it has led to further 
contraction of production and very low levels of investment. 
Productivity growth was less marked in the other four industries considered. 
In the case of spinning and weaving, where import competition has led to further 
contraction of domestic production, there has been very little new investment or 
technological change and increased productivity is mainly a result of the closure 
of the most inefficient producers and scrapping of obsolete equipment. In 
clothing, stagnant production has been accompanied by increasing informality, 
limiting the scope for productivity increases. 
The two beverage industries have been relatively unaffected by the move to 
trade liberalisation. Although not facing increased competition from imports, 
in both industries, particularly soft drinks, there has been increased domestic 
competition in recent years. In the case of beer this has led to substantial 
investment and increased productivity, although this has been limited by 
increased excess capacity. In non-alcoholic beverages, although some firms 
have invested, financial constraints have limited the possibilities of others. As 
a result technological change has not been widespread and this has restricted 
productivity growth. 
Conclusion 
Labour productivity in Bolivian manufacturing industry has increased signifi-
cantly since the economic crisis of the mid-1980s, which raises the question of 
how far this was a result of the liberalisation of trade which took place after 
1985. The evidence of this section casts some doubt on the link between trade 
liberalisation and productivity growth. 
First of all, the statistical analysis above failed to find any relationship 
between productivity growth by industry and any of the variables which theory 
suggests link trade liberalisation and productivity. Specifically there was no 
relationship between the extent to which an industry faced competition from 
imports and its productivity performance, nor was there any link between 
reliance on imported inputs and performance. What is more, productivity 
growth was positively associated with production for the domestic market rather 
than for export. 
Increases in productivity may be brought about in a number of different ways 
(and should not be regarded as 'manna from heaven'). At the level of the firm, 
productivity may rise as a result of increased levels of production which enable 
the firm to take advantage of economies of scale or to increase capacity 
utilisation. Productivity may also increase as a result of investment in new 
machinery and equipment which embody more advanced technology. Changes 
in management and organisation can also result in increased productivity levels 
through, for example, the introduction of Just-in-Time and Total Quality 
Control methods. Finally, productivity may be increased as a result of reduced 
manning levels and increased work intensity or longer hours, when workers are 
laid off. 
At the industry level, the productivity of the industry as a whole may be 
increased through greater concentration of production in a smaller number of 
larger firms. Productivity may also rise where an industry contracts leading to 
the elimination of the least efficient producers and the scrapping of obsolete 
plant. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s there is little doubt that increased levels of 
output, as industry recovers from the crisis, have been a major factor in 
increased productivity. Capacity utilisation, for instance, has increased from just 
over a third in 1985 to more than 50% in the early 1990s (CNI, 1992, Table 16) 
and there is a clear relationship between growth of output and productivity. 
However the impact of trade liberalisation on output has been negative for 
many sectors. Industries such as spinning and weaving, clothing and footwear, 
which faced substantial import competition, have contracted since the mid-
eighties. Only in a few exceptional cases such as the knitting industry, which has 
managed to increase exports substantially, has there been significant growth in 
production among industries facing substantial import competition. 
A major constraint on productivity improvements in the Bolivian manufactur-
ing sector in recent years has been the low level of investment. As Table V. 13 
shows, this has not even been sufficient to balance depreciation, so that net 
investment in manufacturing has been negative. 
The overall depressed level of investment in manufacturing in this period 
partly reflects the lack of a buoyant market for domestic producers faced with 
the loss of market to imports. A survey of 59 manufacturing firms undertaken 
in 1991 found that over 53% considered competition from imports a 'most 
serious' problem constraining investment (World Bank, 1991, Table 5.7). 
Table V.13: 
Gross Fixed Capital Investment and Depreciation (Bs. million at current prices) 
Fixed Investment Depreciation 
1987-88 89.6 89.7 
1988-89 1*20.4 173.6 
1989-90 139.8 179.0 
1990-91 196.3 193.0 
Source: CNI, Sistema de Information Industrial Privado. 
Low investment also reflects the very high real rates of interest in Bolivia 
since 1985. The same survey found that 60% of manufacturing firms considered 
the cost and/or restricted availability of credit as a 'most serious' problem. With 
an average rate of gross profitability of 22% in manufacturing, interest rates of 
20% in dollar terms are a substantial disincentive to investment. 'Insider' firms 
which belong to groups which are linked to the banking sector are able to 
concentrate long-term development credits, while (usually smaller) 'outsider' 
firms are forced to rely on their own limited resources for investment (World 
Bank, 1991, p.59). 
There is little evidence of significant organisational changes taking place in 
Bolivian manufacturing. Not only are there very few examples of the new 
Japanese-style forms of organisation being introduced in Bolivian industry, but 
there seems to be very little awareness or knowledge of these practices among 
managers. Increased productivity as a result of such changes are in practice 
insignificant. 
A factor which has led to increased productivity in a number of firms has 
been increased intensity of work as a result of reductions in personnel. The new 
labour legislation introduced as part of the NEP in 1985 removed the traditional 
protection provided to workers, and this was an important factor in the 
reductions in manufacturing employment which occurred in 1986. The fact that 
reductions in employment have occurred both in firms/industries facing 
competition from imports and those which did not, such as the breweries and 
some of the soft drinks producers, indicate that increases in intensity of work 
were not primarily the result of trade liberalisation. 
At the industry level, there are some cases where rationalisation has occurred 
and this has contributed to productivity increases as in the case of the knitting 
industry. However in other industries, such as clothing, the trend has been in the 
opposite direction towards increased proliferation of small scale producers and 
the growing 'informalisation' of the industry. The growth of small scale 
'informal' producers has also occurred in other industries which have not been 
subject to import competition such as soft drinks. Thus there is no clear evidence 
that trade liberalisation has contributed to increased productivity through 
rationalisation at the industry level. 
The most clear way in which liberalisation has contributed to increased 
productivity at the industry level is through the elimination of high-cost 
producers and the scrapping of obsolete capacity. This has been an important 
mechanism in the spinning and weaving industry which had a considerable 
amount of old machinery in the mid-eighties and where a number of inefficient 
firms have closed down. However, such increases in productivity are more 
apparent than real since they represent no technological or organisational 
improvement in production. 
There is very little evidence from the Bolivian case to support the view that 
trade liberalisation leads to significant productivity improvements in manufac-
turing. The theoretical arguments on which this expectation is based are in any 
case fragile. The Bolivian evidence both from the cross-section data analysed in 
Section 4 and the individual industry case studies discussed in Section 5 suggest 
that trade liberalisation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for rapid 
productivity growth. 
VI: TRADE LIBERALISATION 
AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE 
Introduction 
An important plank in the case for trade liberalisation is the belief that a more 
liberal regime will lead to increased exports which in turn will have a favourable 
effect on economic growth and employment generation. A major element in the 
critique of import substituting industrialisation (ISI) was that such policies 
created a bias against exports, so that 'export pessimism' became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
As was indicated in Section I, trade liberalisation is defined in terms of 
reduced trade controls and a move towards neutrality in the sense of equal 
effective rates of protection for different activities, including production for the 
domestic and the export market. Thus an important element of trade reform 
should be a reduction in the anti-export bias of the trade regime. A second way 
in which it has been argued that liberalisation can contribute to improved export 
performance is through the increased availability of imported inputs (Dorn-
busch, 1992). Finally, trade liberalisation may be accompanied by a more 
competitive real effective exchange rate which will also boost exports. 
In this section, the performance of Bolivia's non-traditional exports of 
manufactures is analysed to see whether there is a prima facie case for believing 
that trade liberalisation has led to improved export performance. The mecha-
nisms through which the New Economic Policy could have affected exports are 
examined and there is a statistical analysis of the determinants of manufactured 
export performance in Bolivia and the impact which trade liberalisation has had 
on exports. These issues are then explained further, based on a number of firm-
level surveys and industry case studies. 
Has Export Performance Improved since 1985? 
Level of Exports and Export Growth 
We first turn to the question of whether trade reform has been reflected in better 
export performance in Bolivia in the period since 1985 when the New Economic 
Policy was introduced. Figure VI. 1 shows the evolution of Bolivia's total 
exports, non-traditional exports (i.e. all exports except minerals and petroleum 
and natural gas) and manufacturing non-traditional exports between 1978 and 
1992. In all three cases, exports declined sharply during the first half of the 
1980s. Non-traditional exports, including non-traditional manufactures 
recovered strongly after 1985 and by the end of the decade surpassed their 
previous peak level. Low prices for tin and natural gas, and the general decline 
of Bolivian tin mining however, affected traditional exports, and as a result the 
level of total exports remains below that of 1980. 
Figure VI. l 
Bolivian Exports, 1986-1992 
($mn) 
In analysing the impact of trade reform on export performance, the most 
relevant indicator is exports of non-traditional manufactures. Many of the 
studies of the impact of trade orientation have used such an indicator. In the 
Bolivian case,traditional exports have been affected by external factors which 
have little to do with the changes in trade policy, while by their nature 
agricultural exports are subject to the vagaries of climate and again may not 
accurately indicate the effects of policy changes. In what follows, therefore, the 
focus will be on non-traditional manufactured exports, which excludes some 
processed minerals classified as manufactures in the International Standard 
Industrial Classification. 
Manufactured exports grew rapidly in the late 1970s, but then fell precipi-
tously with the economic crisis of the first half of the 1980s. The recovery since 
1985 has occurred in two sharp steps: first an increase of almost fourfold in 
1986 and then a further doubling of exports in 1989. In other years the level of 
exports has tended to stagnate, or even decline slightly. 
What this suggests is that there has been a significant upward shift in the level 
of non-traditional manufactured exports in the post-1985 period. However it is 
less clear whether this has been a once-and-for-all shift in the level of exports, 
or a move to a higher growth trajectory. 
To test for this, two multiple regressions were run, using a dummy variable 
for the years from 1986 onwards to assess the effects of liberalisation. Since the 
economic crisis of the early 1980s obviously had a negative effect on exports, 
GDP is included in the regression to capture the effect of the overall level of 
economic activity on exports. First, the level of manufacturing exports (MFGX) 
was regressed on GDP and the liberalisation dummy (LIB): 
MFGX = -521 + 5.6GDP* + 53LIB* Adj R2 = 0.79 
(-4.6) (5.1) (4.1) D W = 1.61 
(t-statistics in brackets) 
The results support the view that the level of exports in the post-1985 period was 
significantly higher than in the earlier period. 
Second, the annual growth rate of manufactured exports was regressed on 
GDP growth (GDPgr) and the liberalisation dummy: 
MFGXgr = -25 + 135LIB* - 19GDPgr* Adj R2 = 0.27 
(-0.9) (2.65) (-2.1) D W = 1.64 
Although the explanatory power of this equation is not as strong as the earlier 
one, the liberalisation coefficient is still significant at the 5% level, indicating 
that the rate of growth of exports as well as its level has increased since 1985. 
Sources of Growth 
Another indicator of the improved export performance of the manufacturing 
sector in the post-liberalisation period is the significant contribution made by 
exports to the growth of manufacturing output between 1986 and 1991. In 
aggregate, exports accounted for over half the increase in manufacturing 
production in this period, while import substitution was, not surprisingly, 
negative (see Table VI. 1). 
This result needs to be qualified by the observation that the significant 
contribution of exports is the result of the performance of two sectors: (i) 
textiles, clothing and footwear and (ii) base metals. The only other sectors in 
which exports contributed to growth in a major way were wood and wood 
products, and chemicals. In all other manufacturing sectors, domestic demand 
was the major contributor to industrial expansion. 
Table VI. 1: 
Contribution of Exports, Import Substitution and Domestic Demand to Growth of Production, 
1986-1991 
Exports Import Domestic 
(%) Substitutes (%) Demand (%) 
Meat Products 0 -1 101 
Dairy Products 0 33 67 
Flour Milling & Bakeries -9 -2 111 
Sugar & Confectionery 1 1 98 
Other Food Products 0 -2 102 
Drink 1 2 97 
Tobacco 0 3 97 
Textiles, Clothing & Leather Products 435 -512 -24 
Wood & Wood Products 55 -32 -123 
Paper & Paper Products 0 94 6 
Chemicals 526 -1,159 733 
Petroleum Products 3 9 89 
Non-metallic Minerals 0 32 67 
Base Metals 133 -30 -3 
Metal Products, Machinery & Equipment -36 108 28 
Other Manufacturing 18 32 50 
Total Manufacturing 51 -11 60 
Note: Each column shows the increase in the variable indicated as a percentage of the total 
increase in local production. Production declined in two industries, Textiles, 
Clothing and Leather and Wood and Wood Products. In these industries the total of 
the three columns therefore sums to -100%. 
Source: author's elaboration from INE data. 
The Structure of Exports 
While there appears to have been a quantitative shift in the level of exports with 
liberalisation, a further question is whether or not this has been accompanied by 
a qualitative change in exports. Two questions are of particular interest in this 
context. First, has there been an upgrading of exports from relatively unpro-
cessed products to more complex goods which incorporate more value added? 
Second, has there been a diversification of exports in terms of both products and 
markets? Data are not readily available to answer these questions for manufac-
tured exports, so that they will be examined using information on non-traditional 
exports as a whole where necessary. 
Table VI.2 compares the structure of non-traditional exports in the five years 
from 1976-80 with that for the last five years. It can be seen that while total 
exports have more than doubled between the two periods, exports of processed 
goods have increased only slightly. Manufactured exports can be roughly 
identified with semi-processed and processed products which account for 
approximately two-thirds of non-traditional exports. Within manufactures, there 
has been a complete reversal in the relative importance of less and more 
processed goods, with semi-processed exports almost doubling their share while 
that of processed products fell by almost a half. In other words the composition 
of manufactured exports has shifted significantly towards less highly processed 
goods. 
Table VI.2: 
Non-Traditional Exports by Degree of Processing, 1976-80 and 1988-92 
1976-1980 1988-1992 
$mn % $mn % 
Primary 177.1 33.5 352.6 32.2 
Semi-processed 131.3 24.9 507.3 46.3 
Processed 217.2 41.1 233.7 21.3 
Other 2.6 0.5 1.8 0.2 
Total 528.2 100 1095.4 100 
Source: DICOMEX and Ministerio de Exportaciones y Competitividad Economica. 
Despite the growth of exports since 1985, there has been little diversification 
in terms of products exported. Four products accounted for two-thirds of non-
traditional exports in 1970 and this concentration remained unchanged in the late 
1980s (UDAPE, 1990b, p. 11). In the case of manufactured exports, two four-
digit industries, saw mills (3311) and oils and fats (3115), have consistently 
accounted for half of the total in each year since 1986 (MECE data). 
Similarly, data on the destination of non-traditional exports show that they 
have remained concentrated mainly within Latin America with the Andean Pact 
countries and other Latin American countries accounting for around three-fifths 
of the total (Table VI.3). Indeed, if anything, the trend seems to be towards 
greater concentration on regional markets. 
In conclusion then, the growth of non-traditional and manufactured exports 
after 1985 has not been accompanied by diversification either in the structure of 
those exports or of the markets in which they have been sold. In so far as there 
has been a change in the structure of manufactured exports, this has been away 
from more highly manufactured goods towards products which involve limited 
processing of local raw materials. 
Although there has been some improvement in export performance in Bolivia 
following the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1985, the ways in 
which trade reform affected export performance have still to be analysed. As 
indicated above, there are a number of ways in which protection can have a 
negative effect on exports and hence trade liberalisation may lead to improved 
export performance. The remaining sections of this section will consider the 
evidence of each of these effects in the Bolivian case. 
Table VI.3: 
Share of Non-traditional Exports going to Andean Pact and ALADI Countries, 1981,1986, 
1992 
1981(%) 1986(%) 1992 (%) 
Andean Pact (AP) 28.5 41.2 26.1 
ALADI 30.8 21.2 38.2 
AP + ALADI 59.3 62.4 64.3 
Source: DICOMEX and MECE. 
Mechanisms linking Trade Liberalisation and Export Growth 
Removal of Bias Against Exports 
As was discussed in Section II, protection can lead to both an absolute and a 
relative bias against exports. The first question that needs to be considered is 
whether these biases against exports have been removed or reduced in Bolivia 
as a result of trade liberalisation. This requires an estimation of the ERP on 
exports. 
(i) ERP on Exports 
The ERP on exports can be calculated by substituting the level of export 
incentive for the level of protection of output in the equation for calculating the 
ERP on production for the domestic market. For this purpose, the incentive 
actually paid as a percentage of total non-traditional exports was used for 1988 
and 1990. In the absence of such data for 1982, it was assumed that the average 
export incentive for manufactured goods under the CERTEX system was 10%. 
Table VI.4 estimates the effective protection for exports in each of these years. 
(ii) Relative Anti-Export Bias 
The relative bias against exports is defined as [ 1 + ERP(D)]/[ 1 • ERP(X)] where 
ERP(D) and ERP{X) are the effective rates of protection on production for the 
domestic market and exports respectively (Balassa, 1982). 
Table VI.4 shows a substantial reduction in the anti-export bias between 1982 
and 1988, as a result primarily of the large reduction in the ERP on production 
for the domestic market discussed above. Nevertheless despite trade liberal-
isation, there continued to be a significant bias in favour of production for the 
domestic market. Although the CRA was established in 1987, only a limited 
amount of credits were issued in 1988 so that the incentive was very low. By 
1990, however, the CRA was fully operational and import duties had been 
further reduced so that there was only a slight bias against exports. 
Table VI.4: Estimates of the Bias Against Exports 
NRP(%) x (%) ERP (D) 
(%) 
ERP (X) 
(%) 
Rel Bias 
(%) 
1982 47.7 10.0a 94.1 -22.8 2.51 
1988 14.0 0.87 17.1 -14.4 1.37 
1990 9.7 7.5 8.9 3.5 1.05 
NRP - tariff on output 
x - export incentive 
ERP(D) - ERP on sales on domestic market 
ERP(X) - ERP on export sales 
Rel Bias - [1 + ERP(D)]/[1 + ERP(X)] 
Note: a The tax rebate for exporters varied from 5% to 25 % depending on the product. 
The figure of 10% is an estimate of the average incentive for manufactured exports. 
Source: Econometria (1987); author's elaboration. 
Information on the actual level of protection of the domestic market after 
1990 is not available; therefore, it was not possible to calculate ERPs for more 
recent years. However, the incentive received on exports was reduced from 
7.5% in 1990 to 3.4% in 1991 as a result of the reduction in the level of the 
CRA and its subsequent replacement by the Drawback system. Therefore, it is 
likely that the relative bias against exports increased after 1990, although 
remaining well below the levels prior to 1985. 
iii) Absolute Bias 
The crucial determinant of international competitiveness, as indicated above, is 
the absolute bias against exports. The extent to which there is an absolute bias 
against exports depends on the impact of tariff duties on inputs and the level of 
export incentives. If the ERP on exports is negative, this indicates the existence 
of an anti-export bias. 
Table VI.4 indicates that, although there was a reduction in the absolute bias 
against exports between 1982 and 1988, this was nowhere near as marked as the 
reduction in the relative anti-export bias. This can be attributed to two factors. 
First the level of import duties on industrial inputs did not fall significantly as 
a result of trade liberalisation and for many industries the cost of imported 
inputs actually increased (Espejo et al, 1988, pp.40-41). Secondly, in 1988 the 
CRA offered little real incentive to exporters since it was only beginning to be 
implemented. Thus, as far as the absolute level of international competitiveness 
of exports was concerned, trade liberalisation made very little difference. 
The situation changed in 1989 and 1990 when the CRA was fully in operation. 
As a result the absolute bias against exports of manufactured goods was removed 
in 1990 and the export incentive slightly more than compensated exporters for 
the additional cost of inputs. However, this situation appears to have been short-
lived. As indicated above, the incentive to exporters was reduced substantially 
in 1991 and this probably resulted in the reappearance of an absolute anti-export 
bias.23 
(iv) Conclusion 
Trade liberalisation in Bolivia therefore had a substantial effect on the relative 
bias against exports by reducing protection for the domestic market. However, 
the significance of this is unclear since high levels of excess capacity and 
unemployment in Bolivia mean that it cannot be argued that any increase in 
production for the domestic market must be at the expense of exports. 
Trade liberalisation does not appear to have had such a major impact on the 
absolute level of export competitiveness. Moreover the reduction in export 
incentives which resulted from IMF and World Bank pressures to abolish the 
CRA in 1991 have reduced the international competitiveness of exports. 
Access to Imported Inputs 
A second way in which trade liberalisation may lead to better export perfor-
mance is through greater access to imported inputs and capital goods. Restrictive 
trade regimes may make it difficult for potential exporters to obtain the inputs 
or equipment which they require. Liberalisation increases the availability of 
such imported inputs. 
There is little doubt that in the period immediately before the trade reforms 
of the mid-1980s, access to imports did represent a problem for Bolivian 
manufacturers, as was indicated in section V. While there is evidence that 
foreign exchange for imported inputs was more readily available under the New 
Economic Policy, the question still remains whether this contributed to the 
growth of exports. 
A More Competitive Real Effective Exchange Rate 
A major factor determining a country's export performance is the level of its 
Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER). It is therefore relevant to look at how 
this evolved in Bolivia during the period under consideration. Figure VI.2 shows 
the evolution of the REER as calculated by the IMF from 1978 to 1992. It shows 
a steady appreciation of the boliviano in the late 1970s and early 1980s which 
accelerated as hyperinflation took a grip in 1984 and 1985. There was a sharp 
real depreciation in 1986, followed by a very slight further depreciation to 1990. 
Figure VI.2 
Manufactured Exports and REER 
1978-1992 
Although the REER is clearly less overvalued now than it was in the mid-
19808, it is not possible to establish on the basis of the above data whether it is 
now over- or under-valued, or indeed whether it is more or less overval-
ued/undervalued than in the late 1970s. The reason for this is that, although 
there has been a real depreciation compared to the late 1970s, the equilibrium 
real exchange rate has almost certainly changed over the period because of the 
way in which its underlying determinants have altered. 
The main factor here has been the difficulties faced by Bolivia's traditional 
export industries, tin and natural gas, leading to a substantial deterioration in the 
terms of trade, which fell from 100 in 1980 to 70 in 1985 and 32 in 1991 
(UDAPE, 1992a, Table 3.2.9). Another factor which has tended to reduce the 
equilibrium real exchange rate has been the process of trade liberalisation itself. 
It has also been suggested that reductions in capital inflows have been a further 
factor tending to depreciate the equilibrium rate. Thus, some writers continue 
to regard the exchange rate as overvalued in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(Edwards, 1992; Ferrufino Goitia, 1992). It has also been argued that Bolivian 
coca exports may have had a 'Dutch disease' type effect on the exchange rate 
(Jenkins, 1990). 
A More Stable Real Effective Exchange Rate 
A further factor which may affect export performance is the stability of the real 
exchange rate. A highly volatile real exchange rate makes it difficult for firms 
to predict the returns which they will obtain from exporting, and this increased 
uncertainty acts as a disincentive to exports. 
In order to test the hypothesis that the real exchange rate became more stable 
after the introduction of the NEP, monthly data for the exchange rate between 
the boliviano and the US dollar, and the monthly consumer price index for 
Bolivia were used to calculate the real exchange rate from 1978 to 1992 (this 
does not take into account the effect of US inflation on the real effective 
exchange rate, but since US inflation in this period was fairly low it would not 
have a great impact on the variability of the real exchange rate which is our 
prime concern here). 
The variability of the exchange rate was measured using the coefficient of 
variation of the monthly real exchange rate in each year. This shows a 
significantly higher level of fluctuation in the period 1982-85 than either before 
or after. From 1987 onwards the policy of gradually devaluing the boliviano has 
kept the real exchange rate very stable even compared to the situation in the 
early 1980s. There is little doubt, even given the crudity of the measure used, 
that the returns to exporting have been much more stable since the implementa-
tion of the New Economic Policy. 
The reduction in the anti-export bias compared to the pre-1985 period, the 
increased availability of imported inputs and the more realistic and less volatile 
real exchange rate are all expected to have a positive effect on Bolivian exports 
of manufactures. The determinants of export performance are analysed below, 
in order to identify the contribution of each of these factors to the growth of 
exports. 
Determinants of Bolivian Manufactured Export Performance 
The Growth of Total Manufactured Exports 
There are a number of factors which may influence the level of exports of 
manufactures from a country on a year by year basis. Those most frequently 
found in empirical studies of export performance include the real effective 
exchange rate, domestic market conditions, the level of export incentives, and 
world market demand. 
A model of this kind was fitted to annual data for Bolivia for the years from 
1978 to 1992, which has roughly equal time periods before and after the 
introduction of the NEP. Because the volume of Bolivian exports is so small in 
relation to world trade in manufactures, it was not considered necessary to 
include a term for world market demand. 
The model was estimated with the annual change in manufactured exports as 
the dependent variable. In order to establish the basic model, exports were 
expressed as a function of manufacturing GDP, capacity utilisation and a real 
exchange rate variable. The size of manufacturing GDP is taken as a proxy for 
economies of scale and is expected to be positively correlated with export 
growth. The level of capacity utilisation is used as an indicator of domestic 
demand conditions. It is expected to be negatively related to the growth of 
exports because when capacity utilisation levels rise, production may be diverted 
to the domestic market. A high level of the real effective exchange rate, 
indicating an overvaluation of the local currency, makes exports uncompetitive 
and it is therefore expected that there will be a negative relationship with the 
growth of exports. Similarly, a highly unstable real exchange rate increases the 
risk of exporting and should therefore be negatively related to export growth. 
Because of the high degree of co-linearity between the level of the real exchange 
rate and its instability, it was not possible to include both as independent 
variables in the same equation. Equations la to le therefore use the level of the 
real effective exchange rate while equations If to lj are estimated using the 
instability variable. 
Equations la, lb, If and lg give the results of these regressions. All the 
coefficients have the expected signs with capacity utilisation and the two 
exchange rate variables all negative and the manufacturing GDP being positive. 
The relationship between export growth and the size of the manufacturing sector 
is not, however, statistically significant and it is therefore dropped from 
subsequent equations. 
The exchange rate is clearly a key determinant of the growth of manufactured 
exports in this period. The existence of a significant inverse relationship 
between the REER and exports is given further support by a recent study of non-
traditional exports using quarterly data over the period from 1988 to 1992 
(Pinell Siles, 1993). Thus, whether one looks at the longer term, when there 
have been very large changes in the real effective exchange rate, or the more 
recent short term period in which variations have been much less pronounced, 
the real effective exchange rate has been an important determinant of export 
performance. 
There is also evidence of an inverse relationship between the growth of 
exports and the level of capacity utilisation, suggesting that exports may be a 
way of utilising excess capacity when domestic demand is depressed. 
Equation la lb lc Id le 
Const 1067 
(3.30) 
1159 
(3.67) 
1065 
(3.16) 
1085 
(3.21) 
1104 
(3.74) 
REER -4.35* 
(3.27) 
-4.85* 
(3.56) 
-4.28* 
(3.00) 
-4.54* 
(3.13) 
-5.44* 
(4.04) 
CAPUT -18.3* 
(3.12) 
-25.7* 
(3.09) 
-18.3* 
(2.99) 
-19.5* 
(2.89) 
-19.3* 
(3.59) 
GDP 0.02 
(1.24) 
CRA 1.46 
(0.20) 
MIMP 0.22 
(0.42) 
MDUTY 4.86** 
(1.85) 
Adj R2 0.40 0.43 0.35 0.36 0.50 
DW 1.73 1.78 1.72 1.79 2.03 
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 
Equation If 1* lh li li 
Const 962 
(3.19) 
978 
(3.15) 
963 
(3.07) 
988 
(3.15) 
937 
(2.88) 
REER -4.94* 
(3.21) 
-5.09* 
(3.18) 
-4.84* 
(2.96) 
-4.94* 
(3.11) 
-4.98* 
(3.10) 
CAPUT -18.1* 
(3.06) 
-21.4* 
(2.64) 
-18.2* 
(2.96) 
-17.4* 
(2.78) 
-17.8* 
(2.83) 
GDP 0.01 
(0.61) 
CRA 2.24 
(0.31) 
MIMP -0.29 
(0.57) 
MDUTY 0.77 
(0.28) 
Adj R2 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.34 
DW 2.52 2.58 2.50 2.37 2.60 
Observations 15 15 15 15 15 
Notes 
REER - index of real effective exchange rate; 
RERVAR - monthly variance of effective exchange rate 
CAPUT - capacity utilisation3; GDP - value of manufacturing GDP in constant prices; 
CRA - value of CRA issued as a % of non-traditional exports; 
MIMP - value of imports of raw materials and intermediate inputs for industry; 
MDUTY - average import duty paid on imports of raw materials and intermediate inputs for 
industryb 
a Data pre-1982 estimated from deviation of index of manufacturing production (INVOFIM) from 
trend. 
b Data pre-1981 estimated from data on the value of import duty paid on all imports. 
Figures in brackets are t-statistics 
* - significant at 5% level; ** - significant at 1 % level. 
The question then arises of whether the specific trade policy measures 
introduced as part of the NEP have also contributed to export performance. If 
changes in the relative incentive to export was a significant determinant of 
performance, it would show up in terms of a significant positive coefficient on 
an export incentive variable. Similarly if increased access to imports was 
important, there would be a positive relationship between the growth of exports 
and the level of imported inputs for the industrial sector. If there was an absolute 
bias against exports as a result of high tariffs on imported inputs, this would be 
reflected in an inverse relation between the level of import duties and the growth 
of exports. 
To test the first hypothesis, the ratio of the value of the CRA issued in each 
year to the value of non-traditional exports was included as an additional 
independent variable in equations lc and lh. Although the CRA variable had the 
correct sign in both cases, in neither was it statistically significant. 
In order to test the second hypothesis, the value of imported industrial inputs 
was included as an independent variable in Equations Id and li. The variable 
enters the two equations with opposite signs, but in neither case is it significantly 
different from zero. 
Finally, in order to see whether the level of import duties on imported inputs 
for industry acted as a disincentive for exports, an import duty variable was 
introduced in equations le and lj. In the case of equation le, where the level of 
the real effective exchange rate is taken as the exchange rate variable, the level 
of tariffs paid on imports is significant at the 10% level. However the sign on 
the coefficient is positive, not negative as expected. In equation lj the import 
duty term is not significantly different from zero. 
The time series evidence supports the view that the real exchange rate is an 
important factor affecting export performance. It seems, therefore, that it is the 
exchange rate policy aspects of the NEP which has made the main contribution 
to export growth. On the other hand, there is no evidence that either greater 
availability of imported inputs, or changes in trade policy variables have 
contributed significantly to export performance. 
Intra-Industry Export Performance 
In order to explore further the impact of trade liberalisation on exports, the 
pattern of intra-industry export performance will be considered. Since the 
introduction of the NEP some sectors have experienced rapid export growth 
while in others exports have fallen. 
As in the case of the time series data analysed above, a number of factors may 
account for differences in intra-industry export performance. These include 
domestic market conditions, world demand, differences in the comparative 
advantage of different industries, and the level of incentives. 
At the level of 14 national accounts manufacturing sectors, the growth of 
exports between 1986 and 1991 was regressed on various factors which were 
considered determinants of export performance. Domestic market conditions 
were proxied by the rate of growth of non-export production. In the expectation 
that, as a low income country, Bolivia would have a comparative advantage in 
labour-intensive industries, the capital-labour ratio was included as an 
explanatory variable. Once more world demand was not considered because of 
the small share of Bolivia in all trade in manufactured goods. 
Exports were found to be negatively related to the growth in production for 
the domestic market during the same period, again supporting the finding in the 
previous section that depressed demand conditions were a factor contributing to 
export growth (see Equation 2a). The effect of the proxy for comparative 
advantage was more surprising. Equation 2b shows a significant positive 
relationship between capital intensity and the growth of exports, indicating that 
exports have grown most rapidly in the more capital-intensive sectors of 
industry24. The most plausible explanation for this finding is that Bolivia's 
comparative advantage is based more on local natural resources, rather than on 
labour intensity. 
Determinants of Export Growth, 1986-1991, for 14 Manufacturing Sectors 
Equation 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 
Const 51.1 
(4.44) 
22.6 
(1.44) 
25.4 
(0.86) 
24.5 
(1.35) 
-14.0 
(0.69) 
GrNXP -0.83* 
(3.90) 
-0.84* 
(4.63) 
-0.86* 
(3.47) 
-0.84* 
(4.39) 
-0.92* 
(5.92) 
K/L 2.19* 
(2.32) 
2.15** 
(2.03) 
2.24** 
(2.22) 
2.95* 
(3.46) 
DERP -0.03 
(0.12) 
ERP88 -0.16 
(0.25) 
MIMP 0.79* 
(2.39) 
Adj R2 0.52 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.75 
DW 2.14 2.72 2.72 2.78 3.26 
Observations 14 14 14 14 14 
Notes: GrNXP - growth of non-export production, 1986-91 
K/L - fixed assets per person employed, 1987/8 
DERP - change in ERP, 1982-1988 
ERP88 - ERP, 1988 
MINP - imported inputs as % of total inputs, 1988 
Figures in brackets are t-statistics 
* - significant at 5 % level; ** - significant at 1 % level. 
As regards the effect of trade liberalisation, two hypotheses were tested. The 
first is that export performance is influenced by the extent of the anti-export bias 
in each sector. It is assumed that the level of the Effective Rate of Protection in 
an industry is a good proxy for the degree of anti-export bias. Two formulations 
of this hypothesis were tested. The first assumes that export growth will be most 
rapid where the change in anti-export bias between the pre- and post-liberal-
isation period is greatest. The second assumes that export growth will be fastest 
in those industries with the lowest anti-export bias after liberalisation. To test 
the first of these formulations, the change in ERP between 1982 and 1988 was 
added to the equation. However, this was not statistically significant and the sign 
was negative not positive as predicted (Equation 2c). When the level of ERP in 
1988 was used as a proxy for the anti-export bias post-liberalisation, although 
the sign was negative as predicted, the coefficient was not significantly different 
from zero (Equation 2d).25 
The second hypothesis tested is that the increased availability of imported 
inputs as a result of trade liberalisation will contribute to an improvement in 
export performance. If indeed increased availability of imported inputs has led 
to increased exports, then it is to be expected that the increase in exports would 
be most marked in those industries which rely most heavily on imported inputs, 
and that those which are based on local inputs would not be as affected. To test 
this hypothesis, the share of imports in total inputs after liberalisation (1988) 
was included as an independent variable in Equation 2e. As expected the 
variable was positively related to the growth of exports and significant at the 5% 
level. A word of caution is in order, however, since the very high Durbin-
Watson statistic suggests that there may be a problem with the specification of 
the model. 
The national accounts sectors used for the above analysis are at quite a high 
level of aggregation which may give rise to some relationships not emerging 
clearly. Moreover the small number of observations is clearly a problem from 
the statistical point of view. In order to overcome this problem, regressions 
were also run at the 4-digit level of the industrial classification. For this exercise 
31 4-digit industries for which data were available were used. 
Once more the basic model linked exports to domestic market conditions and 
to industry variables to proxy for differences in comparative advantage across 
industries. As in the case of the time series analysis, market conditions were 
proxied by the level of capacity utilisation in each industry.26 The variable used 
to measure comparative advantage by industry was value added per person 
employed, which is often used as a proxy for the combined physical and human 
capital intensity of production. Again, given the relatively low levels of physical 
and human capital in Bolivia, it is expected that this variable will be negatively 
correlated with export performance. 
Equation 3a shows that both capacity utilisation and capital intensity are 
significantly related to the growth of exports. As expected, the coefficient on 
capacity utilisation is negative, confirming the relationship found using time 
series data. There is, however, a positive relationship between export growth 
and capital intensity, confirming the finding from the analysis based on national 
accounts sectors, indicating that this was not a spurious result of excessive 
aggregation. 
Determinants of Export Growth, 1986-91, at 4-digit Level 
Equation 3a 3b 3c 3d 
Constant 50,152 41,443 
(1.29) 
58,880 
(1.85) 
6248 
(2.03) 
CAPUT -1444* 
(-2.74) 
-1412* 
(-2.39) 
-1680* 
(-2.71) 
-1703 
(-2.80) 
VA/L +994* 
(3.76) 
+ 1084 
(3.67) 
+1040* 
(3.76) 
+ 1066* 
(3.94) 
CHPROT -242 
(-0.70) 
MSHARE -886 
(-0.04) 
MCONT -20562 
(-0.58) 
Adj R2 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.41 
DW 2.24 2.33 2.23 2.29 
Observations 31 31 30 30 
Notes: CAPUT - capacity utilisation, 1987-88 
VA/L - value added per person employed, 1988 
CHPROT - change in nominal protection 1982-1988 
MSHARE - imported inputs as a share of total inputs, 1988 
MCONT - ratio of imported inputs to gross production, 1988 
Figures in brackets are t-statistics 
* - significant at 5% level; ** - significant at 1 % level. 
To test for the impact of trade liberalisation, other variables were added to the 
basic model. Unfortunately, there are no estimates of effective protection in 
Bolivia at the four-digit level, so that the nominal rate of protection had to be 
used as a proxy for the degree of anti-export bias. Equation 3b shows that there 
is no statistically significant relationship between the reduction in protection in 
an industry after liberalisation and the rate of growth of exports. 
Is there then a link between the availability of imported inputs and export 
performance, as appeared to be the case at the more aggregative level? To test 
this hypothesis, two measures of reliance on imported inputs were used, the 
share of imports in total inputs and the ratio of imported inputs to gross 
production. Once more it was expected that the industries which rely most 
heavily on imported inputs would have the fastest rate of growth of exports. In 
fact, however, the coefficient on both these variables was negative, although in 
neither case was it significantly different from zero (see Equations 3c and 3d). 
The evidence from cross-section data is consistent with the finding from time 
series data that domestic demand conditions and exchange rate variables have 
been the main determinants of export performance. It also broadly confirms the 
scepticism expressed earlier concerning the impact of trade liberalisation per se 
on Bolivian exports since 1985. As was seen above, there was no significant 
relationship between reductions in protection and increases in exports after 
1985. Indeed, it has even been pointed out that some of the most successful 
sectors in terms of exports, edible oils, flour milling and sugar refining, are also 
industries which continue to receive significant protection (Montano and 
Villegas, 1993, p.72). Similarly, although access to imported inputs became 
significantly easier after 1986, the evidence that this made a major contribution 
to export growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s is rather weak. 
Case Studies 
In order to explore further the relationship between trade liberalisation and 
export performance, data from firm surveys will be drawn upon. Such surveys 
can provide an indication of the factors which firms themselves considered to 
have had a favourable impact on exports and what they consider to be the major 
obstacles to increased exports. These in turn can help evaluate the impact which 
trade liberalisation has had on export performance.27 
The Overall Position 
A survey of the non-traditional export sector carried out in 1992 by the Bolivian 
government think-tank, Unidad de Analisis de Politicas Economicas (UDAPE, 
1992a), indicates that the most important factors identified by the sample of 70 
firms in explaining the growth of exports were favourable international prices 
and a comparative advantage based on natural resources (e.g. in the case of 
agro-industrial exports). The third ranked factor in encouraging exports was 
limited local market demand (see Table VI.5). 
On the other hand, specific government efforts at export promotion such as 
export incentives, institutional support, or promotion in overseas markets, were 
not major factors in the growth of exports for the vast majority of firms. The 
impact of the new economic model introduced in 1985 was in an intermediate 
position, with about a sixth of firms citing this as a major factor in the growth 
of exports. The major contribution which the model made to exports was 
basically through establishing macroeconomic stability (UDAPE, 1992a, p. 19). 
Table VI.5: Factors Encouraging the Growth of Exports 
Factor % Response 
International Prices 44.9 
Comparative Advantage 42.9 
Limited Domestic Market 20.4 
New Economic Model 16.3 
Skilled Labour 6.1 
Cheap Labour 4.1 
Fiscal Incentives 4.1 
Institutional Support 2.0 
Promotion in Foreign Markets 2.0 
Other 12.2 
Source: UDAPE (1992a), Table 3. 
Further light can be thrown on this issue by considering the factors which 
firms consider to be the major obstacles to increased exports. The most serious 
problem identified by the firms surveyed by UDAPE was financing, particularly 
the high cost of capital not only for fixed investment, but also for pre- and post-
shipment costs (UDAPE, 1992a,, Table A.4). A second major factor was 
considered to be the inadequate transport infrastructure (UDAPE, 1992a, Table 
7). These findings coincide with those of a 1991 World Bank survey which also 
identified the restricted availability and high cost of credit and the inadequate 
transport infrastructure as the major constraints on investment by exporting 
firms (World Bank, 1991, Tables 5.7 and 5.9). 
Two other factors which, although not as serious as those mentioned above, 
were identified by a number of firms as important obstacles, were low levels of 
labour productivity and a lack of price competitiveness. Low productivity was 
identified as a moderate or severe problem in the leather, wood and textile 
industries (UDAPE, 1992a, p.22). The lack of price competitiveness was also 
seen as a problem by a number of firms (UDAPE, 1992a, Table 12). 
Indirect evidence of the way in which the New Economic Policy has created 
a favourable environment for export is provided by the perception of the firms 
surveyed that the exchange rate is not a significant obstacle to exporting, nor is 
access to imported machinery and equipment or imported inputs (UDAPE, 
1992a, p.24). This suggests that while the NEP has removed certain disincen-
tives to exports e.g. by providing a more competitive exchange rate and 
reducing bureaucratic procedures, there remain crucial obstacles to increased 
exports on the supply side. 
How effective then have been the various specific measures introduced by the 
Bolivian government in order to promote exports? The most important of these 
have been the Certificado de Reintegro Arancelario (CRA), the Regimen de 
Importacion Temporal para la Exportacion (RITEX), the Free Zones, and the 
creation of the Instituto Nacional de Promotion de Exportaciones (INPEX) (see 
Section III). 
As indicated in Table VI.5, fiscal incentives were not considered an important 
factor in the growth of exports by most firms. The UDAPE report concluded 
that the CRA was only significant for a few products (UDAPE, 1992a, p. 19). 
My survey shows a somewhat more positive view of the CRA, but only six of 
the 25 firms interviewed considered its effect to have been highly positive. 
The Regimen de Importacion Temporal para la Exportacion is another policy 
directly aimed at increasing exports. Table VI.6 indicates the relatively small 
number of firms that have actually exported under the programme since it was 
introduced and the total volume of exports generated and machinery and raw 
materials imported. Exports under the programme accounted for only about 
12.5% of total non-traditional exports between 1990 and 1992. It is also worth 
noting that one firm, producing jewellery, accounted for two-thirds of total 
exports during this period. 
Another mechanism intended to promote exports, the Industrial Free Zones, 
had still not come into operation in mid-1993, three and a half years after the 
relevant decree was issued. Interviews with major manufacturers in Bolivia 
indicated very little interest in the free zone concept, apart from some soft drink 
manufacturers who had taken advantage of the commercial free zones in order 
to import concentrates to use in their production for the domestic market. 
Table VI.6; RITEX Programmes Carried Out, 1990-1993 
No. of Firms Imports ($mn) Exports ($mn) 
1990 7 20.8 20.7 
1991 13 63.0 61.2 
1992 14 10.3 14.1 
1993 1 0.04 0.2 
Total 30 94.1 95.2 
Note: a up to 1/6/93 
Source: MECE. 
INPEX was set up as a joint public-private organisation, began to operate in 
1988, and was intended to be the major vehicle for implementation of the 
government's export promotion plans. However the experience so far has been 
disappointing. Only 49% of exporters surveyed by UDAPE made use of INPEX 
and only a third of the large firms did so (UDAPE, 1992a, Table 9). The 
services offered by INPEX are regarded as inadequate both in quantity and 
quality by exporters (UDAPE, 1992a, p.30). This picture was confirmed by my 
survey which found only two firms (out of 25 total and nine which exported) 
which regarded the creation of INPEX as having had a positive impact. 
Industry Case Studies 
Of the six industries examined in depth in the previous section, five have 
realised some exports during the period since 1985 (see Table VI.7). Of these 
only two, knitting and clothing, show a sustained upward trend, while the other 
three have had fluctuating levels of exports with a decline in the early 1990s. 
Table VI.7: Export Performance of Five Industries, 1985-1992 ($mn.) 
Spinning/ 
Weaving Knitting Clothing Footwear Beer 
1985 0.6 neg neg 0 0.2 
1986 4.8 0.2 0.4 0 0 
1987 6.6 0.1 0.8 neg neg 
1988 2.1 0.7 2.1 neg 0.5 
1989 9.0 2.5 2.4 0.4 0.5 
1990 3.3 3.9 3.0 1.4 1.6 
1991 4.5 5.5 3.2 0.6 2.2 
1992 4.0 6.9 4.0 0.7 0.8 
Notes: neg. - <$50,000 
Source: 1985-91 - Institute Nacional de Estadistica 
1992 - Ministerio de Exportaciones y Competitividad Economica. 
(i) Spinning and Weaving 
Almost all the exports from this sector are of cotton yarn, and there are virtually 
no exports of woven goods. One firm, which was set up in the early 1980s to 
spin locally produced cotton, accounts for the bulk of these exports. The firm 
has been little affected by the trade liberalisation measures, although the change 
in the exchange rate has helped promote exports. The firm has substantial excess 
capacity and therefore has not needed to undertake new investment in order to 
increase exports. The main obstacle to exports is the cost of transport. Quality 
is also a problem in some areas. 
The other firms interviewed in this sector did not have significant exports. 
The main problem which they identified was that their production was not 
internationally competitive either in terms of quality or in terms of price. Lack 
of international competitiveness reflected the technological backwardness of 
much of the industry and the small scale of production. Low volumes were also 
identified as a problem by some firms because of insufficient capacity to fill the 
kind of demands that are standard in the industry internationally. 
(ii) Knitting 
Exports of knitwear are comprised of two types of products, knitted alpaca and 
llama clothing, and cotton knitwear. The former are often produced by artisans 
and exported by marketing firms, while the latter are more likely to be produced 
industrially. There are some manufacturers of alpaca and llama clothing which 
produce on an industrial scale and also export, and one of these was interviewed. 
The other firms surveyed in this industry were producers of cotton and synthetic 
knits. 
Exports of alpaca and llama articles have grown steadily since 1986. The 
major exporter began production before the introduction of the NEP and has 
grown steadily. Some aspects of trade liberalisation have contributed to exports. 
The CRA made it possible to expand production and the trade agreement with 
Peru has reduced the cost of imported alpaca yarn . However, this is clearly an 
example of successful niche marketing and the effect of trade liberalisation in 
expanding exports has been helpful rather than fundamental. 
Exports of cotton and synthetic knitwear have been more unstable. Again one 
firm accounts for the bulk of the exports of these products, although others had 
plans to begin exporting at the time of the interviews in 1993. Unlike the 
situation in woven textiles, deficient quality was not considered a major obstacle 
to exports in this sector. The most frequently mentioned restriction affecting 
exports was finance, particularly the high rate of interest. As in the case of 
alpaca and llama articles, the reduced tariff on imported inputs and the 
introduction of the CRA were regarded as positive in this sector. 
(iii) Clothing 
Exports of clothing have also shown steady growth. The bulk of exports are 
accounted for by one firm which is also the main exporter of cotton knitwear. 
As in the knitwear industry, the most commonly identified obstacle to exports 
is the high cost of capital. Transport costs are also seen as a problem for 
exporters of clothing as is the low level of labour productivity. 
The second most important exporter of clothing exports is a sub-contractor 
for an international clothing company and has made extensive use of RITEX in 
order to import the inputs which it requires, suggesting that in this sector the 
measures to liberalise imported inputs may have had a positive effect, at least 
for some firms. 
(iv) Footwear 
Exports of footwear have evolved in an erratic manner, growing from negligible 
levels to a peak in 1990. This coincided with the trough in terms of local 
production, suggesting that exports may have been made to offset the depressed 
state of local demand. At present the bulk of Bolivian shoe exports are accounted 
for by one firm which is not the leading manufacturer. 
The major obstacles identified for exports of footwear are high interest rates 
and the low level of labour productivity. There is also evidence of problems with 
the quality and the availability of raw materials for the shoe industry (PREALC, 
1989, p.33) and more then two-thirds of the inputs used for exports of leather 
shoes are imported (UDAPE, 1992a, Table 6). 
(v) Beer 
Exports of beer grew from negligible levels to over US$2 million in 1991, but 
fell back to under $1 million in 1992. The bulk of exports go to neighbouring 
countries, but there has also been an effort to take advantage of the growing 
market for exotic beer in the United States. As in most of the other sectors 
considered, one firm accounts for the lion's share of exports, although exports 
account for less than 5% of its total production. 
Transport costs are a major factor limiting exports of beer. Bolivian beer has 
to compete with Mexican beer in the USA at a considerable disadvantage. 
Furthermore, some firms were unable to export because they did not produce 
their product in appropriate containers (cans or non-returnable bottles). 
The reduction in import duties on imported inputs has not been an important 
factor in this industry since the main firms were able to import duty free before 
trade was liberalised. The CRA was, however, regarded as having a significant 
positive effect on exports and its replacement by the Drawback was seen as a 
negative factor. Also the breweries were the only firms amongst those 
interviewed that thought that INPEX had a favourable effect on exports. 
(vi)Soft Drinks 
Because of high transport costs relative to the value of the product, non-
alcoholic beverages constitute virtually a non-tradable good, and there have been 
no significant exports from Bolivia. An added factor in the case of manufactur-
ers producing well-known international brands was that under the terms of their 
franchise they were only permitted to sell in the domestic market. 
A number of additional features, which were not evident from the statistical 
analysis, emerge from the detailed consideration of these industries. First, 
exports are highly concentrated in a few firms, indeed often the bulk of exports 
from a particular industry are accounted for by a single firm, making exports at 
the industry level highly dependent on the decisions of one producer. 
Secondly, in some industries exports have not grown in a sustained way, but 
can rather fluctuate on a year-to-year basis. This is consistent with a study of 
317 exporting firms which found that only 29% of them exported in all five 
years during the period 1988 to 1992 (INE, 1993). Furthermore, of the firms 
which did export continuously during the period, only five firms showed 
continuous year-on-year growth. 
Thirdly, the various government policies designed to promote exports have 
not in general been a major factor in export performance, although some firms 
did regard the CRA as a significant incentive. 
The general picture which emerges is one where very few firms have re-
oriented their activities towards competing internationally and have made a 
serious long-term commitment to exports. Although for some firms, trade 
liberalisation may have eased the path to exporting, the effect has been relatively 
minor. Major obstacles to increasing exports of manufactures still exist on the 
supply side, particularly low productivity, inadequate quality, and high transport 
costs. What is more, one aspect of the New Economic Policy, high interest 
rates, also constitutes an obstacle to successful exporting. 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the level of Bolivian exports of manufactures has 
increased significantly since the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 
1985. There is some evidence that the rate of growth of such exports has also 
increased, although there have been substantial variations in growth from year 
to year. However, on the evidence presented above, trade liberalisation has not 
had a major direct impact on manufactured exports. Neither the arguments 
concerning the elimination of an anti-export bias nor those based on greater 
access to imported inputs receive empirical support in the Bolivian case. 
On the other hand, there is strong evidence that better export performance has 
been associated with a more competitive REER and with a more stable real 
exchange rate. This is hardly surprising since the overvalued and - perhaps even 
more importantly - highly unpredictable exchange rate up to 1985 was a major 
disincentive to exporters. However, this is a reflection primarily of the reform 
of the exchange rate system, through the introduction of the Bolsin and the 
operation of a kind of crawling peg, rather than a consequence of the changes 
in commercial policy. 
As was argued above, there appears to be little direct relation between the 
trade liberalising aspects of the NEP and export performance. Further evidence 
that trade liberalisation is not a major factor in the growth of exports is the 
limited use made by firms of the various free trade regimes which have been 
legislated for by the Bolivian government. 
The success of the Bolivian government in increasing exports also needs to 
be qualified in a number of respects. First, growth has been concentrated on 
primary and semi-processed products, while exports of products which involve 
a high degree of local processing have stagnated. Secondly, exports have been 
mainly concentrated on Latin American markets, particularly neighbouring 
countries, and do not necessarily indicate that Bolivian goods have acquired 
wider international competitiveness. Thirdly, there has not been any significant 
diversification of exports, which continue to come mainly from a very limited 
number of industries. Fourthly, the number of firms which have displayed a 
serious commitment to exports is extremely small. 
While the growth of exports cannot be attributed to trade liberalisation, these 
weaknesses in Bolivia's export structure may well be linked in part to the trade 
reforms. These have led to the concentration of manufactured exports on a few 
commodities with relatively low levels of processing, in which Bolivia enjoys 
a resource-based comparative advantage. As a result, exports have failed to 
dynamise the economy through the incorporation of increased value added and 
backward and forward linkages. 
The Bolivian experience contrasts markedly with that of other countries which 
have successfully expanded exports by a more 'dirigiste' strategy, such as South 
Korea, Taiwan or even Chile. These countries have sought to anticipate 
comparative advantage, by intervening both to promote exports and to protect 
infant industries with a view to becoming internationally competitive. Particu-
larly in the East Asian countries, liberalisation followed the creation of 
internationally competitive firms and industries. In contrast, the Bolivian 
strategy has sought to remove certain obstacles to exports, hoping that this will 
encourage the emergence of internationally competitive production, while 
remaining neutral as far as the type of export is concerned. The result is that 
although exports have grown, they have failed to become a dynamising factor 
for the economy as a whole. 
VII: THE LIMITATIONS OF 
BOLIVIAN TRADE LIBERALISATION 
Introduction 
So far a number of key aspects of trade liberalisation in Bolivia have been 
examined. In this concluding section the discussion is broadened to an overall 
evaluation of the success of trade liberalisation and its relation to other parts of 
the reform package introduced in Bolivia in 1985. I first discuss the initial 
conditions facing Bolivia when the NEP was introduced and the key features of 
the design and implementation of the trade policy reforms. These are related to 
the discussion of some of the lessons which have been drawn from other studies 
of trade liberalisation. The conclusions of this study concerning the impact of 
trade liberalisation on the performance of the Bolivian manufacturing sector 
which emerge from the earlier chapters are then summarised. This is followed 
by an attempt to explain why, in the light of Bolivia's apparent 'success' in 
introducing and sustaining trade reform, it has not been more successful in terms 
of economic performance. Finally, it is suggested that an alternative policy 
package to the wholesale liberalisation actually applied might have had more 
beneficial effects. 
The Conditions for 'Successful' Trade Liberalisation 
There is now a growing literature concerning the conditions under which trade 
liberalisation is likely to be successful (Thomas, Nash and Associates, 1991; 
Michaely et al, 1991). In this context the 'success' of trade policy reform is 
defined primarily in terms of its sustainability. Trade reforms which are 
reversed within a relatively short period of time are by definition unsuccessful. 
A number of factors are seen to determine the likely success of trade 
liberalisation. The initial conditions under which liberalisation occurs are 
particularly important. It might be expected that favourable initial conditions in 
terms of inflation and the balance of payments would be more conducive to 
successful trade reform than a situation of economic crisis. However, Michaely 
et al (1991, Ch.4) conclude that liberalisation introduced under conditions of 
'distress' are likely to be more intense and therefore are more likely to survive 
than those introduced under somewhat less unfavourable conditions. 
It has also been pointed out that long periods of stability make reform 
difficult. A radical policy change often occurs where there is a sharp change of 
political regime or a very severe external crisis. Such a crisis not only discredits 
existing policies, but also facilitates reform because falling incomes prevent a 
flood of imports when restrictions are removed (Thomas, Nash and Associates, 
1991, Ch.4). 
This suggests that the very severe economic crisis in Bolivia which preceded 
the introduction of the New Economic Policy was paradoxically a factor 
favouring trade liberalisation. Moreover, the fact that it was introduced by a 
new government within a few weeks of coming to office, and represented a 
sharp break with the previous thirty years of Bolivian economic policy also 
contributed to the sustainability of the reforms. It is certainly striking that those 
groups which would normally oppose liberalisation, particularly industrialists 
and organised labour, were forced to acquiesce to the government's policy. It 
is hard to imagine that this could have occurred, had it not been for the 
economic and social dislocation caused by hyperinflation in 1985. 
In addition to the initial conditions, the design and implementation of trade 
reform is also likely to influence its success. Although there is still some debate 
concerning aspects of trade reform such as the relative merits of a 'shock' vis-a-
vis 'gradualism' and the appropriate sequencing of reforms, advocates of 
liberalisation have suggested a number of broad rules which should be followed 
in the design of trade policy reform (Michaely et al, 1991, Ch.16). 
First, it is advisable to start with a strong initial move, such as dismantling 
quantitative restrictions on imports. This will give a clear signal that the 
government is serious about liberalisation. It should then be followed by 
reductions in tariffs which should be pre-announced with the largest reductions 
on the highest tariffs. The initial move to remove quotas should be accompanied 
by a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate, after which a relatively stable 
Real Effective Exchange Rate should be maintained. 
Specific measures to promote exports are not regarded as necessary when 
import restrictions are removed and devaluation takes place, nor is a separate 
stage of export promotion, preceding import liberalisation, required (Michaely 
et al, 1991, Ch. 16). Some advocates elaborate on this, emphasising the need for 
an efficient system to provide exporters with rapid and reliable access to inputs 
at prices no higher than world market prices (Thomas, Nash and Associates, 
1991, Ch. 6). 
There is general agreement that where inflation is high, stabilisation must 
either precede or accompany trade liberalisation. Macroeconomic stability 
during the period of liberalisation is seen as a key necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for successful trade policy reform. 
How did Bolivia's trade reform match up against these recommendations? 
The introduction of the NEP in August 1985 certainly represented a strong 
opening step in liberalisation. As was seen in Section III, quantitative restric-
tions were abolished and the first steps to reduce tariffs were included in DS 
21060. A year later all tariffs were unified at 20% and a policy of further 
reductions to a level of 10% was announced. 
The adoption of the NEP was accompanied by a massive devaluation of the 
boliviano and the establishment of a crawling peg system which, as was seen in 
section VI, kept the REER roughly stable. There was also a strong stabilisation 
policy which brought the rate of inflation down to less than 20% a year. 
Macroeconomic stability has been maintained throughout the period and the 
inflation rate was brought down to single figures by 1993. 
In 1987 the Bolivian government did introduce an export incentive, the CRA, 
although this was regarded as unnecessary by some advocates of liberalisation. 
As was seen in the last Chapter this in fact helped to reduce the continuing bias 
against exports of manufactured goods. However this was seen by the World 
Bank and the IMF as an export subsidy, and they brought pressure to bear on the 
Bolivian government to replace the CRA by a Drawback system at a signifi-
cantly lower rate. Thus, apart from a brief period at the end of the 1980s, there 
was little additional incentive to exporters. The government did, however, 
attempt to provide access to imported inputs at world prices for exporters 
through the RITEX and to establish industrial free zones, although as was seen 
above these were relatively little used. 
Thus in terms of the initial circumstances in which trade liberalisation was 
introduced, the conditions in Bolivia were propitious. Even more significantly, 
the design and implementation of the trade reforms were very much in line with 
what is recommended by leading advocates of liberalisation. The Bolivian trade 
reforms have been sustained now for almost a decade, and the process of 
liberalisation has been extended during this period. In these terms, therefore, 
Bolivia can be regarded as an example of successful trade liberalisation. 
Trade Liberalisation and Economic Performance in Bolivia 
The present study has been concerned not with the success of trade policy 
reform in the narrow sense of the sustainability of liberalisation, but rather in 
terms of economic performance. In particular, it has focused on the extent to 
which the expected benefits from trade liberalisation have been achieved in 
Bolivia. This has been addressed in the context of the manufacturing sector, in 
the belief that a dynamic industrial sector is an important element in successful 
economic performance. 
Section IV examined the extent to which trade liberalisation has been 
associated with changes in resource allocation in Bolivia. Although the 
manufacturing sector recovered from the depth of the crisis after 1985, and 
increased its share of GDP, it was concluded that in the longer term there has 
been a slight shift in resources away from manufacturing. However, broad 
sectoral aggregates disguise many of the changes in resource allocation which 
have taken place, so that it was necessary to look at changes taking place within 
the manufacturing sector. 
As expected, resources were reallocated out of import-competing industries 
and into exportables and non-tradable good industries. This reflected a decline 
in production in import-competing industries rather than significant expansion 
in either of the other two categories over the longer term. Indeed, with only 
isolated exceptions, there was very little evidence of substantial new investments 
in the manufacturing sector. 
What was more surprising was the fact that, because import-competing 
industries were relatively labour-intensive, relative to export industries and 
particularly non-traded goods, there was a shift in the composition of output 
away from labour-intensive industries towards capital-intensive ones. In other 
words the expected benefits in terms of additional employment as a result of 
changes in the composition of output following trade liberalisation were not 
forthcoming. 
In any case the advocates of trade liberalisation place more emphasis on the 
dynamic gains than on questions of static resource allocation. Here a central 
issue is the impact of trade reform on productivity performance. As was seen in 
Section V, while there is some evidence of a significant once and for all increase 
in labour productivity after 1985, this is probably due to the shake-out of 
workers made possible by the changes in labour legislation at that time rather 
than being a result of trade reform. 
Of the mechanisms which it is claimed link trade liberalisation to productiv-
ity, there is no evidence to support the view that either increased competition or 
increased availability of imported inputs played an important role. The only 
mechanism which did potentially contribute to productivity growth was through 
increased output which would enable firms to take advantage of economies of 
scale. However, the overall impact of trade liberalisation on production is 
ambiguous since it leads to increased production in some industries and 
reductions in others. Moreover there is no clear link between trade liberalisation 
and rationalisation which would lead to an increase in firm size. Indeed there is 
some evidence that the average size of firms in Bolivian manufacturing since 
1985 has contracted. 
Another link which is often made between trade liberalisation and economic 
performance involves the growth of exports. Section V analysed Bolivian 
manufactured exports and concluded that the main factor which has led to 
improved export performance has been a more competitive and more stable Real 
Effective Exchange Rate. Import liberalisation has not had a significant effect 
on exports and few firms have taken advantage of the special temporary import 
regime for exporters (RITEX). Export incentives may have had some effect on 
the growth of exports in the late 1980s, but the reduction and subsequent 
withdrawal of the CRA has undermined this effort. 
It was also noted that there has been a significant shift in the composition of 
Bolivian non-traditional exports away from more highly processed products 
towards unprocessed and semi-processed exports. Very few exporters are 
internationally competitive and the bulk of exports of manufactured goods are 
to regional markets. Moreover, many exporters tend to do so only on a one-off 
basis and have not made the necessary investment to become long-term 
exporters. 
This suggests that although Bolivia has been successful in the narrow sense 
of having designed and implemented a sustainable trade liberalisation package, 
in the more fundamental sense of the impact of the package on economic 
performance, trade liberalisation has been a failure. This is part of a more 
general paradox. Why, after pursuing neo-liberal policies for almost a decade, 
is the Bolivian economy struggling, with GDP per capita barely growing and 
still well below pre-crisis levels? 
The Limitations of Trade Policy Reform in Bolivia 
There are a number of possible explanations which could be advanced to explain 
this failure. All of these focus to a greater or lesser extent on the lack of an 
adequate supply response to the changes in incentives brought about by trade 
liberalisation. 
First, it might be argued that the liberalisation of trade has not been 
implemented vigorously enough or that other policy reforms which are needed 
to support trade liberalisation have not been carried out and that in order to elicit 
the necessary supply response, further reforms are required. However, in view 
of the very thorough-going reforms introduced under the NEP and subsequently, 
this is not very convincing. 
A second line of argument is to suggest that the trade reforms have lacked 
credibility. There is evidence from Argentina that firms may delay responding 
to reforms for up to 20 months where they are sceptical over the viability and 
duration of the reforms (Petrei and de Melo, 1985). This can lead to perverse 
effects - for example, where goods are imported in anticipation of a subsequent 
return to trade controls. 
While this may have been a problem during the early stages of the Bolivian 
NEP, it is difficult to argue that a policy which has been sustained for almost ten 
years is lacking in credibility. In these circumstances, causation is more likely 
to go from the failure of trade reform to deliver the goods in terms of increased 
growth, productivity and exports to the eventual undermining of credibility, than 
the other way round. 
Structuralists have always argued that the Latin American economies have 
been characterised by supply rigidities and bottlenecks. The neoclassical view 
of efficient free markets with high elasticities of supply and of substitution is a 
long way from the reality of Bolivian markets. Thus, a third argument is that 
numerous bottlenecks have acted to constrain the supply response to policy 
reform. In this context one widely cited bottleneck is in transport which is often 
referred to as an obstacle to exports (see Section VI) and as a constraint on 
increased investment (Mireau-Klein et al, 1992, Table 10). 
Since resources are not fungible between different economic activities, the 
low level of investment is clearly central to the inadequate supply response of 
Bolivian manufacturing (see Section V). Although in the short-run there is some 
scope for increased production and productivity from higher levels of capacity 
utilisation, in the long term this depends on investment to expand and modernise 
plants. Similarly, export expansion requires investment to produce products of 
international quality and to develop foreign markets, and cannot be based simply 
on switching production from the domestic to overseas markets. 
What then are the major constraints to increased investment in Bolivian 
manufacturing? A survey of 59 manufacturing firms in 1991 found that the high 
cost and restricted availability of credit was the major constraint on investment 
(Mireau-Klein et al, 1992, Table 8). This is not surprising since interest rates 
on dollar bank loans in Bolivia have been over 20% for most of the period since 
1985. Moreover, bank credits have tended to go disproportionately to firms 
which are linked to the banks through cross-directorships (Mireau-Klein et al, 
1992, Table 9). 
The next two factors, in terms of the proportion of manufacturing firms 
identifying them as a most serious constraint on investment, were insufficient 
domestic purchasing power and pressure from imports and/or smuggling 
(Mireau-Klein et al, 1992, Table 8). These constraints derive at least in part 
from the trade liberalisation itself, which has led to a contraction in demand for 
domestic producers in many areas. 
A further factor which ranked highly for exporting firms, but was less 
significant for domestic market-oriented manufacturing firms was inadequate 
infrastructure. As indicated above, the most frequently mentioned aspect of 
infrastructure was transport, particularly to foreign markets and to a lesser 
extent to domestic markets (Mireau-Klein et al, 1992, Table 10). 
These constraints on investment derive to a large extent from the structural 
adjustment policies which have been pursued by the Bolivian government since 
1985. Low levels of investment in the aftermath of trade liberalisation is not 
unique to Bolivia. It seems to have been a particular problem in the low-income 
countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa (Thomas et al, 1991, Table 3.6), and has 
also occurred in some other Latin American countries which have liberalised 
such as Uruguay (Fanelli et al, 1992). 
This suggests that there are inherent contradictions in the policies pursued. 
The most obvious of these relates to the high real interest rates which are 
brought about by financial liberalisation. Although these are sometimes regarded 
as transitory following a period of high inflation, this transitory period has been 
extremely long drawn out in the Bolivian case. As a result, the World Bank is 
now emphasising the need for further reform of the financial sector in order that 
interest rates can be brought down. However, it is possible that interest rates 
will remain high and that investment will be concentrated on activities such as 
trade and real estate which give a much quicker return than manufacturing.28 
The inadequate infrastructure identified by many firms as a constraint is 
partly a long-term consequence of Bolivia's underdevelopment. However, 
structural adjustment policies may well have intensified the problem. Although 
initially public investment increased from the very low levels of the crisis, it fell 
in the late 1980s and remains well below the levels of the early 1980s (UDAPE, 
1992b, Table 3.9.1). Thus, the need to reduce public expenditure generally has 
constrained investment in infrastructure. 
In the Bolivian case the problem is not one of 'crowding out' of private 
investment but, because of the complementarity between public investment in 
infrastructure and private investment, low levels of public investment tend to 
have a knock-on effect on the private sector. This is a second way in which 
structural adjustment policies which accompanied trade liberalisation have 
impeded the supply response which is required if trade reform is to be 
successful. 
A final factor which has contributed to the inadequate supply response from 
manufacturing has been a tendency for the 'rules of the game' to change. The 
stability and predictability of incentives is important in the face of the irrevers-
ibility of investment decisions (Rodrik, 1992). One of the complaints of firms 
in the Bolivian survey previously quoted was that changes in taxes and export 
incentives have had a negative effect on the climate for investment. This is 
particularly true in the case of investment for exports. While a major source of 
uncertainty has been removed as a result of the new exchange rate policy, 
frequent changes in incentives have partly offset this. 
Conclusion 
This review of the Bolivian experience gives rise to some scepticism concerning 
the advantages of a wholesale policy of liberalisation in a low income country 
such as Bolivia. While some positive steps have been taken, particularly the 
introduction of a more realistic and stable Real Effective Exchange Rate, and the 
dismantling of some highly protected and extremely inefficient sectors, the 
overall results have been disappointing. 
This is not a result of the Bolivian government's failure to implement fully or 
to maintain its trade reforms. As the previous section shows there are a number 
of inherent contradictions in the package of policies which have been applied in 
Bolivia. 
The very rapid, 'full menu' approach to liberalisation, which may indeed 
have contributed to the success in terms of sustainability, has been partly 
responsible for its failure in terms of performance. A more gradual approach, 
involving a number of stages might well have proved more successful. In 
particular the development of some competitive industries before widespread 
liberalisation could have had a more beneficial outcome. 
The experience of other countries which have become successful exporters 
indicates that they developed their exports while still maintaining a protected 
domestic market and that they succeeded in creating internationally competitive 
industries (cf. Sachs quoted in Helleiner, 1990). Similarly, far from liberalising 
financial markets, they kept the financial sector under tight state control and 
used low interest credit to promote export and other activities. 
The type of liberalisation pursued in Bolivia is likely to lead to a return to an 
allocation of resources along the lines of static comparative advantage. Indeed, 
as noted above, there is evidence of this in terms of the changes in the 
composition of non-traditional manufactured exports towards less processed 
goods. Few, if any, of the dynamic gains from trade liberalisation are likely to 
be generated since these depend on creating a dynamic comparative advantage 
in new activities. This in turn can only be achieved through a significant degree 
of state intervention. 
The history of state intervention in Bolivia before 1985 can hardly make one 
optimistic concerning the ability of the Bolivian state to pursue the kind of 
strategic economic interventions that are required. However, the depth of the 
economic crisis of the mid-1980s did, paradoxically, give the Bolivian state 
more room to manoeuvre domestically. It is perhaps regrettable that it chose to 
make use of it in the way that it did. In any case the international room to 
manoeuvre was, and remains, extremely constrained. 
Notes 
1. From the mid-1970s illegal coca exports became an increasingly important 
source of foreign exchange earnings. 
2. There is a substantial literature on the New Economic Policy. See for 
example Morales (1987, 1988a), Antezana (1988), Nogales (1989), Aguirre et 
al (1992). 
3. The ratio of exports plus imports to GDP averaged 53.5% in the period 1975 
to 1979. 
4. This is the equivalent of a reduced form equation since the intermediate 
variables which affect productivity are not included in the analysis. 
5. An exception is the study by Clarke and Kirkpatrick (1991) which found no 
statistically significant relationship between trade liberalisation and the growth of 
imports. 
6. See UDAPE (1990a) for a summary of the findings of a number of these 
studies. 
7. This involves breaking down non-tradable inputs into their tradable and non-
tradable components and including the non-tradable component in the value added 
on which protection is calculated. 
8. It is particularly difficult to draw conclusions from changes in the share of 
agriculture in GDP since this depends on the level of agricultural output and this 
is affected by weather conditions in the year concerned. 
9. Industries were defined as producing exportables when exports accounted for 
over 10% of gross production in 1988, importables when imports represented 
more than 10% of imports plus production. All other industries were treated as 
non-tradables. In one case, sugar refining (3118), although the export ratio was 
slightly below 10% in 1988, the industry was considered as producing 
exportables because over the period as a whole, it was a leading export sector. 
10. Imported inputs accounted for 29% of the value of production for industries 
producing import competing goods, 8% for non-tradables and 1% for exportables 
in 1989 (author's calculation from INE data). 
11. If Base Metals (3720), the industry which bore the brunt of the deterioration 
in the terms of trade in 1985-6, is excluded, output of exportables rose very 
slightly between 1978 and 1991, but still by considerably less than production of 
non-tradables. 
12. Under certain assumptions there is a direct relationship between these two 
indicators such that DRC = 1 4- ERP. This requires ERP to include the effects 
of non-tariff as well as tariff barriers, and for there to be no non-trade price 
distortions. Neither of these assumptions holds in the Bolivian case, so that at 
best the ERP measure is a crude proxy for DRC. Despite these qualifications 
ERP may provide a useful indicator at least of the ranking of industries according 
to their DRCs. For a discussion of the DRC concept and its relation to ERP, see 
Greenaway and Milner, 1993, Ch.6. 
13. Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient was -0.464 for 1978-91 and -0.143 
for 1985-91. 
14. Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient was 0.503 for 1978-91 and 0.539 
for 1985-91. 
15. Figures in brackets are t-statistics. 
16. One industry, oil refining (3530), was excluded because its extremely high 
capital-intensity relative to the rest of Bolivian manufacturing industry would 
have severely distorted the results. 
17. The estimated regression equations for the 1978-91 period were: 
GROWTH - -7.02 • 0A2KINT* • 0.02PROT Adj R2 » 0.14 
(-2.87) (2.61) (0.31) 
while for the 1985-91 period, it was: 
GROWTH = -2.55 • 0AZKINT* • 0.06PROT Adj R2 = 0.07 
(-0.55) (2.07) (0.61) 
18. For the 33 industries covered in Table IV.2, the value-added measure of 
capital intensity was 22.0 for importables, 30.7 for exportables and 45.8 for non-
tradables. The electricity measure gave a similar ranking with 1.14 for 
importables, 1.29 for exportables and 2.01 for non-tradables. 
19. For a full discussion of these relationships, see Weiss (1984). 
20. Since data on capacity utilisation in manufacturing is only available from 
1982 onwards, the level of capacity utilisation in earlier years was estimated from 
the deviation of the index of manufacturing output (INVOFIM) above or below 
its trend rate of growth. 
21. The Camara National de Industrias (CNI) data base is known as the Sistema 
de Information Industrial Privado and is referred to henceforth as CNI, SUP. 
22. An interesting question is how the beer industry has been able to finance 
such large investments in recent years when other industries have suffered severe 
financial constraints. The buoyant domestic market has helped in keeping profit 
margins relatively high in the industry. It is also widely rumoured that drug 
money is involved in the industry. 
23. The deterioration in the international competitiveness of non-traditional 
exports as a result of changes in incentives in 1991 have also been commented 
upon in two other studies which have used different methodologies (see UDAPE, 
1990b; Pinell Siles, 1993). 
24. This parallels the finding in Section IV that trade liberalisation has been 
accompanied by a shift in resource allocation towards relatively capital intensive 
industries, and that contrary to the prediction of the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem, 
Bolivian exportables were more capital intensive than import competing sectors. 
25. In both cases the significance of the capital intensity variable was slightly 
reduced when the protection variable was included in the equation. 
26. Capacity utilisation in the fiscal year 1987-8 was used as this was the first 
year for which data at the 4-digit level could be obtained. The data was taken 
from the Camara Nacional de Industrias, Sistema de Information Industrial 
Privado. 
27. The remainder of this section draws on three main sources. The first is a 
general survey of 70 exporters and potential exporters carried out by UDAPE in 
1992. The second is my own interviews with 25 firms in the textile and beverages 
industries undertaken in 1993. Finally it also draws on data from an INPEX 
survey of the obstacles to exports faced by sixteen textile firms carried out in 
1989. 
28. A third of the manufacturing firms surveyed in 1991 indicated that the length 
of the pay-back period from investment was a 'most serious* problem 
constraining investment. 
APPENDIX: 
SURVEY OF MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
Introduction 
Some of the expected responses to trade liberalisation which take place at the 
firm level are difficult to identify from aggregate or industry level data. These 
firm- and plant-level responses involve such things as the introduction of new 
technology, changes in the organisation of production, the introduction of new 
or improved products, or efforts to develop new markets. 
In order to discover the extent of such changes within Bolivian manufactur-
ing, interviews were carried out with managers in 25 Bolivian firms in May and 
June 1993. In most cases, one of the firm's plants was also visited so that any 
changes in production could be observed visually. 
Rather than select a random sample of manufacturing firms, it was decided 
to concentrate on two three-digit industries: beverages (313) and textiles (321). 
These industries were chosen because they represented two very different 
situations. Beverages have grown rapidly and increased their share of manufac-
turing value added, while textiles have been one of the sectors worst hit, first by 
the economic crisis and then by competition from imports. 
Four four-digit industries which accounted for the bulk of production within 
the two three-digit industries were then selected. These were beer (3133), soft 
drinks (3134), spinning, weaving and finishing (3211) and knitting (3213). As 
was seen in Section V, production in these four industries has shown very 
different patterns over the past decade. 
No attempt was made to select a random sample of firms within each of these 
four industries. In some industries, particularly soft drinks and knitting, there 
are a large number of small producers and such a procedure would have been 
extremely time consuming. Since the main objective of the survey was to 
understand the effects of trade policy reform on production and trade, it was 
legitimate to concentrate on the firms which accounted for the bulk of output. 
This inevitably meant that it was not possible to address some interesting 
questions such as the differential effects of trade liberalisation on different kinds 
of firms, but this was not the main aim of the research. The firms interviewed 
therefore include most of the major producers in the four industries. As Table 
A.l indicates, three firms were interviewed in the beer industry, five in soft 
drinks, twelve in spinning, weaving and finishing and five in knitting. 
Table A . l : Firms Interviewed 
Firm Location Industry Start Date Employment Control 
1 SCZ 3133/4 1952 300 Ind 
2 LPZ 3133 1886 600 Group 
3 CBB 3133 1895 500 Group 
4 LPZ 3134 1920 630 Ind 
5 LPZ 3134 1888 600 Group 
6 SCZ 3134 1976 192 Group 
7 LPZ 1334 1953 160 Group 
8 SCZ 3134 1978 70 Group 
9 CBB 3211 1969 420 Ind 
10 LPZ 3211 1953 350 Group 
11 LPZ 3211 n.a 200 Group 
12 LPZ 3211 1923 190 n.a 
13 SCZ 3211 1968 186 Group 
14 SCZ 3211 1981 170 State 
15 LPZ 3211 1959 120 Group 
16 SCZ 3211 1969 100 Group 
17 LPZ 3211 1948 100 Group 
18 LPZ 3211 1982 87 Group 
19 LPZ 3211 1991 72 Group 
20 CBB 3211 1965 40 Group 
21 LPZ 3213 1984 170 Ind 
22 LPZ 3213 1978 160 Group 
23 LPZ 3213 1967 150 Group 
24 LPZ 3213 1973 102 Ind 
25 LPZ 3213 n.a 65 Group 
Notes: Control: Group - part of a multi-firm group 
Ind - independent firm 
Location: LPZ - La Paz 
SCZ - Santa Cruz 
CBB - Cochabamba 
Source: Personal interviews. 
Firms' Perceptions of the Impact of Trade Policy Reform 
In order to assess the impact of different aspects of the trade policy changes 
introduced in Bolivia after 1985, firms were questioned regarding the impact of 
a number of key policies on their activities. On the import side, the policies 
considered were the changes in tariffs on imported inputs, on imports of 
machinery and equipment, and on imports of finished goods competing with the 
firm's own production, and changes in non-tariff barriers. On the export side, 
interviewees were asked their opinion of the Certificado de Reintegro Arancel-
ario (CRA) which gave exporters a 10% tax rebate; its replacement by the 
Drawback which reduced the rebate to between 2% and 4% for manufactured 
goods; the system of temporary imports for exporters (RITEX); the free trade 
zones (FTZs); and the assistance given to exporters by the Instituto Nacional de 
Promotion de Exportaciones (INPEX). Finally, firms were questioned about the 
impact of simplification of the bureaucratic procedures involved in importing 
and exporting (tramites) and the change in the foreign exchange system as a 
result of the introduction of the Bolsin and the adoption of a crawling peg. 
The responses of the firms were scored for each policy instrument on a scale 
from -2 for very negative to +2 for very positive. Table A.2 indicates the 
average score for each policy for all firms and for each of the four industry 
groups. Perhaps the most striking feature of the table is that, overall, trade 
reform is not perceived by the firms interviewed to have had very much impact 
on their activities. The only aspect of government policy to emerge with an 
unambiguously significant positive effect (a score of over +1) is exchange rate 
policy, involving a steady gradual devaluation to maintain a roughly stable real 
exchange rate. Another area which was regarded fairly positively was the 
simplification of the bureaucratic procedures involved in importing and 
exporting. 
The export incentives provided by the CRA were mentioned positively by 
some firms, while a number of firms also felt that the reduced tariff duty on 
imported capital goods was beneficial, although two firms felt that they were 
better off with the exemptions that used to be granted under investment laws 
prior to 1985. 
Only two aspects of the policy reforms were regarded as negative on balance. 
First, a number of firms had been hit by the reduction in protection for the goods 
which they produced, although overall the assessment of the negative impact 
was not overwhelming. The second negative effect was felt to be the replace-
ment of the CRA by a drawback system which considerably reduced the 
incentives for exporters. 
These generalisations need to be qualified somewhat for each of the four-digit 
industries identified. The beer companies had the most positive overall 
evaluation of the programme, and regarded the impact of the reduced tariff on 
capital goods, the CRA, simplification of the bureaucracy and the role played 
by INPEX particularly favourably. Interestingly, this was the only industry in 
which it was felt that the government export promotion agency INPEX was a 
positive factor. Perhaps surprisingly, the foreign exchange system was not 
regarded as a major positive factor. 
Table A.2; Firms' Perceptions of Impact of Trade Policy Reforms on their Activities 
3133 3134 3211 3213 Total 
Tariff 1 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.28 
Tariff 2 1.00 0.60 0.25 0.60 0.48 
Tariff 3 0.00 0.00 -0.83 -0.60 -0.52 
NTBs 0.00 -0.20 0.08 0.40 0.08 
CRA 1.33 0.00 0.25 1.40 0.56 
Drawback -1.00 0.00 -0.25 -0.60 -0.36 
RITEX 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.40 0.20 
FTZs 0.0 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 
INPEX 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 
Bureaucracy 1.33 1.20 0.58 ^ 0.60 0.80 
Foreign Exchange System 0.67 1.40 1.00 1.20 1.08 
Average 0.42 0.40 0.11 0.40 0.27 
Notes: Firm responses have been qualified as very positive (+2), positive (+1) , no impact 
(0), negative (-1), very negative (-2). 
Tariff 1 - changes in tariffs on imported inputs. 
Tariff 2 - changes in tariffs on machinery and equipment. 
Tariff 3 - changes in tariffs on finished products. 
Source: Personal interviews. 
The soft drinks industry is in some ways the least affected by the policy 
changes, since it has neither benefited from measures to promote exports, since 
the industry does not export, nor suffered from the liberalisation of imports 
which are negligible. However, it has benefited somewhat from measures which 
have reduced the costs of imports of its inputs and machinery, including the 
simplification of paper work and the greater predictability of the exchange rate. 
This industry has also benefited somewhat from the creation of the free trade 
zones which has enabled them to keep imported concentrates in the zones and 
only pay duty on them as they are withdrawn from the warehouse for use in the 
plant. 
Not surprisingly the spinning, weaving and finishing industry has the least 
positive overall evaluation of the trade reforms. Although some measures such 
as the foreign exchange regime and the reduction in bureaucracy are viewed 
favourably, the reduction in protection on finished products has had a negative 
effect. Interestingly the knitting industry has a rather more positive assessment 
of the impact of the reforms, although it also shares the negative view of the 
impact of liberalisation of imports of competing products. It has, however, the 
most positive evaluation of the reductions in tariffs on imported inputs which 
have to some extent offset the negative impact on effective protection. Since 
there are a number of exporters in this industry, it shares the positive view of the 
CRA and the negative view of its replacement by the drawback system which 
was found in the beer industry. 
Changes in Production, Technology, Investment and Organisation 
In order to try to evaluate the responses of firms to trade liberalisation, they 
were also asked about major changes which had taken place within the firm 
since the mid-1980s. In terms of investment, firms were asked to indicate 
whether there had been no, little, average or substantial investment to expand 
and to modernise capacity since 1985. Responses were ranked on a scale from 
0 (none) to 3 (substantial). 
As Table A.3 indicates, there were major differences between industries. The 
beer industry made substantial investments both to expand and modernise their 
capacity. The soft drinks industry showed less substantial investment than beer. 
This was a result of a mixed picture, with substantial investment in capacity 
expansion and modernisation by two Coca Cola franchisees, but little investment 
among the other firms interviewed. The predominant picture in the spinning, 
weaving and finishing industry was of very little investment, with a couple of 
exceptions, while in knitting there was considerable investment in capacity 
expansion but very little evidence of modernisation. 
Table A.3: Changes in Production since 1985 
Expansion Modernise Technology Organisation 
3133 2.33 2.33 1.33 0.33 
3134 1.60 1.40 0.80 0.60 
3211 0.83 0.83 0.33 0.33 
3213 2.60 1.40 0.80 0.80 
Total 1.52 1.24 0.64 0.48 
Notes: Investment to expand or modernise plant ranked on a scale from 0 (none) to 3 
(substantial). 
Change in technology and organisation ranked on a scale from 0 (none) to 2 
(major). 
Source: Personal interviews. 
In the case of technological and organisational changes, firms were asked 
whether there had been no change, some change or major change and the 
responses were scaled from 0 to 2. The responses to questions on technology not 
surprisingly corresponded quite closely to those on investment in modernisation, 
with significant changes being reported only by 3 firms in the beverages 
industry. Similarly, there was little evidence of organisational changes taking 
place at the plant level, such as the introduction of just-in-time systems or group 
working, although managers at one or two firms were aware of these practices. 
Changes in Trade and Product Strategy 
Response to Import Liberalisation 
Micro-level studies of the response of firms to the economic reforms in the 
southern cone countries of Latin America during the late 1970s and early 1980s 
indicate a number of possible reactions to import liberalisation (Corbo and de 
Melo, 1985). In Argentina and Uruguay it was found that firms introduced new 
products in order to compete with imports. In Chile a somewhat different 
strategy was pursued, with firms becoming more specialised in order to 
concentrate on those product lines in which they could compete with imports, 
and to become more competitive by increasing production runs and reducing 
down-time. This response was not significant in Argentina and Uruguay 
because, it was suggested, redundant protection remained late into the reform 
period. In Argentina and Chile, firms claimed to have improved the quality of 
their products in order to compete with imports. 
In the Bolivian cases there was little evidence of any of these strategic 
responses to the trade reforms. None of the firms interviewed, for example, had 
decided to specialise in a small range of products in order to be better placed vis-
a-vis international competition. Although a number of firms across all four 
industries reported that they had introduced new products since 1985, in none 
of these cases was it seen as a response to competition from imports. 
Similarly, although most firms claimed to have improved the quality of their 
products since 1985, this was not directly attributable to increased competition 
from imports. Indeed it was rather a routine response that the firm was always 
seeking to improve quality and it was difficult to obtain independent verification 
that such improvements had taken place in many cases. 
Another response noted in the southern cone countries was that a number of 
firms had started to import products themselves and to shift out of production. 
This reflected the lack of distribution channels for imports when they have been 
restricted for a long time. Such a response was rare in the Bolivian case. Only 
two firms reported having imported products to complement their locally 
produced product range, and one of these had found that this was not profitable 
and no longer did so. This may reflect the relatively open nature of the Bolivian 
economy compared to those of the southern cone prior to liberalisation, and the 
fact that a widespread, and often informal, distribution network already existed 
for imported products. 
Perhaps surprisingly, despite reduced import duties and easier access to 
foreign exchange, only one firm reported that it had increased its reliance on 
imported inputs since 1985. This is consistent with the finding in Table A.2 that 
changes in tariffs on imported inputs were not perceived as having a significant 
positive effect by the firms interviewed. This probably reflects the fact that 
many of these firms enjoyed exemptions or faced low import duties on their 
inputs even before 1985. 
Export Performance 
Among the southern cone countries, a strong export response by firms was only 
noted in the case of Uruguay in the mid-1970s, but these firms turned back to the 
domestic market in the period 1979-82 (Mezzera and de Melo, 1985). In Chile 
only one import-competing firm attempted to export, but the effort was 
abandoned after four years due to increasing costs (Corbo and Sanchez, 1985). 
In the Bolivian case, although nine out of the 25 firms interviewed reported 
some exports, only two of them exported a significant proportion of their output, 
and both were already exporting before trade was liberalised. With the exception 
of these two firms, which also exported to Europe and North America, the bulk 
of exports went to neighbouring countries in Latin America. Thus there is little 
evidence that firms have so far re-oriented their strategies to international 
markets, although a few firms did report plans significantly to increase their 
exports over the next few years. 
Why has the export performance of the firms interviewed not been more 
impressive in the aftermath of the post-1985 reform of trade policy? A number 
of obstacles to expanding exports were identified, some of which are internal to 
the firm and some external. The most commonly identified external factor 
limiting exports were transport costs which were mentioned by nine of the 25 
firms and by six of the nine firms which had any experience of exporting. It was 
seen as a problem by at least some firms in each of the four industries surveyed. 
As far as internal problems were concerned, a more differentiated pattern 
across industries emerged. A number of firms in the beverages industry (both 
in beer and soft drinks) were unable to export because they did not produce their 
product in appropriate containers (cans or non-returnable bottles). An added 
complication in the case of some soft drinks manufacturers who produced well 
known international brands was that under the terms of their franchise they were 
only permitted to sell in the domestic market. 
A major problem facing a number of firms in the spinning, weaving and 
finishing industry was that their production was not internationally competitive 
either in terms of quality or in terms of price. Lack of international competitive-
ness reflected the technological backwardness of much of the industry and the 
small scale of production. Low volume was also identified as a problem by some 
firms because of insufficient capacity to fill the kind of demand requests that are 
standard in the industry internationally. 
Conclusion 
The overall picture that emerges is that trade liberalisation appears to have had 
few of the dynamic effects anticipated at the firm level. The most obvious 
illustration of this is the soft drinks industry, which is largely a non-traded good 
industry. Despite liberalisation, imports have remained negligible as have 
exports. The main dynamic in the industry has been the growth of the domestic 
market and the struggle for market share. Liberalisation has had a minor effect 
in so far as it has cheapened imported inputs, but this has not led to any major 
change within the industry. 
The beer industry too has been relatively unaffected, with very limited 
imports. The rapid growth of the domestic market has again been the main 
factor leading to considerable investment and technological change. Although 
two of the three companies do export and look favourably on the government's 
measures to promote exports, in aggregate overseas sales are marginal. 
The textile industry has been affected to a much greater extent by trade 
liberalisation. In the area of flat goods, the major effect has been through 
increased competition, both directly from imported fabrics and indirectly as the 
result of the loss of market share by the domestic clothing industry. The result 
has been substantial excess capacity and very little new investment. As a result 
technological and organisational change has been insignificant in most firms. It 
is also important to bear in mind that the firms interviewed were those that had 
survived the trade reforms, and that in the textile industry particularly, a number 
of major firms had in fact closed down. Thus the negative effects of trade 
liberalisation are inevitably underestimated since the impact on such firms is not 
evident from the interviews.1 
The only area in which it is possible to perceive some elements of a positive 
supply response to liberalisation is in the knitting industry. Even here, however, 
the positive developments are at best patchy and have not led to substantial 
technological or organisational change except for one or two cases. 
1 In fact interviews were carried out with the owner and a former manager from the largest textile 
firm in Bolivia, which closed down in 1989. These highlighted the problems created by increased 
competition from imports for a firm which had failed to update its plant and equipment (while it had 
been highly protected) . 
Generally it can be concluded that there was no relation between the extent 
to which firms were subject to international competition and the extent to which 
they adjusted. Growing firms in beverages tended to invest and change more. 
Textile firms often found it difficult to invest and therefore changed very little. 

STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
Table A . l : Data used in Time-series Regressions 
Year GDP MIMP CAPUT REER RERVAR 
(%) 
MfgX MDUTY CRA 
1976 101.8 168.7 n.a n.a n.a 58.0 n.a 0 
1977 107.2 164.9 n.a n.a n.a 47.9 n.a 0 
1978 109.2 192.5 51 29.0 n.a 46.3 9.3 0 
1979 109.5 256.9 50 30.4 n.a 78.6 9.9 0 
1980 106.1 205.6 50 33.7 6.7 119.6 12.3 0 
1981 106.5 264.0 50 45.1 4.4 75.4 11.5 0 
1982 103.1 196.6 47 47.7 39.7 60.9 6.3 0 
1983 98.8 223.7 45 45.0 27.4 34.6 5.9 0 
1984 98.2 152.4 42 58.4 33.3 20.0 0 0 
1985 97.5 231.7 38 100.0 58.1 19.4 32.3 0 
1986 96.0 183.2 42 29.5 8.5 73.6 10.7 0 
1987 98.3 256.1 48 28.4 1.7 73.5 13.0 0 
1988 102.2 185.7 50 27.0 3.9 71.1 15.8 0.87 
1989 105.4 208.3 49 25.9 1.7 142.4 11.6 7.59 
1990 108.2 214.0 50 21.8 2.1 175.2 10.3 7.49 
1992 113.4 286.2 54 22.6 0.3 166.3 7.1 3.4 
1992 117.7 200.4 55 22.0 0.9 176.9 7.1 1.89 
Notes: GDP - Gross Domestic Product in Bs. mn. at 1980 prices 
MIMP - Imports of intermediate inputs and raw materials for industry ($ mn.) 
CAPUT - average annual level of capacity utilisation in manufacturing (%) 
REER - Real Effective Exchange Rate Index (1985 = 100) 
RERVAR - coefficient of variation of monthly Real Exchange Rate 
MfgX - exports of non-traditional manufactures ($mn.) 
MDUTY - import duties paid as % of imports of manufactures 
CRA - value of CRAs issued as % of value of non-traditional exports 
Source: INE; UDAPE; IMF. 
Table A.2: Industry Variables at 4-Digit Level 
CIIU LP87-91 Prod87-91 VA/L CAPUT 4CR 
(%) (%) (%) 
3111 -12.9 -1.2 15.6 59 79.4 
3112 29.3 22.2 33.0 49 91.2 
3113 -1.6 -15.8 9.7 43 100.0 
3115 0.0 7.3 50.5 62 100.0 
3116 11.7 4.4 35.7 41 63.2 
3117 -0.1 6.6 26.5 53 82.5 
3118 20.9 17.5 46.4 33 100.0 
3119 2.6 2.8 9.9 72 90.2 
3121 0.1 2.5 42.5 54 91.6 
3122 -28.8 -9.3 21.0 53 100.0 
3131 n.a 2.7 23.7 38 94.8 
3132 7.5 -3.8 15.2 45 100.0 
3133 4.5 5.6 98.4 27 94.9 
3134 2.7 5.6 25.7 46 47.5 
3140 -7.9 3.9 96.5 70 100.0 
3211 6.2 -5.7 13.6 42 62.2 
3213 31.1 25.9 13.3 52 68.8 
3220 4.4 0.5 13.2 47 81.5 
3240 10.0 4.0 22.3 45 96.9 
3311 n.a -3.1 15.7 49 43.3 
3420 1.1 3.6 22.7 43 64.5 
3511 -7.8 6.4 25.9 42 80.2 
3512 n.a -37.6 10.1 n.a n.a 
3523 23.2 22.0 30.3 42 93.3 
3530 n.a 5.2 1267.7 n.a 100.0 
3559 n.a -4.9 13.8 63 n.a 
3560 -2.5 -7.6 17.2 44 37.9 
3620 -4.2 -3.6 20.7 40 100.0 
3691 n.a 19.0 12.2 55 77.3 
3692 9.7 9.6 55.5 46 96.8 
3699 2.6 5.9 19.5 47 79.8 
3720 12.1 51.1 26.6 43 100.0 
3811 n.a -19.2 4.2 35 100.0 
3819 1.6 5.0 29.3 44 72.4 
Notes: LP87-91 - average annual growth in labour productivity, 1987-91 
Prod87-91 - average annual growth in production, 1987-91 
VA/L - value added per person employed, 1989 ('000 Bs.) 
CAPUT - capacity utilisation, 1987/8 (%) 
4CR - share of largest four plants in industry output, 1989. 
Source: Own elaboration from INE and CNI, SUP data. 
Table A.3: Trade Variables at 4-Digit Level 
CIIU MCOMP DPROT XRATIO EXPGR IMPCONT IMPSHARE 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
3111 0.5 0.0 3.0 -27 5.4 9.0 
3112 22.9 2.9 0.0 0 4.5 8.4 
3113 31.8 -19.1 1.6 1448 32.8 63.1 
3115 13.5 -9.4 12.8 161 18.7 25.2 
3116 14.4 -6.1 8.2 394 45.1 62.1 
3117 0.2 -30.9 0.0 0 8.9 15.2 
3118 1.6 -26.5 9.4 534 0.3 0.8 
3119 47.5 -37.1 5.9 -79 0.3 0.8 
3121 31.8 -4.1 0.0 1028 15.5 39.9 
3122 17.7 9.0 0.0 n.a 30.8 69.0 
3131 8.1 -53.2 0.9 36 0.9 2.8 
3132 37.3 -53.9 0.0 -100 0.0 0.0 
3133 6.3 -13.0 0.7 221816 21.3 62.1 
3134 1.5 -29.5 0.0 13 19.3 45.6 
3140 23.1 1.2 0.1 -100 41.6 81.4 
3211 31.3 -24.2 5.0 -6 32.6 59.8 
3213 37.5 -53.4 2.5 3119 16.7 30.5 
3220 37.5 -77.4 5.6 646 16.5 35.7 
3240 24.0 -40.5 0.1 59681 16.8 53.3 
3311 0.4 -19.3 36.7 115 0.9 2.1 
3420 20.9 1.2 0.0 7373 52.9 99.3 
3511 86.1 -0.2 10.5 650 4.1 25.6 
3512 95.3 4.2 0.0 99 n.a n.a 
3523 45.9 -20.9 0.2 -100 34.7 65.3 
3530 4.5 3.5 1.3 311 0.7 3.0 
3559 81.5 -22.0 1.7 12411 n.a n.a 
3560 58.3 -37.8 0.6 0 49.3 95.3 
3620 23.3 -15.0 0.0 -49 13.0 49.6 
3691 26.7 8.2 0.0 0 0.0 0.1 
3692 9.9 -10.5 0.0 17 3.5 18.4 
3699 25.2 -16.5 0.0 790 9.5 26.4 
3720 4.2 7.2 104.4 81 0.1 0.1 
3811 32.7 -21.0 0.0 -96 9.1 22.3 
3819 32.7 -23.0 7.0 -100 50.3 85.6 
Notes: MCOMP - imports as a share of gross production plus imports, 1988 
DPROT - change in nominal rate of protection, 1982-88 
XRATIO - exports as a share of gross production, 1988 
EXPGR - percentage increase in $ value of exports, 1986-1991 
IMPCONT - ratio of imported inputs to gross production, 1989 
IMPSHARE - share of imported inputs in total inputs, 1989 
Source: Own elaboration from INE data. 
Table A.4: Data for Manufacturing Industries by National Accounts Sectors 
GRNXPRD GREXPOR K/L MSHARE ERP88 DERP 
6 7.20 0.0 10.1 1.6 -4.4 84.8 
7 100.50 0.0 8.0 70.0 7.8 -5.7 
8 23.60 -10.0 9.1 27.2 21.2 43.8 
9 51.10 7.0 6.7 16.1 54.6 59.9 
10 21.00 0.0 21.0 8.5 49.6 -9.6 
11 39.70 77.3 37.6 12.5 19.5 68.9 
12 20.60 0.0 0.0 74.5 13.0 182.7 
13 -124.60 210.0 15.6 32.9 19.9 149.2 
14 -35.00 25.4 6.1 2.5 1.6 144.2 
15 44.40 0.0 10.0 36.5 12.8 63.2 
16 -17.40 79.9 16.5 71.4 13.6 51.2 
18 58.40 50.0 28.2 24.9 18.7 37.4 
20 46.60 11.4 11.8 62.7 11.6 45.8 
21 21.60 50.0 2.8 55.7 6.3 43.6 
Notes: GRNXPRD - % increase in Non-export Production, 1986-91 
GREXPORT - % increase in Exports, 1986-91 
K/L - fixed assets per person employed, 1987-8 ('000 Bs.) 
MSHARE - imports as a share of total inputs, 1988 (%) 
ERP88 - Effective Rate of Protection, 1988 (%) 
DERP - change in Effective Rate of Protection, 1982-88 
Sources: Own elaboration from INE and CNI, SUP data. 
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